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Abstract 
The focus of this thesis is an investigation of the post-privatisation performance of the 
international telecoms sector. Firstly, the general hypothesis (1) of this thesis has been 
pursued, which states that the privatised telecoms companies perform differently from their 
non-privatised (private) counterparts. Several tests were applied; namely, ANOVA, and 
multiple regression analysis. The principal finding was that there was no significant 
difference in performance. 
Secondly, the next hypothesis (2) states that the financial performance of each company is 
positively related to that of the other two selected companies. For this purpose, multiple 
regression tests were performed to investigate any inter-relationships between BT, AT&T 
and NTT. It was found that the performance of each was affected by the other companies. 
Thirdly, the next hypothesis (3) states that, in a global market, company performance is 
related more closely to the sector than to each respective stock market. It was found that 
performance was affected more significantly by their respective stock markets than by 
competitor global players. Fourthly, the next hypothesis (4) states that, in terms of 
competitive advantage, NTT exhibits through time a superior position compared with BT 
and AT&T on account of its monopoly position. It was found that monopoly was not an 
issue. Fifthly, the next hypothesis (5) states that, of the three global players, AT&T is more 
adversely affected in its competitive advantage on account of its having a weaker 
monopoly position. It was found that AT&T had a competitive advantage from 1990 to 
1993. BT took the lead until 2000, then NTT forged ahead after the Japanese market 
started to become more liberalised in terms of competition. Original tests were performed 
regarding the changing degree of competitive advantage of these three companies. This 
required an evaluation of the relationship between competitive advantage and price- 
earnings inverses, capital asset pricing model derived rates of return and dividend-based 
rates of return. A random walk with drift model was also applied, in order to evaluate 
forecasted trends. 
Finally, BT's short-term debt-financing problems were examined. To overcome these 
difficulties, BT raised funds via a rights issue, selling off Yell and other profitable assets 
and de-merged their mobile company. It was found that the strategic risk probability of a 
failed rights issue was quite small. 
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Introduction 
Thesis Outline 
Introduction 
Privatisation is a complex phenomenon, because it covers a variety of organisational 
transformations occurring in diverse and under-researched contexts in terms of analysis, 
development and empirical work. It is also a multidisciplinary phenomenon, studied by 
financial analysts, organisational experts, management consultants, economists, political 
scientists, public administration specialists, and lawyers. In addition, privatisation has 
brought about a major restructuring in the economic, social and political arenas in many 
different countries. Privatisation has increased the role of the private sector through state 
deregulation, economic liberalisation and institution building, which improves the 
functioning of private firms and markets (see Ramamurti, 2000). 
The United States liberalised the long distance telecommunications markets in the 1960s. 
The United Kingdom and Japan followed suit in the 1980s, but neither fully liberalised and 
permitted effective competition. The other countries of the European Union (EU) 
undertook partial liberalisation (of both local and long-distance service) in the late 1990s. 
As a result, the industry remains largely a privatised monopoly, but elsewhere the global 
industry is characterised as largely state-run. 
The shift to competition in all these countries was prompted in part by changes in 
technologies, but more fundamentally by the realisation that users, and the economy in 
general, would benefit greatly from a broader range of services, of higher quality and at 
lower prices, in a competitive environment (Michel et al., 2001). 
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Most of the dramatic changes in telecoms policies have occurred in the past two decades, 
mainly because of the swift changes in the technologies. Many state-owned companies 
have followed the lead of British Telecom to privatise their state-owned telecoms 
companies, further motivated by the rules of the WTO (World Trade Organisation) and 
European Commission. 
This thesis sets out to examine two issues relating to the privatisation of telecoms 
companies. The first issue: is how to compare and contrast the financial performance of the 
fully, the partially privatised and private companies in telecoms. The second issue: is how 
to compare the financial performance of three major companies in the telecoms sector, 
which are chosen to represent the three categories, namely BT (fully privatised), NTT 
(partially privatised) and AT&T (private). 
The general hypothesis 1 states that the privatised telecoms companies perform differently 
from their non-privatised (private) counterparts, given the present contestability. 
In pursuit of this hypothesis, the first issue is addressed by the financial testing of a large 
group of international telecoms companies in order to identify to what extent their financial 
performance differed according to their being privatised or not. The second issue is 
addressed by an in-depth analysis, examining three aspects of performance, namely: (a) the 
degree of interrelationship between the companies; (b) their local stock market 
performance over a set period; and (c) the degree of competitive advantage. 
The thesis approaches the question of privatisation differently from that already chosen by 
most researchers (see chapter 3); the comparisons with pre- and post-privatisation and 
privatisation versus state-ownership have deliberately avoided in this thesis. Instead, the 
choice for study is a comparison of those companies, which were privatised 
fully or 
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partially, with those companies, which were always in the private sector. Note: that when 
the thesis uses the term non-privatised, it means private. 
While it is understood that many theorists have made claims to the effect that there is 
economic efficiency and managerial effectiveness to be gained from the privatisation 
process, the evidence from past research has not been based on a thorough examination of 
financial results (see table 3.1). The purely financial data produced by such companies has 
been inadequately interpreted for support of the claims. This thesis sets out to address this 
deficiency. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. First part is the theoretical part, which contains three 
chapters. The first chapter deals with the literature review of the privatisation issue. The 
second chapter will discuss the importance of ownership and the regulator's role in the 
market. The third chapter will cover the methodologies-related literature in this thesis. 
The second part is divided into three chapters. Chapter Four will deal with global analysis 
of the telecoms companies. Chapter Five will focus on the biggest three telecoms (BT, 
NTT, and AT&T) worldwide. Chapter Six is a continuation of chapter five employing a 
new method of measuring competitive advantage. 
The third part is a reflection chapter in which it looks at the financial performance of the 
three companies in terms of their recent performance and some of the issues arising from 
the current post-boom period in the sector. The question of what effects there are if any, 
regarding the BT's rights issue in May 2001 has been further examined. It has been 
intended draw down some contemporary articles in the news media, which relate to 
comparisons with France Telecom to show that BT was particularly fortuitous in the 
timing of the rights issue. The scope of influence of the regulatory system now being 
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developed through OfCom and its effect on the contestability in the telecoms sector has 
been pointed out in this thesis. The final chapter is the conclusion and deals with an 
overview of the thesis. 
Chapter One 
This chapter will provide a historical overview of the privatisation issue by expressing 
many researchers' views and definitions. Some objectives and aims of privatisation will be 
presented with reasons for privatising BT. 
The privatisation methods will be dealt with and some examples of each one of the 
methods will be provided in Appendix 4. A graph that shows the privatisation process will 
be included with some narrative of the process in Appendix 4. 
Chapter Two 
Chapter Two will discuss the importance of ownership in a comparative manner between 
private and state enterprises. A regulator's roles will be explained with some illustrations 
of the regulation powers. 
Chapter Three 
Chapter Three will deal with the methodologies of this thesis. The previous studies on 
British Telecom are provided to identify the approach of this research. ANOVA tests and 
multiple regression analysis are the main tools in examining chapter 4. Multiple 
regressions and time series analyses will be used in chapters 5 and 
6. 
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Chapter Four 
Chapter Four will examine telecoms companies globally. The numbers of companies vary 
depending on the time of privatisation. Both ANOVA and multiple regression tests will be 
used to measure the financial performance of these companies. A study period of 7 years 
(1995-2001) will be conducted to address the hypothesis 1 that the privatised telecoms 
companies perform differently from their non-privatised (private) counterparts, given the 
present contestability. 
Chapter Five 
The three telecoms companies representing the range in the study are presented in this 
chapter for analysis. These companies are: BT as the one of the leaders in telecoms in 
Europe; NTT is the leader in Japan and most of the Asian telecoms industry, and last, but 
not least is AT&T, which is one of the leaders in telecoms in the north and south American 
market. 
Multiple regression tests will be performed to test whether or not the performance of each 
of the three telecoms companies is related to each other or not. A further test against the 
stock market index in each country is performed. These tests are in part fulfilment of the 
general hypothesis 1: 
H2: The financial performance of each company is positively related to that of the other 
companies. The rationale is that, in the telecoms market, companies would be affected by 
similar technological factors. This can be represented by ß2, ß3 >0 where the financial 
performance of company j at time t is given by f j, t. So, for the first company: 
f i, t =a+ ß2f 2, t+ 
ß3f 3, t 
(Equation 5.1) 
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H3: In a global market, company performance is related more closely to the sector (i. e. 
other respective companies) than each respective stock market. This can be represented by: 
f i, t =a+ 
ß2f 2, t+ 
P43, 
t+Y Fi, t (Equation 5.2) 
Where Fl, t represents the performance of the stock market index of the chosen company 1, 
and the y coefficient is less significant than ß2 and (33. 
A random walk with drift model is used as a forecasting tool to measure the performance 
of each one of these companies for one year ahead. The forecasting period starts April 
2002 to March 2003. 
Finally the return analysis will indicate which of the companies has the better performance 
overalls. The down-side risk measurement will be included to indicate which one of these 
three companies offers a safer investment. 
Chapter Six 
In order to examine the competitive advantage and risk associates with each of the 
companies in the thesis, a new test derived from Pointon's theoretical model for 
competitive advantage has been employed. Different risk premium estimates are used in 
the competitive advantage model. This is in part fulfilment of hypothesis 1: 
H4: In terms of competitive advantage, NTT exhibits through time a superior position 
compared with BT and AT&T on account of its monopoly position. 
H5: Of the three global players, AT&T is more adversely affected, in its competitive 
advantage position, by the other two companies. 
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Chapter Seven 
Chapter Seven is a reflection chapter, which deals with some of the many side issues and 
events, which occurred in the telecoms market over the past few years. The first part will 
be an evaluation of the strategic risk associated with BT's rights issue. 
The second part makes an evaluation and interpretation of the model chosen for the 
analysis in chapter 6. 
The third part reviews the news reportage of the telecoms industry worldwide during the 
most recent period before the thesis was completed. It addresses in particular some 
consideration of the strategies employed by some of the major players. France Telecom's 
rights issue and potential state intervention and re-nationalisation are discussed because 
this is a topical issue. The continuing and possible expanding role for regulation completes 
the chapter. 
Chapter Eight 
Chapter Eight summarises the conclusions and the findings in this thesis. In particular, it 
will indicate that, contrary to the expectations at the beginning of the study, privatised 
companies perform equally well as their equivalent non-privatised companies. As to global 
players in the market, the competitive advantage analysis predicted AT&T's relative 
demise before it was highlighted in the financial press relating to the period of July 10`h 
2002. The random walk with drift application suggests that NTT will strengthen its relative 
global position according to the forecast in chapter 6. BT's fortuitous outcomes can be 
seen as largely a product of timing rather than prescient strategies, because they were able 
to raise funds via rights issue just prior to the collapse in the stock of the telecoms market. 
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Outline of the thesis chapters 
Introduction 11 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
Chapter One: Literature review 
1.1 Historical overview of the privatisation process 
It is instructive to start by noting Smith's (1776) observation can privatis alien. hi the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith favoured the privatisation of crown lands on c il iciciicy grouinds. 
He believed that: 
"In every great monarchy of Europe the sale of crown lands would produce aI 
large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of public debt, would deliver 
from mortgage much greater revenues than any which those lands have ever 
afforded the crown " (Nelsen, 1996: 17). 
When a state-owned enterprise is transferred from the state-owned into the private sector 
environment, many changes occur during this transfer. These changes include management 
strategy and style, operational and financial changes and ownership change. Because of the 
importance of the financial performance changes, this thesis will use the financial data for 
developing the epistemology for measuring the performance of privatised companies 
versus their non-privatised counterparts. 
Privatisation has been a key element in the ascendance of the new market orthodoxy since 
the 1970s, and has been at the forefront of economic policy debates in all parts of the 
world. The international wave of privatisation began in the United Kingdom and thereafter 
rapidly spread to other industrial countries (see Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995: 1; for a fuller 
disclosure of worldwide privatisation, see appendix 1). 
Most people associate the modem privatisation programmes to the Conservative 
government led by Margaret Thatcher that came to powcr in 1979. I looweve r, the 
government that launched a privatisation programme for cc 11 »uic rckli-iii vas that of 
Konrad Adenauer in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1'>()1. tic (R'rn>: m ýý. ýºý ý'ý iýý>>ý'ýýt 
sold off the majority stake in Volkswagen in a public sIi uc (41k"11 ug III 1 IN-0111 (fl' SImIlI 
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investors. Four years later, the West German government launched an even larger offering 
for shares in VEBA. However, the small investors were hurt badly after the stock declined, 
so the government took the responsibility to bail them out afterwards (see Megginson, 
Nash, and Randenborgh, 1994: 406-407) 
According to Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2001: 1) in the late 1970s, the 
Thatcher government utilised the term privatisation to mean the sale of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to private investors. Since then, the growth of the privatisation 
programme all over the world has been phenomenal. This change of ownership has 
reduced the position of the state in many world economies. 
British Telecommunications (BT) was one of the first companies to be privatised through 
the public share offerings method. BT was successfully privatised and the UK government 
generated huge proceeds from the sale. BT was the first utility company in the UK and the 
world to be exposed to a regulator (see Lawless, 1991; Walters, 1989, and appendix 2 for 
list of the privatisation companies in the UK). 
According to World Bank reports, more than 12,000 companies have been privatised since 
the 1980s, and the privatisation programme is moving fast in many countries. Letwin 
(1999) estimates that $800 billion of assets were privatised internationally during the 1980s 
and 1990s, with more than $50 billion privatised in western Europe in 1998 alone. 
Roche (1996: 5), president of the research firm "Independent Strategy" and a columnist in 
Euromoney, predicts that $6 trillion of privatisation assets will be sold over the next 20 
years, including $3 trillion in eastern Europe and China combined. He says: "The pace in 
the past five years has been slow in comparison to what is about to come. " 
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According to the FT (2002: 29) of Sept. 26th, the China telecom will list 16.8bn shares or 
about 20 per cent of the company in its initial public offerings next month. Bankers expect 
the company to be valued at $3bn-$4bn, which would make the IPO the largest in Hong 
Kong this year. 
Roche (1996: 26) has stated that "In the last two years, the privatisation sales of assets 
reached $53 billion in Europe, over $5 billion in the Americas and nearly $9 billion in 
Asia. In eastern Europe privatisation helped push the transition from communism to 
capitalism. As output from the non-state sector soared to 55% of GDP, assets with an 
estimated economic value of $200 billion were returned to the citizens. " 
He addes (p. 26) that "Worldwide, in most countries where state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
had played a significant role, selling them off added between 0.5% and 3% to equity 
market capitalisation, on average amounting to 0.7% of GDP" (Roche, 1996). (see 
appendix 1 for more details of country breakdown of global amounts raised from 
privatisation from 1990 to 1998). 
While the Thatcher government may not have been the first to launch a large privatisation 
programme, it is without doubt the most important historically. Thatcher is credited for 
being the one who changed the policy's name from "denationalisation" to the more 
appealing "privatisation". It is important to note that the concept of privatisation in its 
present form is considered one of the modem concepts in the economic literature. No one 
knows exactly when people started to use the word privatisation, however, it is believed 
that the term appeared for the first time in western dictionaries in 1983 (Al-Samadi, 1993). 
-11- 
Privatisation is known by different names around the world. For example, apart from the 
use of "de-nationalization" in the UK., it is termed as "dis-incorporation" in Mexico, 
"prioritisation" in Australia, "asset sales programme" in New Zealand, "transformation" in 
Thailand, "people isolation" in Sri Lanka, and "dis-investment" in Pakistan (Gupta, 
1996: 98). 
Privatisation has certainly been a major event in the economic and financial history of the 
last twenty years, and its impact on equity markets has been particularly dramatic. The 
cumulative value of proceeds raised through privatisation programme by governments' 
exceeded $1 trillion sometime during the second half of 1999, and the value of such 
revenue raised each year is now roughly $140 billion (Gibbon, 2000). 
Boutchkova and Megginson (2000: 69) provide a rough yet significant measure, i. e: the 
total market value of privatised companies (SIPs) to date is nearly 10 per cent of the 
world's total market capitalisation, accounting for over one-fifth of the non-US total. 
However, SIPS also play a significant role in the even more dramatic increase in global 
stock market trading volume, from $1.23 trillion in 1983 to $37.5 trillion in 1999. 
According to Miller (1994: 125) the worldwide interest in the privatisation has increased 
recently for several reasons. These include: 
(1) The collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and its eastern European allies 
and the emerging governments' determination to transform state owned enterprises into 
private sector entities; 
(2) The desire of a growing number of political leaders and their constituents to reduce the 
size and scope of local and national government; 
(3) The problem of how governments can continue to provide adequate public services 
given the reluctance of many citizens to fund regular tax increases; 
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(4) The commitment of some governments to increase state-owned enterprises' efficiency, 
productivity, and responsiveness to customer needs; and 
(5) the desire of many nations to promote free market principles and to establish an 
enterprise culture. 
Privatisation is claimed by governments to enhance individual freedom, encourage and 
improve efficiency, make industry more responsive to the demands of the customer, 
decrease the public debt and weaken the power of the trade unions by forcing management 
to face the realities of the market place. It is said to create a shareholder democracy by 
giving a large number of small shareholders a stake in the economy (Veljanovski, 1987 
and 1989). 
Whilst the privatisation of government-owned enterprises (GOEs hereinafter) may have 
almost reached an end in the UK, where this (now global) phenomenon may be said to 
have started in the early 1980s, it is nevertheless continuing strongly elsewhere: in the EU; 
in the transitional economies of east/central Europe and CIS; in China, India, Africa, 
Middle East and Latin America (Economist, 1998). 
In 1995 the global volume of government sales of state assets reached a record figure of 
US$73 billion (Economist, 1996). From 1980 to 1995 more than $85billion of 
privatisations were handled through a public share offerings method (Euromoney, 1996). 
Some experts argue that the current annual world volume of privatisation is, however, 
small compared to what is yet to come (see appendix 1), particularly as regards Central 
Europe, the former USSR, and China (Roche, 1996; Burton and ul-Haq, 2001). 
- 13 - 
Brtitish Telecommunications was the first large utilities company to be privatised in the 
UK and worldwide in 1984, and it came after the privatisation of British Petroluem in 1979 
and Cable and Wireless in 1981 (see El- Naggar, 1989; Waverman and Esen, 1997; Hills, 
1986; and Thornton, 1998, see appendix 2). 
According to Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997: 275-276) when a firm is privatised, several 
factors change simultaneously. First, the ownership changes from the government to 
private hands. Second, the firm's objective changes to profit maximisation. Third, changes 
in regulation designed to enhance competition in product markets are likely to take place. 
There is general agreement on factors that change after privatisation, but there are other 
factors that change. Most likely, the privatised company starts to think globally through 
having alliances and subsidiaries in different countries. The whole strategy of the company 
changes internally and externally to compete with others for market survival or dominance. 
1.2 Definitions relating to privatisation 
It was claimed by Beesley and Littlechild (1983: 1) and Peacock (1984: 3) that privatisation 
is generally meant as the formation of a "Companies Act" company and the subsequent 
sale of at least 50 per cent of the shares to private shareholders. However, there is an 
underlying idea by policy makers that such a transformation will improve the industry 
performance by increasing the role of market forces. 
BT was transformed to private status and more than 50 per cent of its shareholdings were 
sold to private shareholders in 1984 (see Thornton, 1998; and Fraser, 1988). See BT 
privatisation timetable in appendix 3. 
-14- 
On the other hand, Pine (1988: 3), Posner (1984), and Dunleavy (1986: 13) claim that 
privatisation means transferring the production of goods and services from the state-owned 
sector to the private sector, in order to make a public gain from asset sales (see Walle, 
1989: 601; Hemming and Mansoor, 1988: 31; and Rees, 1986: 19). Certainly the sale of BT 
did indeed, net gains for the UK treasury, as was the case in most privatisations. 
A more euphoric description is offered by Ahmed (1993) and the Adam Smith Institute 
(1985: 3): 
"An approach which recognises that the regulation, which the market imposes on 
economic activity is superior to any regulation, which men can devise and operate 
by law. This focuses on the issue that the market measures, and responds to the 
choices and preferences of people more accurately than the political process. A 
programme performed by the private economy can be done more efficiently, more 
cheaply, and with greater satisfaction to its beneficiaries than its counterpart can 
achieve in public sector" (see Veljanovaski, 1987: 2). Drawn upon Adam Smith 
himself in the wealth of nation, he observed "private ownership improves 
productivity and efficiency" (Veljanovaski, 1989: 35). 
Young (1986: 236), Donnison (1984: 45), and Ascher (1987: 4) suggest that privatisation is a 
set of policies, which aim to limit the role of the state-owned sector, and increase the role 
of private sector, while improving the performance of the remaining state-owned sector. 
This is as yet to be demonstrated, but perhaps the assumption is that the state-owned sector 
should only do what the private sector cannot, such as social rationing-provisions of public 
goods (Starr, 1989: 6; and Butcher, 1995: 108). 
Some have defined privatisation simply as the sale of government assets, either through the 
sale of some or all of a government shareholding in a company or through the sale of 
specific assets (see Dodgson and Topham, 1988; Bos, 1998: 51,1988 and 1993). 
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There were a number of common definitions for the term privatisation as stated by Heald, 
1984: 37; Kay and Thompson, 1986: 118; Bishop and Kay, 1989; Abu Shair, 1997: 1; 
Clementi, 1985: 124; Savas, 1991: 1-3; Prager, 1992: 311-13; Glade, 1983; Domberger and 
Piggott, 1986: 146, where most of them agreed on more than one of the following 
privatisation definition elements as: 
(1) The privatisation of financing of the state enterprises, which entails the utilisation of 
private funds to relieve the enterprises from temporary budgetary constraints; 
(2) The privatisation of production; 
(3) Denationalisation is the selling of shares of state-owned enterprises to private 
investors; and 
(4) the liberalisation interim of relaxing or removing statutory constraints on competition, 
prices etc (see Yacob and Mengistu, 1988). 
In 1983 the Thatcherite Financial Secretary to the Treasury, John Moore, declared that: 
"Privatisation is a key element in the government's economic strategy. It will lead 
to a fundamental shift in the balance between the public and private sectors. It is 
already bringing about a profound change in attitude within state industries. It 
opens up exciting possibilities for the consumer: better pay, conditions and 
employment opportunities for the employees; and new freedom for the managers of 
the industries concerned" (Moore, 1983: 78). 
Privatisation can be narrowly defined as "the sale of state-owned sector assets and exclude 
issues such as contracting out, debureaucratization and the promotion of competition by 
market forces" (Bos, 1991). 
Other researchers believe that privatisation is the goal of SOE (State-Owned Enterprises) 
reform and this concept of reforming SOE has been used as a synonym for privatisation 
(see Galal, 1991; Shirley, 1990; Shirley and Nellis, 1991). 
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Zahariadis (1995: 4), Andrews and Dowling (1998: 601), Ogden and Watson (1999: 526) 
agree on defining privatisation `as the transfer of the central government's ownership 
rights in commercial entities to private investors', they chose this definition because firstly, 
it is a form that includes a fairly tight set of presumptions in contrast to the diversity of 
other forms. Secondly, it is the more widely practiced, most ambitious, and most visible 
form of privatisation. Thirdly, it avoids the problems of issue equivalent or which is best 
( Roche, 1996: 26; and Estrin, 1994: 3). 
According to Ramamurti (2000: 526) privatisation has narrow and broad definitions. The 
narrow definition is any measure that transfers some or all of the ownership and/or control 
over SOEs to the private sector. This definition treats privatisation as a continous variable, 
with many possible intermediate forms of state-owned-private partnership (see Ramamurti, 
1997). 
His broad definition of privatisation is any measure that increases the role of the private 
sector in the economy: e. g., through deregulation, which permits private entry into markets 
previously reserved for SOEs; economic liberlisation, which exposes them to greater 
competition (e. g., through lower tariffs or fewer restrictions on foreign investment); or 
institution building, which improves the functioning of private firms and markets. 
Definitions from other sources are also worth reproducing because of the increased or 
simplified dimensions they provide. There has not been any definition of privatisation by 
the UK government itself. However, John Moore's speeches, Financial Secretary to the 
UK Treasury, during (1983,1984, and 1985) used the words, `returning state owned 
companies to the private sector', `contracting out services to the private sector', 
`liberalisation' (meaning opening to competition) and' deregulation' (Wiltshire, 1987: 16). 
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Despite this, at the time of BT privatisation, the UK Conservative manifesto in 1979 did 
not have any definition for privatisation and neither was there a policy for seriously 
debating proposals to sell off BT (see Zahariadis, 1995). 
Most of the privatisation's definitions depend on how these writers or researchers look at 
privatisation. It might also depend on the circumstances, the information and data 
available. Overall, different definitions of privatisation make it easy and flexible for many 
to express it in a way where it matches their political and economic views. 
The writer believes that privatisation as a process involves the transfer of ownership of the 
state-owned to private enterprises. This transfer involves the assets of the company, and 
can take many forms such as a public share offerings, assets' sale, vouchers, service 
contracts, or a management buyout. Moreover, privatisation is a policy for restructuring 
political and economic themes, and a way to develop the capital market and increase the 
participation of domestic and foreign investors. 
Furthermore, the writer believes that privatisation can be seen as a mechanism that can 
change the whole system, improve the efficiency and the performance of an enterprise. 
That does not mean privatisation is a perfect strategy. The perfection of this process 
depends on a governments' serious commitment to complete the programme, judicious 
regulation and the capacity of private management to realise the potential of the assets 
through improved financial performance (see appendix 4 for some of the privatisation 
issues). This study reveals to some extent that degree of financial imporvement and 
competitive advanatge of the three representative telecoms companies. 
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1.3 Privatisation Objectives 
In the case of BT, the official case for privatisation had a number of specific objectives. 
They have changed over time and so has the emphasis on them. The basic aims were 
claimed to be: the promotion of competition and increased efficiency. Other derived 
objectives included: the promotion of wider share ownership by both employees and the 
public, increased competitiveness, enhanced technical innovation, and providing a 
stakeholder relationship between employees and management. In July 1982, a White Paper 
on the `Future of Telecommunications in Britain' was issued and the new Secretary of 
State, Patrick Jenkin, in a statement to the House of Commons on Monday 19 July 1982 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1982), stated the objectives for privatising BT: 
"It is the government's aim to promote consumer choice. Where ever possible, we 
want industrial and commercial decisions to be determined by the market and not 
by the state. We believe that consumer choice and the disciplines of the market lead 
to more stable prices, improved efficiency and a higher quality services. As a 
nationalised industry British Telecom does not have access to financial markets. Its 
borrowing is controlled by government and counts against the public sector 
borrowing requirements. Monopoly power has allowed British Telecom to raise 
prices to finance investment without doing all that could be done to increase 
efficiency" (see Newman, 1986: 6). 
According to Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 205), it is easily noticeable from the White Paper 
that the UK government privatised BT from the desire to promote consumer choice, market 
forces and allowing BT to access capital markets without increasing the public sector 
borrowing requirements. 
The UK telecommunications sector was falling behind all other European countries, and 
the UK government sought to increase the efficiency of the telecommunications industry, 
to allow for better investment and to increase consumer choice. Table 
(1.1) gives some 
details of deficiencies in telecommunications in the UK (see Molyneux and 
Thompson, 
1987). 
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Table 1.1 A comparison of telecommunications systems in three countries 
Britain France Germany 
1974 1982 1974 1982 1974 1982 
Density of penetration 34.1 50.7 23.6 54.1 30.2 51.0 
Telecommunications 10.7 6.5 5.2 7.0 7.6 7.4 
investment as percentage 
of GDP 
Employees per 100,000 201.6 128.8 142.5 84.0 156.2 89.7 
main lines 
Source: International telecommunication Union, Yearbook of Common Carrier Statistics 
(Geneva: ITU, 1984). 
Observing table (1.1), it appears from the change in the density of penetration that there 
has been much greater growth in telecoms usage in France and Germany over the same 
period. In the second category, investment as a percentage of GDP, the level of investment 
has fallen from 10.7 to 6.5, whereas in France it has risen from 5.2 to 7.0 and in Germany 
it has remained high at 7.6 and 7.4. This may be explained as a cyclical shift in that the 
large scale investment in the UK of 10.7 might have been because of a need for technical 
improvement when the company was still a public utility. 
Hence, the level of investment in 1982 of 6.5,7.0 and 7.4 respectively would appear to 
show a similar level across the three countries. What is noticeable about the third category 
is the dramatic drop experienced in Britain of the numbers employed of 36 per cent, France 
41 per cent and Germany 44 per cent. In the case of the other two, France and Germany 
were providing their services with much lower numbers employed to begin with in 1974 
than in the UK and yet still managed a subsequent reduction greater than that achieved by 
the British company pre-privatisation. 
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Steel and Heald (1982), Hatch (1987: 60), and Moore (1992: 119-120) were able to identify 
four main privatisation objectives: enhancing freedom; improving efficiency; reducing the 
public spending borrowing requirements (PSBR); and tackling the problem of state-owned 
sector pay (see Heald, 1985; Grimstone, 1988: 106; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 157; 
Goodman and Loveman, 1991: 26; Letwin, 1988: 26; Stevens, 1992: 3-4; Grosfeld, 1991; 
Lieberman, 1994; Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, 1992 for further details). 
According to Hyman (1988: 120-121) the principle objectives of privatisation can be 
summarised as: 
(1) A perception that the efficiency of the industry could be improved by transition to the 
private sector. This can be done through better motivation of management and 
employees, the force of competition and the ability of management to run the 
business free from government interference; 
(2) A means of raising funds for the Exchequer. The British Telecom (BT) flotation 
raised £2.6 billion net of the pension liabilities kept by the government; and 
(3) the desire to widen share ownership. The BT flotation emphasised the objective of 
widening share ownership. 
When BT was transferred to a private enterprise, it was meant to increase its financial 
performance overall, and open up a new competitive telecoms market in UK. 
King (1987: 21) argued that `privatisation posititively affects employee attitudes and 
motivation when the employees' became shareholders in the company. It increased the 
involvement of staff in owning shares elsewhere as well as in their own companies, thus 
helping to establish more securely, a capitalist economy. British Airways was seen as a 
good example, where more than 9.4 per cent of the shares at flotation were owned by 
employees (Baldwin, 1990; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
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According to Bennett (1997: 7), Shelton (1999: 6), Burton and ul-Haq (2001: 3-4), Russell 
(2000: 30), Boutchkova and Megginson (2000: 3), the privatisation objectives can be 
roughly categorised as follows: 
(a) Political goals such as reducing the size of the state-owned sector, restoring or 
strengthening the private sector (as in all transitional economies), spreading share 
ownership more widely (popular capitalism), and making productive enterprises 
more responsive and accountable to those for whom they produce; 
(b) Efficiency goals such as increasing productivity and microeconomic efficiency, and 
the development of capital market institutions, which intermediate between savers 
and investors; 
(c) Fiscal stabilisation goals such as maximising proceeds of sales, reducing the future 
drain of subventions and capital contributions from government revenue, 
increasing tax revenues from higher profits and reducing the public debt; and 
(d) resource mobilisation goals as promoting foreign investment in the country, 
releasing limited state resources for investment in other sectors such as education 
and health. 
The UK privatisation programme has had many objectives, which have changed over time. 
The UK government's early concern was to limit the power and influence of the state- 
owned sector trades unions, to reduce the role of government, to promote a wider spread of 
share-ownership amongst the population at large and to realise the proceeds from the sale 
of state assets for the government's finances (see Bishop and Thompson, 1993 and 1994). 
Finally, perhaps a most important factor has been a concern to improve the efficiency of 
the public enterprise sector. In 1983, the UK Treasury Minister, Moore (1983: 93), 
concluded that: `our main objective is to promote competition and improve efficiency'. At 
times the UK government has claimed that privatisation aims to prevent politicians 
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meddling in the affairs of business enterprises, and also to distinguish between the 
economic and social objectives of these enterprises to that extent privatisation is claimed to 
produce transparency of decision- making (see Wiltshire, 1987: 22). 
Apart from the official case, a large number of writers have identified many other 
objectives of privatisation. A considerable array of harsher critics claim that the 
government has been out to smash the power of trade unions, reduce the state-owned 
sector borrowing requirement (not just for its own sake, but also because these statistics 
have become a key indicator of government macro-economic performance), and generate 
revenue; some say to finance tax cuts before the next general election (see Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers, 1994 for details). 
Internationally, governments have privatised state-owned enterprises to achieve several 
objectives such as raising revenue for the state; raising investment capital for the industry 
or for the company being privatised; reducing the government's role in the economy; 
promoting wider share ownership; increasing efficiency; introducing greater competition; 
and exposing firms to market discipline. 
Privatisation objectives may differ from one country to another depending on the local 
circumstances. In December 1992, Russia privatised the Bolshevik Biscuit Company in 
Moscow, which was sold at auction as a part of the Russian government's programme to 
transfer state-owned enterprises to private ownership. The main objective was to convert 
Russia from a command economy to a mostly private economy, this was a minor, but 
important beginning to the process (see Blasi, Kroumova and Kruse, 1997: 1; and Lane, 
1995 for details of Russian privatisation). 
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1.4 Specific objectives of the BT privatisation 
The objectives of the privatisation of BT were succintly stated by Cecil Parkinson, the 
Secretary of State for industry, to Parliament in 1984: 
"Develop the UK telecommunications industry as quicky as possible to the widest 
possible benefit to UK customers and manufactures .... to extend share ownership 
and to create within the new shareholding constituency a category of shareholder 
employees with a vested interest in the strength and vitality of BT's 
business..... reward achievement through the mechanism of incentives so that 
reward would be intimately related to performance (and) to provide BT with a 
source of investment finance largely ftee from treasury control" (Pitt, 1990: 68). 
On November 16th 1983, John Moore, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, said (The 
Times, Nov. 17th 1983: 2): 
"Privatisation of British Telecom gives the government an opportunity to offer 
Britain's 19 million telephone subscribers a stake in the business. " 
According to Newman (1986: 41) there were three predominant and interrelated objectives 
for the privatisation of British Telecom. Firstly, a successful sale of 51 per cent would 
allow the treasury to report that it was keeping to its public expenditure plans and 
containing the public sector borrowing requirement. Secondly, there were the wider share 
ownership objectives, based on ideological commitment and partly on fiscal necessity. 
Thirdly, it was recognised that if this issue to be successful, it needed to appeal to as wide 
an audience as possible, not merely from the domestic market, but from investors abroad. 
Harper (1997: 223) states that the privatisation of BT was a political act and it will stand or 
fall on its political merits as the years go by. A new Secretary of State, Partick Jenkin, in a 
statement to the House of Commons on Monday 19th July 1982, announced that the UK 
government intended to privatise British Telecom. He stated: 
"It is the government's aim to promote consumer choice. Wherever possible, we 
want industrial and commercial decisions to be determined by the market and not 
by the state. We believe that consumer choice and the disciplines of the market lead 
to more more stable prices, improved efficiency and a higher quality of service" 
(Newman, 1986: 5). 
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Norman Tebbit, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, made a statement on the 
privatisation of BT in 1983. He stated: 
"The transfer of BT from the public to private sector was an essential step towards 
ensuring effective and fair competition " (The Times, Dec. 16th 1983 : 4e) 
Butcher J, Under Secretary for Department of Industry, made the following statement in 
front of OECD Conference in Paris in 1983: 
"Our intention is to convert British Telecommunication from a PTT in the 
traditional mould into a dynamic private company; fully responsive to market 
demands, free ftom government restraints and able to raise investment capital on a 
commercial basis and on a scale, which will allow it to make full use of the coming 
opportunities" (Ergas and Okayama, 1984: 3 8). 
The Times in 1980 had quoted Sir George Jefferson, BT's Chairman 
"We recognise the need to control public expenditures, but unless we can find ways 
of matching finance to the real need, the ability of commerce and industry in the 
United Kingdom to be competitive will be seriously impaired by lack of a good 
telecom network" (p. 15). 
According to Zahariadis (1995: 85) after the BT's Chairman's statement, there were two 
options available to the treasury in order to solve the financing difficulty for BT's 
investment: either recapitalisation, which was favoured by the Department of Trade and 
Industry and BT's management, or privatisation, which was the most likely favourable 
choice for the treasury. The unwillingness of the UK government to fund BT may have 
been main reason to privatise after all! 
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1.5 Pursuit of privatisation internationally 
Privatisation has become more attractive, with increasing evidence that many state-owned 
enterprises were loss-makers rather than revenue generators. There were studies conducted 
by the World Bank to indicate that by the beginning of the 1980s, SOEs in developing 
countries accounted for one-quarter to one-half of all outstanding domestic debt and for a 
substantial portion of foreign borrowing (Shirley, 1983). 
Governments in both western industrialised nations and developing countries have seen 
privatisation as a means of generating needed revenues and of reducing their budget 
deficits. In 1979, the borrowings and losses of SOEs in the United Kingdom, for example, 
were nearly US$6 billion. However, from 1981 to 1991, the Government was able to raise 
more than US$80 billion from the privatisation of 46 large firms and several dozen smaller 
ones. By 1990, the companies that were privatised by the UK government had contributed 
to tax revenues more than £2.5 billion (Moore, 1992). 
Many developed and developing countries are rushing to sell most of their state-owned 
enterprises to generate revenues and to attract more foreign investment. The World Bank 
(1992: 11) reported that former SOEs in developing countries grew faster and more 
effectively contained their costs after transfer to private ownership (OECD, 2001: 43). 
Generally, most countries might have many mutual objectives, but there are slight and 
unnoticeable different objectives behind pursuing privatisation. 
Objectives of privatisation differ from one country to another, but the United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development in 1995 grouped the objectives of privatisation in 
13 categories (see UNCTAD, 1995). However, most of the points are normative suggestion 
rather than an evaluation of what has occurred and have been addressed by the other 
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writers previously mentioned in this chapter. A full listing of UNCTAD objectives is 
supplied in appendix 5. 
1.6 Factors that determine the choice of privatisation methods 
1.6.1 Market conditions 
The degree of development of the privatising country's capital market will affect the 
decision to sell a SOE in the capital markets. If the capital market is primitive, it may be 
difficult to find buyers (Magginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen, 2001: 4). The more the lack 
of liquidity in the capital market, the greater is the uncertainty regarding the SOE's 
intrinsic value. In less developed markets, pricing the asset and hence share value will be 
problematic (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997 and 1998). 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and Perotti and Oijen (1998) state that government 
sales can jumpstart stock market development and trigger gains in economic growth and 
efficiency. Therefore, the level of development of the domestic capital market can affect 
the choice of privatisation technique (see McLindon, 1996). 
Governments will look at factors, such as the liquidity of the capital market, the level of 
income equality, the budget deficit, and the level of spending as a percent of GDP. 
Countries with a well-developed capital market use different methods, such as asset sales 
to generate money, whereas countries with an undeveloped capital market tend mostly to 
issue shares to the public, in order to increase the volume and the capitalisation in their 
stock markets for future privatisation (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). 
-27- 
Governments consider the level of equality and inequality of income as an indicator 
measure for their decisions. If there is an equality in the level of income, then governments 
might consider offering shares to the public through the public share offerings method. In 
the meantime, if there is an inequality in the level of income, the governments might 
choose asset sales or employ other methods (Biais and Perotti, 2001). 
In the case of budget deficits and high level of spending (GDP), governments tend to use 
methods that would maximise sales revenue and achieve their economic and political 
objectives, such as an asset sales. However, with low budget deficits and low spending 
levels, they tend to have initial public share offerings to enable a wider range of citizens to 
obtain shares (Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen, 2001). 
When the UK government decided to privatise BT in 1984, they were not sure if the 
market is big enough to absorb the BT's issue, so they had to spend considerable sums, 
especially in the advertising segment, to make the issue attractive to investors. Being 
mindful of the fact that the BT privatisation was the first to be launched with a big issue on 
the stock market (see Newman, 1986). 
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1.6.2 Political and legal aspects 
The legal and political environment encompasses the government's ability to commit to 
policy, the protection of property rights and the desire to promote and develop its national 
stock market (Perotti, 1995). 
Developing or establishing strict and regulatory protection for debt and equity investors is 
a prerequisite to establishing the proper institutional setting required for financial 
investment to flourish (North 1994; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1997,1998 and 1999); Bortolotti, Fantini, Siniscalco and Vitalini, 1997). 
Governments with a strong property rights' protection tend to use asset sales as the selling 
method, but with a lack of investors' protection rights they might use initial public share 
offerings. Countries' political structures identify the type of divestment to use (Bortolotti, 
Fantini, and Siniscalco, 2001). Russia uses the voucher, whereas in Germany, they intend 
to use restitution following the reunification period (see appendix 4 for examples of 
privatisation methods worldwide, and further expansion of these points are shown in table 
1.7). 
1.6.3 Factors affecting the individual firm 
Firm specific factors such as the size of the firm, its profitability and industry also impact 
upon the privatisation decision. Small to medium sized firms might be privatised through a 
buyout management or an assets' sale, whereas large firms would be privatised through 
public share offerings. Post-divestment performance of the SOEs may also influence the 
government's choice of privatisation technique (Meggins, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 
2001). 
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Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), Alexandrowicz (1994) Magginson, Nash, and Van 
Randenborgh (1994) argue that the public's perception of the newly-privatised firm's 
performance is crucial to the success or failure of the privatisation programme. Most 
importantly, the early privatisations must be financial success stories, in order to build 
credibility for the government and encourage investors to participate in subsequent 
privatisation (Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen, 2001: 10). 
A good example was the UK government's efforts to privatise BT successully, in order to 
make it possible to generate more proceeds for future privatisation, if BT proved a success 
(Newman, 1986). 
It was noted by Manzetti (1994) that governments are sometimes hesitant to privatise firms 
of "strategic" importance. Industries such as defence, transportation, and energy could be 
of such strategic significance that foreign ownership would be unacceptable. The 
government's protection of private property rights (from itself and from other parties) and 
the long-term viability of contractual commitments will have an important impact on 
privatisation policy in general and the method chosen to privatise assets in particular 
(Magginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen, 2001). 
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1.7 Privatisation methods: 
Table 1.2: Privatisation methods 
Methods Purpose Typical uses 
Restitution and reprivatisation Return confiscated or Means of returning to private 
nationalised property to owners small residential, 
former private owners or industrial, commercial or 
private compensation for all agricultural properties for 
or part of its value. which ownership claims can 
be substantiated. 
Auction Government-organised sale Means of transferring to 
to allow private investors private ownership small 
and individuals to bid for commercial, nationalised 
state property or assets. property that cannot be 
reprivatised through 
restitution; means of selling 
rehabilitated or improved 
property. 
Direct sales Transfer of state property to Means of transferring to 
private ownership through private ownership profitable or 
direct sale to a private potentially profitable state 
investor. enterprises, and plant and 
equipment of liquidated SOEs. 
Stock offerings Public sale of shares in Means of making ownership in 
SOEs through a Stock restructured SOEs, joint-stock 
Exchange or private offers to companies, and holding 
investment groups. companies available to both 
small-and large-scale 
investors. 
Liquidation Legal abolition of a state Means of disposing of the 
corporation so that plant, assets of unprofitable and 
equipment or other assets uncompetitive state enterprises 
can be sold. that cannot be restructured or 
sale through other means. 
Employee or management buyouts Sale of all or part of a state Means of obtaining worker or 
enterprise to its workers, manager participation in SOE 
managers or a combination restructuring; means of giving 
of both. employees a stake in privatised 
SOEs. 
Public distribution of shares Use of lotteries, coupon Means of promoting 
sales, or free distribution of widespread public ownership 
vouchers to citizens who can in private companies; means of 
use them to obtain shares in promoting public support for 
SOEs that are to be privatisation. 
privatised. 
Marketization or demonopolization Requirements that SOEs Means of improving the 
compete with private sector efficiency of state enterprises 
to provide goods and and agencies that the 
services and become government does not want to 
responsible for their profits privatise. 
and losses. 
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Public service contracting Government agreements Means of increasing the 
with private companies to participation of the private 
provide services, manage sector in extending services 
facilities or operate and infrastructure, making 
enterprises for a specified public service delivery more 
period of time; concession efficient, and using private 
agreements with private sector management experience 
sector contractors. There are in public service provision. 
three types of public service 
contacting; (a) service 
contacts; (b) management 
contacts; and (c) lease 
contracts. 
(A) service Contract A private firm is engaged by The government maintains 
a government agency to ownership and policy control 
provide a specific service for of the enterprise. Type of 
a specified period of time. service contracts such as, 
mental health facilities; solid 
waste collection; road repair; 
bus operations, etc. 
(B) management contract A contractor takes The government maintains 
responsibility for operating ownership and policy control 
and maintaining a facility or of the enterprise. These kinds 
programme, with freedom to of contracts can be seen in 
make day-to day managing municipal or public 
management decisions. hospitals; and correctional 
facilities; and some public 
utilities. 
(C) Lease contracts An enterprise leases a The government maintains 
facility providing public ownership and policy control 
service from a public of the enterprise. This kind of 
authority and assumes contract can be seen in 
responsibility for operation, managing freight and 
maintenance and passenger services; and 
replacement of non-fixed municipal operations. 
capital assets. 
Public- private partnerships Joint ventures between Means of increasing private 
government and private sector participation in 
companies in providing providing infrastructure and 
services and infrastructure. quasi-commercial public 
Some type of these services; means of eliciting 
partnerships; (a) joint financial participation of 
ventures; (b) build-operate- private companies in 
transfer agreements; and (c) infrastructure provision. 
joint investment. 
(A) Joint ventures A joint work between public Private companies use their 
and private firms to provide financial, managerial and 
services and infrastructure. technical capabilities, whereas 
the government only funds the 
projects. Joint ventures can be 
seen in Gas and Oil facilities; 
telecommunications activities; 
and to increase foreign's 
capital and technology in the 
country. 
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(B) BOT and BOO Private companies obtain the The project is operated under a 
right from the government to concession from the 
build infrastructure such as government, which lasts for a 
telecommunications period of 15 to 30 years to 
systems, highways, utilities allow the company to recover 
and all works that deal with its costs, repay debt and make 
infrastructures. a return on investment. At the 
end of the concession, the 
project facilities are either 
transferred to the government 
or purchased by the operating 
company. 
(C) Joint investment Less formal co-operation Private companies use their 
agreements between the financial, managerial and 
government and the private technical capabilities, whereas 
sector to meet the growing the government only funds the 
demands for public and projects. 
services and infrastructures. 
Transferring services to private and Government divestment of Means of extending access to 
non-governmental organisations services; allowing private social and community 
sector to provide services; services, low-cost housing, 
using private and non- and other services that 
governmental organisations governments cannot or will not 
to extend or provide higher provide on their own. 
levels of service. 
Source: Rondinelli, D. (1995), "Privatisation and economic transformation: the management 
challenge" pp. 46-47, in J. Prokopenko eds., (1995) Management for Privatisation: Lessons from 
Industry and Public Service, (Published by International Labour Office: Geneva, 300p). 
1.7.1 Comments 
The writer has found the public share offerings to be a worldwide method, which many 
governments use, such as Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. These five 
countries together have raised almost $285 billion through 120 public share offers of the 
common stock of state-owned enterprises (Megginson, 2000). British telecommunications 
has raised more than E12 billion alone from privatising BT through the stock market (see 
Fraser, 1988). 
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1.8 Review 
Some of the privatisation issues have been looked at and the concept has been explained 
through the eyes of other researchers. It is noticeable from the literature that there is a little 
discussion of the issue relating to the privatisation of public monopolies, which remain 
virtual monopolies after privatisation. The hypothesis is set to address this matter. 
Discussion of other issues relating to privatisation can be seen at appendix 4. 
The next chapter (2) will discuss the issue of ownership transfer from the state-owned to 
private and how this issue can have an effect on the success of the privatisation 
programme. The regulation issue, which addresses the condition when virtual monopoly 
still exists after privatisation, will be considered in this chapter and further discussion can 
be seen in chapter 7 (reflections chapter). The regulation regime will illustrate the main 
role of the regulator in the telecoms markets, which definition remains a less contestable 
market than other sectors of the economy. 
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Chapter Two: The importance of 
Ownership and Regulation 
Chapter Two: The importance of ownership and regulation 
2.1 Does ownership matter? 
This is a key element in the pursuit of the thesis that ownership does matter when a firm 
transfers from the state-owned sector to the private sector. This chapter introduces an 
important caveat when we measure the performance of privatised companies and compare 
them with the private companies, insofar that their economic performance may be 
shadowed by lingering attitudes remaining from their previous status as state-owned 
enterprises. At this moment in time, many of the privatised companies have a short history 
of being in the private sector and others have been only semi-privatised because of the 
large shareholding held by the states. In order to compare economic performance between 
these various ownership structures, an awareness of their antecendents and their current 
progress towards a wholly private managerial focus, is essential. 
While observing this problem, the contention of this thesis is, to measure the performance 
soley through the analysis and interpretation of the financial data and make no claims to 
having further capacity for another objective measures of managerial capability 
(entrepreneurial strategies). The thesis is purposefully narrowed to measure performance 
solely by the objective means of measuring financial performance as a simple outcome 
determinant. The writer chooses not to be distracted by pursuing the normative approach, 
which examines managerial style, leadership competence or organisational structure of the 
telecoms companies in the study. 
The transfer from state to private ownership will lead to a change in the incentive structure 
facing its decision-makers (see Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002). This shift basically will have 
two effects from the perspective of agency theory (Yarrow, 
1989; and Chappell, 1986). 
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First, there will be a change in the objectives of the firm: to the shareholders' objectives in 
the private firm (profit maximisation and dividend growth), and to the voting public 
objectives in the case of the state-owned firm to meet the targets of customer provision set 
by the state (See Alchian, 1965; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Fama, 1980 for more 
details). 
Second, are the performance requirements of management. The managers of privately- 
owned enterprises will be concerned with meeting the requirements of the capital markets 
and will have to deal with the possible threat of a take-over and also possible bankruptcy if 
the company fails to ensure revenues (see Aoki, 1983; and Leech, 1987). 
By contrast, the managers of state-owned enterprises seek to satisfy ministerial objectives 
(see Field, 1995), and market forces have much less influence, although they might well 
have to manage within the constraints of the public purse (see Foster, 1992; Blankart, 
1983; and Road, 1997). 
This is a continous perception in the mind of many reseachers that public service 
management exhibits a "civil service mentality" in both workers and management in state- 
owned enterprises and such behaviour can remain a persistent shadow in many newly 
privatised companies, especially so, when the privatisation is only partial through 
regulators or shareholders. 
A large number of the privatised companies are protected by a golden share from takeover, 
which creates a false position in the market place, where in normal circumstances firms are 
exposed to the feature of takeovers (see Pirie, 1988: 63; Wiltshire, 1987: 41-42; Martin and 
Parker, 1997: 22; Economist, 1994: 96; Shearer, 2002: 11-12; and Hofheinz, 2001: 9A). In 
1996, the proposed collaboration between BT and MCI was largely prevented by the 
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existing of goldern share, which would have inhibited any merger between the companies. 
Therefore, it limited their market potential (Financial Times, Nov. 16th 1996: 20, Financial 
Times, Nov 16'h 1996: 10; Financial Times, Dec. 4th 1996: 30; and Financial Times, July 
15th 1997: 16). However, in the 1997 published accounts, the golden share was not shown 
to be a barrier to the acquisition (BT annual report, 1997). 
In private ownership, there is a fairly direct link between agents (managers) and principals 
(shareholders), but the state monitoring hierarchy is more complex, involving two major 
levels of delegation: first to the ministers, and then to the managers (monitored by 
ministers). The most fundamental weaknesses of the latter stems from the interactions 
between voters and politicians (Millward, 1982; Boardman, and Vining, 1989; and Rees, 
1985). 
The state control hierarchy is highly vulnerable to goal displacement in democracies as 
political opponents will most likely change policies when in power. It is this problem that 
most likely accounts for some of the observed relative inefficiency of the state enterprises 
operating in competitive product markets (Yarrow, 1989). 
Common ownership has been a poor means of bringing control over some companies. In 
state enterprises, the planning horizon might not exceed the length of the franchise of the 
political system (5 years in most cases). With privatisation, the sale of shares allow a real 
stake in the industry by the public in general and institutional shareholders, which can 
facilitate much longer-run planning by management, but with a discipline for short-run 
market objective. 
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However, they can be exposed to the volatility of share price movements, which for the 
first-time buyer of shares can prove disturbing and cause a frenzy of selling or buying. 
Brokers may be inundated with requests for information about the company requiring 
regular information about how the company is performing, and small first-time buyers will 
even attend the Annual General Meeting to question the management on policy and 
performance issues. 
The survey of evidence in the UK Stock Exchange-Treasury (1986) suggests that about 
9.4 million people (23 per cent of the adult population) now own shares, compared with 
two million (5 per cent) in 1983, before the large stock market flotation of public utilities. 
Privatisation has given many individuals as well as the employees of the companies, the 
right to purchase shares in the company of their choice, and as a result create wider share- 
ownership among the public at large. Such schemes have an effect on the ownership 
structure of the company and the mentality of the public towards state-owned enterprises, 
since much of the public provision is satisfied from the private sector subsequent to the 
privatisation. There will be a focus on share value as well as in customer satisfaction, 
which may at times appear contradictory. 
It is estimated that the BT privatisation has promoted share ownership. The number of 
shareholders has increased to more than 20 million over the last decade. BT itself added 
more than 9 million shareholders including their employees before most of these shares 
were sold to financial institutions (see Martin and Parker, 1997; Pitt, 1990; Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988). 
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A good example of employees' ownership is Amersham International. Their employees 
were able to subscribe to shares priced at £1.42 (the issue price), and exercise this option in 
either April 1987 or April 1989. In the British gas sale, for example, 93 per cent of 
employees own shares in the company (see Estrin, Grout and Wadhwani, 1987; and Grout, 
1987). 
The convergence of interest hypothesis predicts that a firm's value increases as managerial 
equity ownership rises. Jensen and Meckling (1976) analysed how a firm's value is 
affected by the distribution of ownership between inside shareholders who can consume 
perquisites, and outside shareholders who cannot. According to Earle (1998) there is a 
positive impact of private ownership, relative to state ownership, on labor productivity, and 
most of this is due to the positive effects of managerial and other employees ownership. 
Within this framework, increased managerial ownership of equity alleviates agency 
difficulties by reducing incentives to consume perquisites and expropriate shareholders' 
wealth. This reduces the potential for misallocation of resources, enhancing the firm's 
value (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; and Kay, 1987). 
Similarly, Demsetz (1968) argues that non-management insiders with large shareholdings 
are effective monitors of a firm's activities, suggesting that increased ownership 
concentration enhances a firm's value (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
However, Fama and Jensen (1983), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) argue that increased 
insider ownership-concentration permits managerial consumption of perquisites and the 
entrenchment of incumbent management by reducing the probability of bidding by outside 
agents, thus reducing the firm's value. Several empirical studies have estimated cross- 
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sectional regressions to assess the relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
value, but have reached conflicting conclusions. 
The theory of property rights argues that a transfer of ownership from state-owned to 
private will enhance the efficiency of the firm because of the better incentive system and 
control mechanism associated with private ownership. These are said to derive from the 
benefits associated with residual claimants. State assets are not owned; there are no clear 
rights for residual claimants; and the exchange of rights does not exist (see Forsyth and 
Hocking, 1980; Furubotu and Pejovich, 1972). 
The major difference between state and private ownership is the transferability of property 
rights. The rights of the shareholder in state-owned ownership do not include in the right of 
saleability or exchange of the right, because the right is purely `nominal' (Alchain, 1965; 
Millward and Parker, 1983). If there are shareholders of a state-owned firm who are not 
happy with the performance of the firm, they cannot sell their shares. This causes less 
pressure from the top, or from above, on the management of a state-owned enterprise. 
In contrast, contestability of ownership is a device for managers of a private firm. If there 
are poor returns to the shareholders, the value of the firm's shares are likely to fall on the 
stock market. This gives the shareholders a signal to sell their shares and put pressure on 
the management to increase and improve their efforts. 
Many theorists have discussed the difference between state ownership and private 
ownership. Most of these theories have the same belief that competition 
in the market is 
the only single most important factor in enhancing efficiency and reducing agency costs. 
Thus, it is not the ownership that determines the success or the 
failure of privatisation; it is 
the market structure (see Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988: 7-44, for details of these theories). 
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There is no doubt that ownership plays an important role in the success or failure of the 
firm, but one must be aware that there are many factors, which could be of essential 
importance as well as ownership. The market needs a competitive environment to work 
better. It was said: "it is not enough to argue that improvements in internal efficiency can 
be obtained by changing the external economic environment without transferring 
ownership" (see Beesley and Littlechild, 1989; and Littlechild, 2000) and it seems to be a 
valuable truth. 
Logically, it is difficult to compare the performance of state-owned firms with private 
firms because these organisations pursue different objectives within restraints imposed by 
regulators and monopoly agencies. 
Private firms seem to be, in the main, interested in maximising profit, whereas state-owned 
firms' objectives are complex, unclear, inconsistent and unstable. According to Barberies, 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) the changes in ownership and management styles 
are likely to lead to a value-maximising restructuring. The complexion of aims within 
state-owned firms does not make them perform poorly in many countries. Other factors 
come into play, but the objective of state-owned firms to make profits may be an 
inappropriate criterion, with which to appraise the whole economic performance of state- 
owned firms (see Pryke, 1982 for more comparative analysis of public and private 
enterprises). 
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Changing the ownership structure of a company will have an impact on the company itself. 
This impact could affect the overall performance of the company. Competition is a very 
important factor in changing the management perspectives as a whole. Ownership transfer 
without a competitive and unregulated market seldom works. The process of privatisation 
can be a force for encouraging competition in the market-place where none existed before. 
Ownership transferred to private hands will change the image and the strategy of company 
management from state control to more commercial imperatives. The new management 
will adopt a new style and strategy in order to improve the performance of its business and 
increase the financial performance. 
Martin and Parker (1997: 178 and p. 198) provide a summary of the main changes of the 
privatised firm in the UK and explain the stereotypical view of the change process from 
nationalised industry to private sector producer. 
The improvement in the financial performance of the privatised enterprise will indicate 
whether or not the privatisation programme is successful. Other elements can contribute to 
the success of this privatisation programme such as improved services, better quality, more 
competitive prices and an increased range of products. All these elements together can be 
measured to some extent by the successful financial performance of the privatised 
enterprise. 
In this thesis, spurious claims have been avoided to be able to measure the performance of 
state-owned enterprises with that of the private or the privatised companies. Instead the 
focus is entirely limited to a comparison between recently privatised, fully or partially, 
with that of private companies. In chapters 4,5 and 6, the analysis shown, demonstrates in 
analytical terms the outcomes of the performance irrespective of the extent to which that 
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there has been any management cultural change brought about through privatisation and 
hence, ownership structure. Nevertheless, it must be implied that some changes have taken 
place, since the outcomes of the analysis will show that the general hypothesis will be 
rejected (see chapter 4). 
2.2 Regulation and competition 
Regulation may be defined as the various rules set by the governments or their agencies 
that seek to control the operations of firms (Griffiths and Wall, 2000: 525). There has been 
a shift in policy, which has resulted in the privatisation of large state enterprises with 
significant monopoly power. 
The British Telecommunications privatisation in November 1984 fostered a requirement 
for new regulatory institutions. The existence of a natural monopolistic distribution 
network in telecom, gas, electricity and water, led the government to develop new, semi- 
autonomous and industry-specific regulatory bodies to oversee the activities of the newly- 
privatised companies (Bishop and Thompson, 1992). 
The regulatory worldwide objectives were given as stated in chapter 1 as: (1) to meet 
social objectives; (2) to develop competition; and (3) to prevent monopolistic pricing 
behaviour. 
The main instrument of regulatory policy in the UK was an operating licence with which 
the former state enterprise was required to comply. Social objectives were imposed 
through certain conditions in the licence. These conditions were forced by the government 
to be provided without any reduction in the services. A good example from British 
Telecommunications was the requirement to retain the public phone booths-even when 
they were not on profitable sites. 
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Monopolistic pricing was capped by the regulator (or at least the price of those of its 
products where it is able to exercise market power), and this condition was enforced in the 
licence. This ceiling is set by reference to a formula which permits the company to increase 
its prices no more than a specified amount below the increase in the consumer price index 
(the so-called PRI-X formula). The value of X in the formula is reset at prespecified 
intervals, typically every five years (Littlechild, 1983; Vicker and Yarrow, 1988). 
The most difficult task for this regulatory policy is promoting competition policy. There is 
often scope for competition in some activities. Privatised monopolies have a significant 
degree of market power. Potential entrants face a powerful incumbent and recognition of 
this means that the licence conditions usually contain provisions, which are more specific 
than the provisions of competition policy, which apply to ordinary private sector 
companies. These companies are hybrid private enterprises, in that they have not existed 
before (specifically regulated private monopolies). 
Thus licenses usually require the utilities not to use price discrimination; cross-subsidy 
between specified activities is often explicitly prohibited; and separate profit and loss 
accounts are sometimes required for individual projects (Bishop and Thompson, 1992). 
The regulatory offices monitor and enforce compliance with the licences and seek to alter 
licences in circumstances where the initial provisions turn out not to be appropriate 
(Beesley and Littlechild, 1989). The implementation of these regulatory regimes would 
depend heavily on the regulators' enforcement. 
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The large industries with natural monopoly in the UK such as British Telecommunications, 
British Gas, British Airports Authority and the water industries are operated under licences 
containing many obligations and constraints. Independent regulatory authorities such as 
OFTEL (Office of Telecommunications); OFGAS (Office of Gas Supply); and OFFER 
(Office of Electricity) are each headed by a director-general, and monitor and enforce 
compliance with licence conditions (Beesley and Littlechild, 1997). 
The duties of regulators include protecting the interests of producers, of consumers of 
various kinds, and of employees and third parties (e. g., governmental concern). Beesley 
and Littlechild (1997) have identified the role of the actions of the privatisation regulator: 
(1) to ensure that all reasonable demands are met, and that producers are able to finance the 
provision of these services; (2) to protect the interests of consumers with respect to prices 
and quality of service; and (3) to enable or promote competition in the industry. 
The industries often see this simply as a price cap. 
The regulators' essential task is to assess the relationship between their actions (which will 
include regulatory changes as well as determining disputes and constraining prices) and the 
probability that entry will actually occur. They will need to consider the scale and the time 
path of entry and its impact on all the parties involved as well as on other potential parties 
(Beesley and Littlechild, 1997). 
The effectiveness of the regulator depends upon the scope for new entry and on the 
information available to the regulator. The regulators need to acquire adequate information 
concerning the scope for cost reductions and the extent and effects of new entry. The 
generation and dissemination of information are therefore at the heart of regulatory 
effectiveness (Kirzner, 1973). 
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The regulator remains in the background for these companies when considering the degree 
of competitive advantage, their monopoly position in their markets, and their financial 
performance compared with each other. Chapters 4,5 and 6 constantly infer the inhibiting 
present of the regulator in that the data analysed arises from the current performance of the 
companies all three of which are bounded by the regulator in each of their market. 
2.3 Overall comment 
As this study sets out to assess the financial performance of BT and other privatised 
monopolies in telecommunications, the role and actions of the regulators, now globally 
used throughout this sector, and factors such as EU competition policy, will have 
implications for the financial outcomes we are measuring. In essence, the existence of a 
regulator focused on one company, has the effect of state interference in the objectives of 
management maybe distorted in favour of the regulator and the remit of his office. 
The approach to be used in the study will be to measure the performance of the companies 
by using conventional financial measures and to introduce further sophistication by the 
introduction of new tools and further adaptations of financial models. This is in order to 
ascertain to what extent these privatised utilities have retained their competitive advantage. 
After analysing the ownership transfer and the regulation regime in the telecoms markets, 
it has been emphasised why ownership was an important element in the privatisation 
process, and it was pointed out the main reason for implementing the watchdog regime 
such as price control and controlling the anti-competition behaviour in the telecoms sector. 
The next chapter (3) is the methodology chapter, where it will cover most of the 
literature 
review on the financial tests that will be used. Chapter 3 will consider previous studies of 
BT, identify which areas have or have not been covered, and indicate the 
financial tests 
that will be used in the methodology chapter. 
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Chapter Three: The Methodology Review 
Chapter Three: The methodology review 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the main features of this thesis is to measure the financial performance of a 
privatised monopoly enterprise. 
As a group, other privatised telecoms companies will be examined worldwide to find out if 
there is any significant difference among privatised and non-privatised firms. This chapter 
also provides an explanation of some of the methodologies that will be used throughout the 
whole thesis. Popular analytical methods such as ANOVA and multiple regression, using 
data taken from the conventional financial ratios and other financial statement items will 
be employed. 
3.2 Previous studies on BT 
Table (3.1) presents the most important studies of BT that have been undertaken by other 
researchers, academics and professionals. The previous studies cover a wide range of areas 
such as regulation, ownership transfer, management, and some general discussion on 
financial performance. 
This research has been undertaken from 1980 to 2002 to discover whether there had been 
any thorough financial studies or tests on BY The results of the research revealed no 
formal financial tests had been examined and only total factor productivity (TFP) and 
labour productivity (LP) had been covered. They were the only two productivity measures 
that generally examined BT's financial performance and other privatised companies in 
different sectors without providing any detailed analysis (see table 3.1). 
-47- 
D' Souza., Bortolotti, Fantini and Megginson (2001) produced the only study that examined 
the profitability, efficiency, employment in pre and post-privatisation in telecoms 
companies globally (see table 3.1). 
There was a study partly on BT that covered the cross section of the financial ratios of 
some privatised companies without using the statistical analyatical tools (Hartley, Parker 
and Martin, 1991, see table 3.1). 
This thesis is constructed such that it avoids replication of the financial tests that have been 
examined by others. The conventional and new tests in this thesis make it original and 
more thought provoking, but that does not mean that the previous financial tests are not 
useful or valuable. 
There is a test that covered both pre- and post-privatisation period of telecoms companies 
globally (see D' Souza, Bortolotti, Fantini and Megginson, 2001). The lack of information 
on the pre-privatisation period of the sample companies, had prevented a close 
examination of the pre-privatisation period. Further, the concept of pre and post- 
privatisation performance covered many companies in different sectors in different 
countries and did not focus clearly on telecoms as such or avoid the problems of the 
differing cultural and national regimes (La Porta and Lopez-De-Silance, 1999; Lopez-de- 
Silances, 1997; Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh, 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; 
D' Souza and Megginson, 1999; and Harper, 2001). 
Other researchers have focused on comparing the performance of state firms with either 
private (Boardman and Vining, 1989) or privatised alternatives (Pohl, Anderson, Claessens 
and Djankov, 1997; Roman, Gray, Hessel and Andrzej, 1999; and Omran, 2002). Table 
(3.1) shows these studies in more detail: 
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Table: 3.1: The main BT studies 
Study Main performance measure Findings 
(s) used 
Smith, Barnard Smith (1986) Management development (a) a pattern of commitment 
scheme and involvement has been 
established (b) solving the 
soft edge of management 
Gist and Meadowcroft (1986) Regulatory regime Certain policy provisions 
needed to have effective 
regulation policy and 
constrains BT from anti- 
competitive behaviour. 
Molyneux and Thompson (1987) Total factor productivity and Buoyant labour 
labour productivity productivity growth but a 
poorer performance in 
terms of total factor 
productivity. 
Foreman-Peck and Manning Natural monopoly If BT has natural monopoly 
(1986) then, (a) performance will 
deteriorate in long term, or 
(b) industry will return to a 
monopolistic organisation 
after a number of years. 
Foreman-Peck and Manning Productivity BT was not clearly 
(1988) performing better than the 
state-owned telecom 
monopolies in continental 
Europe. 
Foreman-Peck (1989) Total factor productivity No substantial 
improvement in the growth 
rate of BT since 
privatisation. 
Hartley, Parker and Martin (1991) Employment, productivity and Results were sensitive to 
financial ratios the performance measure 
used. In general the 
performance improved, but 
this result was not 
guaranteed. 
Dutch (1991) Ownership and performance Performance was not 
related to ownership. 
Hunt and Lynk (1991) Productivity Productivity has increased 
in USA and Japan after 
liberalisation but not the 
case for BT. 
Lynk (1991) Utilises the correspondence Since post-privatisation 
between cointegration and error output data for BT in 
correction mechanisms several service areas is 
unavailable testing this has 
proved problematical. 
Trauth & Pitt (1992) Competition effects There are some forces that 
pushed for further 
competition such as 
societal, economic and 
technological. 
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Bishop and Thompson (1992, Labour productivity and total BT labour productivity 
1993) factor productivity grew in both 1970/1980 and 
1980/1990 and total factor 
productivity increased in 
1970/1980 and decreased in 
1980/1990, and in the 
second paper, performance 
of BT improves in 
competitive markets and 
overall, they conclude that 
privatised companies 
operating in competitive 
markets always improved 
their performance. 
Haskel & Szymanski (1990,1991, Employment, Wages, Job and Profits and output grew, 
1992,1993a, 1993b) Competition employment decreased, and 
no evidence of 
improvement in labour 
productivity associated with 
privatisation for BT. 
Kwoka (1993) Total factor productivity The productivity of BT has 
increased to 25% in recent 
years. 
Schneider, Dang-Nguyen and Performance through profit Increase in total factor 
Werle (1994) margins, labour and total factor productivity for BT and 
productivity privatisation of BT has an 
impact on economic 
performance in 
telecommunications. 
Parker (1994) Performance indictors such as Gains have been achieved 
labour, quality of service, R &D by BT in terms of service, 
and labour productivity overall prices, profitability 
and labour productivity 
since privatisation. 
Muller (1994) Telecommunications Regulation Establishing proper 
regulatory institutions is an 
important precondition for 
successfully restructuring 
telecommunications sector. 
Curwen (1995) Telecommunications policy in The European Commission 
EU has a problem in controlling 
the monopolistic operators. 
Dries and Seaton (1995) Daily stock market return No sign of evidence of 
overall capture of the 
regulatory regime by BT. 
Parker (1997) Total factor productivity and Increase in labour 
labour productivity productivity of BT, but 
lacklustre total factor 
productivity in BT 
immediately after 
privatisation. 
D'Souza, Bortolotti, Fantini and Use pre vs. post privatisation Increase in profitability, 
Megginson (2001) methodology output, efficiency, capital 
expenditures, number of 
access lines in service and 
average salary per 
employee, decrease in 
leverage, and employment. 
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Robinson (2000) Modelling the conditional It was found that the 
variance using daily data on conditional variance of BT 
share returns share returns decreased 
after the publication of 
White Paper in March 
1991. 
Kaisheng & Xiongjian (2000) Comparison of reform in British Some similarities and 
and China telecommunications differences between the two 
industry. countries' 
telecommunications 
industries. 
Burton and Ul-Haq (2001) Use a4 dimensional matrix to There is a link between 
examine the management external changes facing the 
strategy of the privatised firm and changes in the 
companies. Their 4 dimensions internal strategic 
are: (1) change in management processes of 
macroenvironment; (2) the subject firm. 
competitive environment; (3) 
management processes; and (4) 
the firm's relation to 4 
dimensions. 
Thoralf, Parker and Saal (2001) Profit margin, labour BT profit margins rose after 
productivity and total factor privatisation but began to 
productivity. fall in the early 1990s. Poor 
labour productivity growth 
following privatisation in 
1984, decline in TFP after 
privatisation but improves 
after liberalisation in 1991. 
Some of the studies are not related to the theme of this thesis, but they must be included to 
show the level of previous research coverage of BT. Overall, these studies give a guideline 
to indicate what has been done and what the areas of BT are that have yet to be covered. 
Molyneux and Thompson (1987) examined nine corporations including BT's performance. 
They tested the labour productivity and total factor productivity as performance measures. 
They examined three periods to analyse the productivity performance for these 
corporations and they measured the trends in productivity from 1960-75,1968-78 and 
1978-85. The following extracts show in detail the productivity performance of BT. 
Table 3.2: BT productivity measures 1960-75 
1960-75 Output per head % Total factor productivity % 
British Telecommunications 7.7* 
- . -rr \ ir-, c 
6.4* 
I. t_! TT( ___. ___ 
I 
_J 1 
Source: NEDO (National Economic Development Office), 1976. A studii of UK nationalised industries, 
London: HMSO. 
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Table 3.3: BT productivity measure 1968-78 
1968-78 Output per bead % 
1968-73 1973-78 1968-78 
Total factor 
productivity % 
`British Telecommunications 7.7* 8.6* 8.2* 5.2* 
Source: Pryke, 1981, The nationalised industries: policies and performance since 1968, Oxford: Martin 
Robertson. 
Table 3.4: BT productivity measure 1978-85 
1978-85 Output per head % Total factor productivity % 
British Telecommunications 5.8* 0.5 
Source: Employment Gazette, August 1956: Molyneux and l hompson, 1986. 
*Indicates that the trend growth is higher than the average for manufacturing industry. 
They concluded that BT had performed well above the manufacturing industry level and 
they claimed that both total factor productivity and labour productivity of BT had 
increased in these three periods (Molyneux and Thompson, 1987). 
The Foreman and Manning (1988) agreed with Kay and Thompson (1986) that the poor 
performance of BT was related to a number of reasons. First, is the manner in which BT 
was placed with the private investor. Second, BT was too large to be vulnerable to 
competition and third, BT should have been broken into a number of independent firms, as 
was the American Bell Company. They argued that smaller European telecoms companies 
in Norway and Denmark performed better than BT in general in both TFP and LP 
measures. 
In the Hartley, Parker and Martin (1991) agreed with the Molyneux and Thompson (1987) 
results that both TFP and LP revealed an improvement in the performance of British 
Telecom (BT), and this improvement was attributed to the change in the organisational 
status. 
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The Bishop and Thompson (1992) covered a longer period to the late 1980s and both 
labour productivity (LP) and total factor productivity growth (TFP) were used for their 
performance measurements at BA, BAA, and BT, the electricity supply industry, gas, 
posts, rail and steel between 1970-80 and 1980-90. They concluded that in the case of BT, 
labour productivity had improved, but with a slight decline in the results of TFP growth 
(see table 3.5 for more details). 
Table 3.5: UK public enterprises: productivity growth from 1970 to 1990 
Enterprises Annual average rates of growth 
Labour productivity % Total factor productivity % 
1970/80 1980/90 1970/80 1980/90 
British Airways 8.1 6.0 7.9 2.7 
BAA .6 2.7 4.8 .3 
British Telecom 4.3 7.2 4.6 3.2 
British Coal (2.4) 8.1 (2.2) 2.8 
Electricity 
Supply 
3.7 2.5 2.3 1.4 
British Gas 4.9 4.9 4.2 1.0 
Post Office (0.1) 3.4 0.0 2.2 
British Rail (2.0) 3.2 (1.7) 1.2 
British Steel (1.7) 13.7 (2.7) 7.0 
Source: Bishop and Thompson (1992: 1181). 
Kwoka (1993) studied: "The effects of divestiture, privatisation, and competition on 
productivity in US and UK telecommunications. " This study sought to determine the 
incremental impact of telecommunications policy on productivity of the leading firms in 
the US and UK industries. He concluded that, BT's TFP had increased by 25% compared 
with the 17% productivity increase in the AT&T. 
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The Parker (1997) supported Bishop and Thompson (1992) that the LP increased whereas 
the TFP showed a lacklustre performance for BT. He pointed out that this lacklustre TFP 
performance of BT was in the years immediately after privatisation, but with performance, 
especially labour productivity, rising quickly in response to increased competition after 
1990.1 
D'Souze, Bortolotti, Fantini and Megginson (2001) examined the pre- versus post- 
privatisation financial and operating performance of firms from 26 national 
telecommunications industries in 21 countries that were fully or partially privatised 
through public share offerings between November 1984 and October 1997. They found 
that profitability, output, efficiency, capital expenditures, number of access lines in service 
(a proxy for quality of goods sold) and average salary per employee all increased 
significantly, leverage decreased significantly, but employment decreased insignificantly in 
the BT case. They attributed profitability gains due to greater output and productivity, 
rather than to output price increases, and the efficiency gains resulting from better 
incentives and cost control, rather than from wholesale firing of employees. 
Thoralf, Parker and Saal (2001) examined: "Economic performance in European 
Telecommunications, 1978-98: a comparative study. " Performance was measured in terms 
of profit margins and labour and total factor productivity. 
Their results show that there is considerable variation in both profitability and productivity 
of telecommunications operators across Europe, compared with the USA and Japan (these 
two countries were introduced into the study as international benchmarks). The study, 
however, provided scant evidence that privatisation has had a reliable and favourable 
Molyneux & Thompson (1987) report buoyant labour productivity growth in state-owned UK 
telecommunications between 1978 and 1985, but a poorer performance in terms of TFP. Europe Economics 
(1998) report labour productivity growth figures for BT since 1980s that are higher but not 
dissimilar in trend 
to our results. 
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impact on economic performance in telecommunications in the absence of market 
liberalisation. BT had recorded a steady growth in TFP, but the improved performance 
lagged privatisation and was more closely timed to the introduction of full competition in 
UK telecommunications from the early 1990s. 
In order for this study to progress from the earlier contributions, it is necessary to employ, 
more thoroughly, conventional financial techniques and to adopt where possible new 
measures for analysing the financial performance of a privatised monopoly utility such as 
BT. 
ANOVA and multiple regression tests are very appropriate and useful tools to implement 
meaningful comparisons and to analyse deteminant factors, and they provide the thesis 
with a range of additional results, allowing for a variety of variables to be tested. 
3.3 ANOVA Test 
The ANOVA test is used to examine the seven variables of this study, and discover which 
variable is the most significant for distinguishing between the privatised and non-privatised 
groups. 
One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) has been of interest to many academic and 
student researchers to analyse a set of samples to see if there is any significant difference 
among these samples. 
Sirotnik (1971: 36) applied the ANOVA test of the mean in relation to paired comparison 
(correlated) t-tests and 1 way ANOVA. He found that the variability of means between 
groups in the ANOVA had not been used in previous tests (see Winter, 1962; Lindquist, 
1956; Edwards, 1968; Myers, 1967; Kirk, 1968; Hyas, 1963; and Kempthorne, 1952). He 
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concluded that the one way ANOVA test produces good results for a limited set of 
samples. 
Levy (1980) applied nonparametric applications of Shaffer's extension of Dunnett's 
procedures. He uses the Kruskal-Wallis procedure, Friedman procedure, and Cochran 
procedure in the one way ANOVA test. 
Atrill, Omran and Pointon (2002) examined: "Shareholders versus stakeholders: corporate 
mission statements and investor return. " They used the ANOVA test to see whether or not 
there was a significant difference between the mean return of the shareholder and 
stakeholder sample. They concluded that there is no significant difference in shareholder 
returns between stakeholder-oriented and shareholder-oriented companies on the basis of 
the test outcomes. 
Girden (1992) applied ANOVA to "repeated measures" and Maxwell and Riccardo (1999) 
extended the analysis of variance in more detail and demonstrated how anyone can 
calculate every procedure of the AVOVA test in more mathematical ways rather than 
relying on the ANOVA computer programme. 
Other researchers have contributed to the analysis of variance in depth and they suggest 
some other techniques to use (see Bolk, 1979; Bolk and Kirk, 1977; Bray and Maxwell, 
1985; Dodd and Schultz, 1973; Hertzog and Rovine, 1985; O'Brien and Kaiser, 1985; 
Rouanet and Lepine, 1970; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991; Siegel and Castellan, 1998). 
ANOVA seems to be a reliable and well tested measure for this study and it has been 
adopted in chapters 4 and 7. Relevant tests are demonstrated in chapter 4 (section 4.3). 
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3.4 Multiple regression 
Multiple regression is a technique used to describe a relationship between two or more 
variables in statistical terms, expressing predictions in values of the dependent variable as a 
linear function of several independent variables. Multiple regression tests have been used 
widely to compare the performance of certain variables (see Francis, 1988: 118). A few 
examples of many are: 
Blay and Geiger (2001) studied the market expectations for first-time going-concern 
recipients. They used multiple regression tests to compare market differentiation of 
subsequently bankrupt and viable companies. 
Another example is Landis and Dunlap (2000), where they examined how the ordering of 
variables and to what extent they were criterion specific, which would have an impact the 
presence of a significant interactive relationship in moderated multiple regression. 
VanDerhei (1987) also studied the effect of voluntary termination of overfunded pension 
plans on shareholders wealth. He examined abnormal returns using multiple regression of 
the common stock of firms with excess assets in their defined benefit pension plans. Again 
focused on specific criterion for making a choice of variables. 
The multiple regression test is used in chapters 4,5 and 6 of this thesis also apply specific 
criterion in that the model is based upon chapter 4 (section 4.3) and the following section. 
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3.5 An evaluation of the study variables 
As with Miles and Timmermann's study in (1996) this thesis has used variations in 
expected returns. This thesis has not used the pricing of equities, but the beta, book to 
market value, size, standard deviation and capital gearing instead of dividend yield, PER, 
leverage and share liquidity used by them. Their study period was 1979-91. They used the 
beta, book to market, size, dividend yield, PER, leverage, and share liquidity, as variables. 
They found out that there is no relationship in univariate or multivariate analysis using beta 
as a variable. However, this thesis has shown that there is a relationship and the beta 
variable identifies this. The MTBV (market-to-book value) according to them, has a 
significant relationship, and this thesis found that the MTBV was not significant. They 
found that there is no linear relationship to size, but the smallest of companies have a 
substantially higher return, in this thesis, size proved not to be significant. They used a 
debt/market capitalisation for gearing (leverage) and they found that this was not 
statistically significant, and this thesis agrees with this result. They concluded that the 
variables belonging to the book to market value, and to a lesser extent size and liquidity, 
were the only variables that appear to contain information about variation in expected 
returns (p. 379). Later it will be discovered that beta is a significant variable in the 
ANOVA test and the standard deviation is a significant indicator in the multiple regression 
test (see chapter 4). 
Chan and Chui (1996) made an empirical re-examination of the cross-section of expected 
returns from UK evidence, the study period was 1973-1990, and they used beta, book to 
market, size, dividend yield, PER, leverage, share liquidity as their variables. They found 
that the beta value according to them, had no relationship in the univariate analysis; and 
was negative in the multivariate analysis, unlike this thesis. The MTBV had a significant 
positive relationship, whereas size was not significant, which is similar to the findings in 
the thesis. They used total assets/market capitalisation and total assets/book value as 
-58- 
measures for leverage, and they found that total assets/market capitalisation had a 
significant positive relationship, unlike the thesis, whereas total assets/book value was not 
significant. They concluded that in contrast to Fama and French (1992), when the book-to- 
market variable is broken down into market leverage and book leverage, the market 
leverage was more significant than the book leverage, and captures the whole effect of the 
book-to-market variable (p. 1446). Some of the variables were not chosen in the thesis. 
Strong and Xu (1997) studied the cross-section of UK expected returns. The study period 
was 1971-1992. They examined beta, book to market, size, dividend yield, PER, leverage, 
and share liquidity as variables. They found that beta has a positive relationship in 
univariate analysis; none in multivariate analysis. The MTBV has a significant positive 
relationship. The small size companies according to them, produced higher returns, but 
they stated that this is not significant when book-to-market or leverage variables are 
included. They used the total assets/market capitalisation and total assets/book value as a 
measure for gearing, and found that there is a significant positive relationship. Overall, 
they concluded that no combination of variables can explain more than 8% of the variation 
of returns. According to the thesis, beta was the only significant variable in the ANOVA 
test. 
Clare, Priestley and Thomas (1998) used beta, book to market, size, dividend yield, PER, 
leverage, share liquidity, their study period was 1970-1993, and they found an 
economically and statistically significant role for beta. The MTBV had a positive 
relationship, but was not statistically significant. The size had a negative relationship, but 
was not statistically significant. They used book value of debt/market value of equity as a 
measure for leverage, and found that there was a positive relationship, but statistically 
insignificant. They concluded that there was a significant and powerful role for beta in 
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explaining expected returns but no role for the Fama and French (1992) variables (p. 
1225). Their study agrees with the results from the analysis of this thesis. 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) studied: "The anomalous price behaviour around 
repurchase tender offers. " They examined size, and found that the smaller the firms, the 
larger the period return, a result also observed by Vermaelen (1981), whose results showed 
24.31 per cent for the smallest firms versus 8.3 per cent for the largest firms with longer 
periods of return. 
Amihud and Lev (1981) studied: "Risk reduction as a management motive for 
conglomerate mergers. " They also examined capital market measures of firm risk, and 
found out that smaller banks were always exposed to higher risks. 
Mandelker and Rhee (1984) studied: "The impact of degrees of both the operating and 
financial leverage on systematic risk of common stock. " They argued that operating 
leverage acts in an analogous fashion to financial leverage in increasing the firm risk. 
Lev (1974) studied the association between operating leverage and risk, and he found that 
highly leverage firms tend to exhibit greater stock return variance. 
A study by Dufresne, Goldstein and Spenser (2001: 2185) found that the change in leverage 
and the firm equity return are statistically significant, but the economic significance is, 
however, rather weak, and the sensitivity to changes in leverage also tends to increase as 
leverage does, but that the results were more apparent in a multi-variance regression 
framework. 
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Many current researchers demonstrate that abnormal return performance and possible 
market imperfection are stronger for smaller firms (Fama, 1998). However, this can be due 
to a delayed response mechanism, which corrects itself in the medium- term (see Bernard 
and Thomas, 1989). 
Fama and French (1992: 427) studied the cross sectional return of expected stock, and they 
commented that there were two easily measured variables, size and book to market equity. 
They combined these effects to capture the cross- sectional variation in average stock 
returns, as well as the effect of market ß (beta), and leverage. They concluded that there is 
no reliable relationship between beta and the average returns. But beta was found to be 
significant in this thesis. 
Furthermore, they indicated that both the size and book-to-market equity provide a simple 
and powerful characterisation of the cross-section of average stock returns for the 1963- 
1990 period (p. 429). Fama and French (1993) examined five common risk factors in the 
returns on stocks and bonds. They concluded that size and book-to-market equity are 
important factors in determining and affecting return on the stock market (see Fama and 
French, 1988; Fama and MacBeth, 1973). 
Banz (1981) studied the relationship between return and the market value of common 
stocks, and he found that the most prominent was the size effect. He discovered that 
market equity, ME (a stock's price times shares outstanding), adds to the explanation of the 
cross-section of average returns and found that the average returns on small (Low ME) 
stocks are too high given their ß estimates, and average returns on large stocks are too low. 
However, size did not appear to have a significant relevance in this thesis. 
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Kothari and Shanken (1997) studied the book-to-market, dividend yield, and expected 
market returns using a time series analysis. They made a comparison between the 
forecasting ability of B/M ratios and dividend yield. They stated that book-to-market 
(B/M) ratios and dividend yields were useful indicators over the period 1962-91 and sub- 
period 1941-91 during time series variation in expected real stock return. The thesis 
disagrees with the results of this study. 
Berk and Berk (1995) studied the critique of size-related anomalies. They argued that the 
size-related regularities in asset prices should not be regarded as anomalies in the stock 
market return. There is a relationship between market value and expected return and this 
book-to-market equity ratio is a better predictor of return than market value. The thesis 
disagrees in that MTBV was a better predictor of performance for telecoms. 
3.6 The importance of the standard deviation variable 
In the study, the standard deviation has proved to be a very significant measure for 
comparing the privatised and non-privatised groups and justifies this approach. The 
standard deviation approach has been revived largely as a consequence of contemporary 
usage (Yoram, Levy and Markowitz, 1984) and given its prominence as a variance element 
in Markowitz 1959 and 1991 (second edition). 
Of course the variance, and hence the standard deviation is used in mean-variance analysis 
(Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1998; White, 1997; Miller and Leiblein, 1991; Wu, 1995; 
Coffee, 1995; and Nielsen, 1992). There is, however, an implied condition that the data set 
is normalised or a sufficiently large sample size is taken to permit a normal distribution in 
order to use the standard deviation for this purpose. 
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3.7 Random Walk with Drift Method 
Because of the importance of information on share price movements, it has been decided to 
use the random walk model to forecast the future financial performance of the three 
telecoms companies (BT, AT&T and NTT) and this can be seen in chapters 5 and 6. 
A random walk with drift model is an artificial approach rather than relying upon data 
prepared by professional forecasters, which would most likely to subjected to short- 
termism and would reflect the distortion of the market collapse in 2000 and 2001 when the 
telecoms bubble burst. 
The price of shares move in a random fashion-one day's price change cannot be predicted 
by looking at graphs of any of the previous day's price change. The random walk model 
occurs because the share price at any time reflects all available information as it randomly 
arises (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Successive price changes will be independent and prices 
follow a random walk because the next piece of news (by definition) will be independent 
of the last piece of news (see Arnold, 2002: 608). 
According to Keane (1983: 11) the random walk model is still a special case of the fair 
game model, and more specifically concerned with the sequence of price changes over 
time. The fair game model expresses efficiency in terms of the opportunities for 
speculators to earn excess returns. He adds (p. 34) that the tests of form of efficiency have 
their origins in what has come to be known as the random walk theory. 
The name random walk theory derives from a series of markets studies carried out by 
researchers, mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, which indicated that the sequence of share 
price movements over time far from forming prophetic patterns, are quite consistent with 
being a series of cumulative random numbers. 
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For example, an early study by Kendall (1953) was presented as a paper to examine the 
security and commodity price movements over time, but he failed to identify any of the 
regular price cycles (see also Roberts, 1959; and Alexander, 1961). 
The random walk emphasises the importance of information on the share price movements. 
The assumption behind this model can be explained by Fama (1970) when he produced a 
three-level grading system to define the extent to which markets were efficient. Fama's 
market efficient system agrees with the random walk model, reflecting the importance of 
information on the share price movements. 
Fama (1970) produced three types of investment approaches, which were supposedly 
designed to produce abnormal returns. The first form is weak-form efficiency, where share 
prices fully reflect all information contained in past price movements. The second form is 
semi-strong form efficiency, where share prices fully reflect all the relevant publicly 
available information (including earnings and dividends announcements, rights issues, 
technological breakthroughs, resignations of directors and so on). 
The third form is strong-form efficiency, where all relevant information, including that 
which is privately held, is reflected in the share price (insider dealing). (For further detail 
of the efficiency market theory see Copper, 1974; Firth, 1977a and 1977b; DeBondt and 
Thaler, 1985; Dissanaike, 1997; Hong and Stein, 1999; Sullivan, Timmermann and White, 
1999; and Shleifer, 2000). 
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In weakly efficient markets, current prices respond instantaneously and without bias to 
new information, which implies the absence of price regularities with any prophetic 
significance (Fama, 1970). Markets that are weakly efficient may be described by the 
process: 
Pt - Pt-1= Xit (Equation 3.1) 
where Pt is the market price in period t, and Pt_, is the price in period t-1. The random error 
term xit, is sometimes referred to as "white noise, " where E (xit) = 0, E(xitxit_1)= 0. 
Equation 3.1 is known as a "random walk" model. It says that the best estimate of the 
current price of a security is the price that prevailed in the previous period. A variation of 
this process is: 
Pt - Pt_, = Zeta + xit (Equation 3.2) 
where is zeta a constant parameter. This model is known as a "random walk with drift" 
(Webster and Szenberg, 1995: 11). 
3.8 The importance of dividends and dividend policy 
Dividends play a central role in traditional models of stock valuation. Dividends constitute 
the primary cash payment to stockholders- the greater the expected future stream of 
dividends, the greater the value of the stockholder's share (Carlson, 2001). 
Asquith and Mullins (1986); Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson (1986); Healey and Palepu 
(1988) express that dividend policy is used by managers to convey private information to 
outsiders, and that prices adjust to this information. 
The stability of a firm's dividend policy may provide information to investors about its true 
value, and this attribute may be particularly useful in attempting to differentiate high value 
firms from their lower-value counterparts, which currently have high payout levels 
(Gwilym, Morgan and Thomas, 2000: 262). 
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Modigliani and Miller (1961) argue that dividend policy is irrelevant to valuation. They 
claimed that the value of the company is not affected by whether it pays the dividends and 
raises funds through an equity issue, or uses only the retained earnings without any 
dividends being paid. They argue as long as a company maintains its investment plans it 
can pay whatever it likes in dividends at the end of the year, without affecting the 
underlying value of the company. 
According to Barker (2001: 31) Modigliani and Miller's conclusion (1961) suggested that 
there is no reason to expect some sort of direct relationship between current dividends and 
future dividends, implying that (even though the Dividend Discount Model remains valid) 
current dividend-based valuation is without foundation. He adds (p. 32) that the most 
fundamental problem of all, however, is that dividend-based valuation models do not 
address the determinants of dividend growth, and he argues that on account of erratic 
growth they do not help in explaining the relationship between current dividends and 
future dividends. 
Penman (1992) has termed the `dividend conundrum', whereby `price is based upon future 
dividends, but observed dividends do not tell us anything about price'. 
3.9 Dividend Yield forecasting method 
The dividend and earnings yields forecast is a standing tradition among academics and 
researchers. Fama and French (1988) find that dividend yields forecast future returns and 
that the forecasting power of individual yields increases with the return horizon. 
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Campbell and Shiller (1988) find evidence that log dividend yield causes real dividend 
growth. Hodrick (1992) confirms that dividend yields forecast significant persistent 
changes in expected stock returns. 
Kothari and Shanken (1992) regress stock returns on current and future changes in 
dividends, and find that a high percentage of return variance can be explained by future 
changes in dividends. 
There were some other studies that document the forecasting power of dividend yields. 
Black and Scholes (1974) examine the cross-sectional relationship between the dividend- 
price ratio and average returns. Several other studies find that stock returns are predictable 
(DeBondt and Thaler, (1985,1987); Lehmann, 1990; and Fama, 1991). 
According to Wu and Wang (2000: 100) the dividend yields predict future returns because 
of their ability to forecast the mean-reverting component of returns and the permanent 
component of future earnings growth, and the yields contain information about future 
returns and growth. 
Both Fama and French (1993,1996); Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (1998) find that 
stocks with higher dividend yields earn higher risk-adjusted returns. 
3.10 Forecasted earnings yield approach 
Fama and French (1992) show that stocks with high earnings yield earn higher returns. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) find those stocks with low prices relative to 
earnings, dividends, cash flows, book assets and sales growth tend to have higher returns. 
Fama and French (1988); and Lamont (1998) find that earnings yield convey information 
similar to dividend yields. 
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Many studies have directly addressed the issue of forecast rationality in the forecast 
earnings (Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld, 1992). 
The body of literature examining analyst's earnings forecasts is large, and many studies 
have directly addressed the issue of forecasting rationality. Recent studies are by Pesando, 
1975; Mullineaux, (1978,1980); Brown and Maital, 1981; Figlewski and Wachtel, 1981; 
Keane and Runkle, 1990; and some others. 
Ackert and Hunter (1995) examine the rational expectations and security analyst's earnings 
forecasts, and they rejected analyst-forecast rationality. 
Beaver et al. (1980,1987), and Collins et al. (1987) show that past stock returns reveal 
information about future earnings. If analysts' forecasts are efficient, this information 
should be reflected in their estimates (Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld, 1992). 
Stickel (1990) uses the change in the mean consensus forecast of other analysts since the 
date of the analyst's current outstanding forecast to predict the individual analyst earnings 
forecast. He finds that updated forecasts are less biased and more accurate predictors of 
future forecasts than the analyst's current forecast. 
Earnings represent an important variable in stock valuation and selection. Earnings are 
assumed to move with cash flows and their forecast is considered, therefore, important for 
predicting future returns (Givoly, 1985). 
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Many researchers have begun to focus on analysts' earnings forecasts as a proxy for 
unobservable market expectations. Givoly and Lakonishok ( 1979) and Elton, Gruber and 
Gultekin (1981) show that stock price movements are correlated with revisions in analysts' 
forecasts of earnings. 
Fried and Givoly (1982) compare the association between stock price movements and the 
prediction errors of analysts' forecasts and time-series models and find out that investors 
behave in a way, which is more consistent with analysts' forecasts being the surrogate for 
market expectations of earnings (see Gonedes, Dopuch and Penman, 1976). 
3.11 An evaluation of both dividends and earnings yields 
Shiller (1984); Fama and French (1988) estimate regressions of returns on either the lagged 
dividend yield or the lagged earnings yield, and find that both have explanatory power, but 
that the dividend yield has greater explanatory power. 
Both Fama and French (1988); Wu and Wang (2000) find that the forecasting power of 
dividend yields increases with the time horizon, and the forecasting power of dividend and 
earnings yields persists over a longer horizon. 
Dividend yields forecast future dividend growth (see Campell and Shiller 1988), dividend 
yields are significantly associated with future stock returns, and earnings yields provide 
information similar to that conveyed by dividends yields (Wu and Wang, 2000: 100). 
Bernartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) assume that dividend changes are positively 
associated with recent earnings changes, but not good predictors of future earnings growth. 
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3.12 Common measures of the market performance 
3.12.1 P/E ratio 
The PE ratio is a ratio of the share price to its earnings per share, and it is a useful measure 
of the market's assessment of the firm's growth opportunities (Kumar and Kumi, 2001: 25). 
The calculation of the PE ratio varies, some analysts calculate it differently, such as by the 
use of current price or future price, and current earnings or future earnings (Pratt, 2001). 
But Penman (1996) demonstrates that PE ratio is related to both current and expected 
profitability. 
According to Pointon (2002b: 3), though the price earnings ratio is a popular parameter for 
providing an initial estimate of the cost of equity; nevertheless, the current price-earnings 
inverse typically understates the true cost of equity (p. 7). Just as the year-ahead dividend 
to the current price is used in a dividend model, a year-ahead earnings figure may be 
applied to a current price in an earnings model. With a growth in earnings, the current 
price-earnings inverse is typically an underestimate of the cost of equity. 
The PE inverse was used as a predictor to calculate the equity cost of capital under the 
competitive advantage model (Pointon, 2001). 
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3.12.2 CAPM 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) is the most popular method in 
estimating the required rate of return on equity capital (Graham and Campbell, 2001; Al- 
Ali and Arkwright, 2000). CAPM is an explanation of how financial assets are priced in 
capital markets, and it demonstrates that the expected return (and hence the price) of an 
asset is directly and linearly related to its risk, and the higher the risk of an asset, the higher 
the return that the asset must offer investors in order to induce them to buy and hold it 
rather than some other security (Davies al et., 1999: 13). 
CAPM recognises that the marginal risk of an asset is what matters to investors and that 
they are not concerned with the total risk of an asset (because the unsystematic component 
of the total risk can be diversified away), and the beta of a security is a measure of this 
marginal risk, assuming that investors hold a well diversified portfolio (Davies al et., 
1999: 31). 
According to Besley and Brigham (2000: 200) the CAPM model is used to determine the 
required asset return, which is based on the proposition that any asset's return should be 
equal to the risk-free rate of return plus a risk premium that reflects the asset's non- 
diversifiable risk. 
David et al. (1999: 23 1) state that CAPM is an equation that the expected rate of return on a 
project is a function of: (1) the risk free rate; (2) the investment's systematic risk; and (3) 
the expected risk premium for the market portfolio of all risky securities. 
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Zavi and Merton (1998: 299-300) argue that CAPM is a theory about equilibrium prices in 
the markets for risky assets and it is important for two reasons. First, CAPM provides a 
theoretical justification for widespread practice of passive investing known as indexing. 
Indexing means holding a diversified portfolio in which securities are held in the same 
relative proportions as in a broad market index such as the Standard and Poor's 500 or the 
Morgan Stanley index of international stocks. 
Second, CAPM provides a way of estimating expected rates of return for use in a variety of 
financial applications. For example, risk-adjusted expected rates of return are needed as 
inputs to discounted cash flow valuation models for stocks and in computing net present 
value when making capital budgeting decisions. For a further depth explanation of the 
CAPM, see Rosenberg (1981). 
However, evidence by Fama and French (1992) indicates that over the period 1963 to 
1990, differences in beta do not explain differences in the performance (rates of returns) of 
stocks. They found that CAPM is not particularly effective at forecasting a stock's rate of 
return, and they concluded that beta is a "dead measure. " 
Other studies have defended the CAPM model and found that betas were significant. Chan 
and Lakonishok (1992) evaluate the entire period from 1926 to 1991 and found that for the 
period ended in 1982, higher betas were indeed associated with higher returns. 
Kothari, Shankin and Sloan (1995) re-examined the issue as to whether beta explains 
variation in average return over the post 1940 period as well as the longer post 1926 
period. They found that beta has a relationship with returns. 
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Roll and Ross (1992) argue that using an index, such as the S&P 500 index or the New 
York Stock Exchange index, the betas and the rate of returns should be positively related. 
Pointon (2002a) defends the use of a beta measure in pointing out that whether the beta is 
high or low is of less consequence and what is more important is the relative value of the 
risk premium. 
Only one alternative theory has been offered as a substitute or as a possible complement 
for the CAPM. This relatively newer theory, the arbitrage pricing model (APT), considers 
multiple economic factors when explaining required rates of return, rather than looking at 
systematic risk or general market returns as a single determinant of an investor's required 
rate of return, but does not meet the requirement of this thesis, because CAPM is part of 
the competitive advnatage model that has been chosen and is used in chapter 6 (section 
6.6.2) (see Bower et al., 1986; Ross et al., 1996; Elton and Gruber, 1987, for more details 
of APT). 
3.13 An innovative approach to the use of ratio analysis 
3.13.1 Competitive advantage model 
The competitive advantage model looks at the future as a healthy and strong sign for the 
evaluation of the performance of a firm. If a firm has a competitive advantage, it means 
this firm retains the sustainable growth and opportunities for further future growth. The 
competitive advantage can be seen clearly in companies with a strong brand name, 
protected patents and market leader position such as Microsoft (Financial Times, 1998: 17; 
and Economist, 1999). 
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Some others have examined key attributes of organisational effectiveness such as corporate 
reputation (such as quality of management as well as their products and services), the 
ability to develop talented people, and to innovate (Al- Najjar and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2001). 
The explanation of Porter's work can be seen in chapter 6 (section 6.1). 
Others have seen the competitive advantage as a way of having economies of scale, and 
barriers to entry, such as the choices in the telecoms sector (Pointon, 2002b). 
Shapiro and Balbirer (2000) suggest that technology-based companies can enjoy some 
privileged position, which indicates a competitive advantage as in the case with the choices 
in the telecoms sector. 
According to Pointon and Boston (1999) when the competitors follow the technology, they 
can take away the competitive advantage from the corporate innovators. 
The competitive advantage can be seen clearly in the main telecoms companies, where 
most of them, if not all, hold a high market share and private or public monopoly of 
networking and services. A good example is BT, whereas of today, more than 50 per cent 
of the market share in the UK is owned by BT. BT has a private monopoly of the 
networking and the rule of regulator (OFTEL) is trying to shrink this monopoly through 
putting a cap on the price charges and to regulate its behaviour. 
Because of the importance of competitive advantage, in calculating the equity cost of 
capital a competitive advantage model will be used in chapter 6 for the three important 
telecoms companies (BT, AT&T and NTT) 
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This competitive advantage model was used for the first time by Pointon, and the 
importance of this model and its formula is explained by Pointon (2001 and 2002b). This 
model is critically examined in chapter 6 (section 6.6.1). 
3.13.2 Cost of capital 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Solomon (1963) suggest a definition for the true cost of 
capital that has gained general acceptance. They define it as the discount rate that equates 
the capitalised value of a firm's expected future cash flows to the firm's value. 
While the cost of capital is simple in concept, it is quite complex in practice. It depends on 
the rates of return demanded by shareholders and bondholders, the tax system confronting 
the corporation, and a variety of auxiliary aspects of firm behaviour. Any attempt to 
estimate the cost of capital must rely on a variety of assumptions about corporate financing 
and investment practices. However, data for firms in different nations are rarely 
comparable, requiring further assumptions and approximations (Poterba, 1990: 20). 
Brealey and Myers (1991) suggest that the cost of capital is the expected return that is 
foregone by investing in a (capital investment) project rather than in comparable financial 
securities. The emphasis of this definition is that the cost of capital is an expected return, 
which investors expect to receive from their investment. 
The cost of capital relates to the returns on new investments and their risk, and not to past 
investments and funding sources. It depends on the use of funds and not on their sources, 
and relates to the particular project being considered (Davies al et., 1999: 2). There are 
various techniques for calculating the overall cost of capital, and the most popular one in 
the literature is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). It is important to estimate 
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the cost of equity, cost of debt and the relative proportions of debt to equity in order to 
calculate the WACC. 
There are several aspects that need to be considered when examining the cost of capital of 
a firm. First, is to adjust the costs for changes in risk. Second, is to recognise that costs will 
depend, in part at least, on the proportion of debt to equity, and changes in the proportion 
of debt to equity will have an impact on the relative costs of debt and equity and hence, on 
the cost of capital. 
The focus in this thesis is to pursue the study through an analysis of financial performance 
because it gives consistency for measuring performance between companies with different 
management styles, culture and forms of regulation. 
3.14 Concluding comments 
The main methodologies that will be used in this thesis have been covered and listed, and 
various financial tests to be undertaken have been examined. However, the financial 
studies of BT did not use the statistical methods and models used in this thesis. This thesis 
sets out to examine three issues relating to the privatisation of telecoms companies. The 
first issue: is how to compare and contrast the financial performance of the fully, the 
partially privatised and private companies in telecoms. The second issue: is how to 
compare the financial performance of three major companies in the telecoms sector, which 
are chosen to represent the three categories, namely BT (fully privatised), NTT (partially 
privatised) and AT&T (private). 
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The next chapter (4) is a global telecoms financial examination of privatised and non- 
privatised groups. Seven variables will be used to test the financial performance of both 
privatised and non-privatised groups in order to find if there are any significant financial 
differences between these groups. This is in fulfilment of the first issue, which is how to 
compare and contrast the financial performance of the fully, the partially privatised and 
private companies in telecoms. 
The seven variables chosen are: return index, standard deviation of returns, gearing, 
MTBV, market value (MV), beta and a dummy variable (Privatised/non-privatised). Most 
of these variables have been chosen by previous reseachers in several industrial cross- 
sectional evaluations. The standard deviation has been included in this thesis largely as a 
consequence of studies conducted by Atrill, Omran and Pointon (2002). A further 
discussion on the choice of variables can be found in the following chapter 4 (section 4.3). 
ANOVA and multiple regressions tests will be the main two tests to be used in chapter 4. 
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Chapter Four: Global Financial study 
Of the Telecoms Market 
Chapter Four: Global financial study of the telecoms market 
4.1 Introduction 
Recently many state-owned telecoms companies have been privatised to promote a better 
service and quality of products. This process has also enabled them to enter the global 
market and compete with different companies in different countries. The investigation in 
this chapter therefore uses all the privatised companies in the global market, excluding 
those privatised after 1999 (due to the short time-scale of data). See table 4.32 for the 
privatised companies' sample for the study. 
However, hardly any of the companies in the sample are fully privatised. It needs to be 
mentioned that BT has been privatised much longer than the other companies. BT is fully 
privatised and expanded globally, whereas the others are still very much in the early stages 
of the global development to compete with each other for the survival in the global 
telecoms market. A separate investigation will be made for BT and two other global 
players, in chapters 5 and 6, which are more suited to a comparison with BT, because of 
their similar size, and similar range of operations. 
The nature of the investigation is to examine whether the privatised group of telecoms 
companies perform significantly differently from the group of private-based companies. 
Hypothesis 1 
The general hypothesis 1 states that the privatised telecoms companies perform differently 
from their non-privatised (private) counterparts, given the present contestability. 
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4.2 ANOVA and Multiple regression tests 
Little past research has concentrated on pre- and post-privatisation for telecoms globally 
with the exception of D'Souza, Bortolotti, Fantini and Megginson, 2001, who found, 
performance improved post-privatisation. However, their attention was directed at 
accounting ratios and employment productivity rather than at a full multiple regression 
analysis of share price performance. An analysis of share price performance is more 
market base and would concentrate on providing an external viewpoint rather than mainly 
focusing on internal drivers of performance. Other studies have examined pre- and post- 
privatisation performance, but have not focused on telecoms (La Porta and Lopez-De- 
Silance, 1999; Lopez-de-Silances, 1997; Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh, 1994; 
Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D' Souza and Megginson, 1999; and Harper, 2001). 
The study takes the discussion into the realm of examining the telecoms companies after 
privatisation and contrasts them with companies who were always in the private sector. 
ANOVA tests are used to determine the individual contribution of each chosen critical 
factor in the determination of the share price. By contrast, the multiple regression tests 
examine the contribution of the combination of critical factors simultaneously; although 
they also deal with individual contributions, but within the context of a model that 
encapsulates other variables also. 
The application of these two tests are standard statistical tools that have been applied in 
many other contexts. They are appropriate in the analysis of the impact of one (in ANOVA 
tests) or more (in the multiple regression tests) independent continuous dependent 
variables (see chapter 3, sections 3.3 and 3.4). Financial data readily fits such 
requirements. The multiple regression methodology does allow the use of a dummy 
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variable. This has proved to be very useful, since two different groups: privatised and 
private companies have been examined. 
An alternative approach could have been a panel data analysis. Panel data refers to the 
pooling of observations on a cross-section of households, countries, firms, etc. over several 
time periods (Baltagi, 1995: 1). There are several benefits from using panel data. These are: 
(1) controlling for individual heterogenity; (2) panel data give more infomative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degree of freedom and more 
efficiency; (3) panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment; (4) panel 
data are better able to indentify and measure effects that are simply not detectable in pure 
cross-sections or pure time-series data; (5) panel data models allow us to construct and test 
more complicated behavioral models than purely cross-section or time-series data; and (6) 
panel data are usually gathered on micro units, like individuals, firms and households 
(Hsiao, 1985,1986; Klevmarken, 1989; Solon, 1989). For the limitations of panel data (see 
Baltagi, 1995; Duncan and Hills, 1985; Hausman and Wise, 1979; Ridder, 1990,1992). 
However, the intention in this thesis is to measure year by year performance, so that 
sudden shifts in structural relationships through changes in technologies can be identified, 
and so the techniques chosen for the analysis are therefore well suited to the requirements 
of the study. 
4.3 Methodology and Identification of key variables 
The ANOVA test is used to examine six variables against the LN (return index) as the 
dependent variable, to find out if there is any significant difference between these variables 
for the privatised and non-privatised groups. For further information about ANOVA tests, 
see chapter 3 (section 3.3). 
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One-way analysis of variance for key variables is also used. This test is to compare the 
mean values of our variables for the privatised and non-privatised companies. 
The F-test in the ANOVA table will test whether there are any significant differences 
among the means. If there are, the multiple range tests will tell which means are 
significantly different from which others. 
Cochran's C Test examines the null hypothesis that the standard deviations of the 
variables within each of privatised and non-privatised groups of dummy variables are the 
same. If this is rejected, then the ANOVA result is ignored in favour of the Kruskal-Wallis 
test. The reason is that the ANOVA test of means pre-supposes a constant variance 
between the groups. If this is violated, a median test would be preferred instead. 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test examines the null hypothesis that the medians of the six 
hypothesised independent variables for the two groups (privatised and non-privatised) are 
the same. 
Additionally, multiple regression tests have been run in order to reflect possible interactive 
effects between explanatory variables, that otherwise might confound the results. In these 
tests, in order to provide a meaningful comparison between the performance of privatised 
and non-privatised firms, it was considered important to control for several key 
explanatory variables, that are likely to affect performance, they were: 
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0 Operating risk, as measured by the standard deviation of the monthly returns index 
of each company for each separate year (see Atrill, Omran and Pointon, 2002). Some 
other studies have used the standard deviation as a variable when examining their data- 
set (Thomas, 2003; Zhang and Tianyou, 2002; Batten, Craig and Warren, 2002; and 
Salman, 2002). 
" Gearing, as measured by debt to equity, since a higher proportion of debt increases 
the financial risk of the firm and so should increase the rate of return required by 
shareholders (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Fama and French, 1992; Chan and Chai, 
1996; Miles and Timmermann, 1996; Strong and Xu, 1997). However, some findings 
suggest that gearing in the UK is negatively related to the level of profitability and the 
market to book ratio (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
0 MTBV (Market-to-book-value) of the equity, since other studies have suggested that 
higher MTBVs reflect better growth opportunities, which should have an impact on 
realised returns (see Fama and French, 1988 and 1992; Clare, Priestley and Thomas, 
1998; Strong and Xu, 1997). Furthermore, expected returns are systematically higher 
for firms with high book-market ratios (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). Rosenberg, Reid 
and Lanstein (1985) suggest that firms with high ratios of book value to the market 
value of common equity stocks have higher average returns than firms with low book- 
to-market ratios. 
0 Market value of the equity, since firms with smaller capitalisations have been found 
to generate superior returns (see Fama and French, 1998), although Ashton and Tippett 
(2000) suggest a measurement miss-specification. Some other findings suggest that the 
market value is the financial determinant of performance (Adams and Hardwick, 1998; 
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Moore, 2001). Ballester, Joshua and Nishi (2002) find that the market value is related 
to the industry's activities. 
0 Beta, being the ratio of (i) the covariance of the rate of return on a share with the 
overall stock market rate of return and (ii) the variance of the rate of return on the 
overall stock market portfolio (Sharpe, 1964). Although beta is a popular measure of 
risk, it has nevertheless been strongly criticized on the basis of other empirical findings 
(Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Fama and French, 1992 and 1993). Other studies have 
suggested that small firms tend to have higher betas than larger firms (Miles and 
Timmermann, 1995: 372). 
In efficient parsimonious financial modelling, many variables are typically not utilised, and 
they necessarily imply the loss of degrees of freedom (Maddala, 1977). This affects the 
statistical power of the model. Also, if there are too many variables, each displaying at 
least some influence, there are many more interaction effects between the variables (Koop, 
2000). In the extreme case, a model with many variables may provide an excellent fit, but 
reveal little of the more important critical factors. 
The approach is to follow a positivistic paradigm that begins with an identification of 
potentially critical factors that other empirical studies have found to influence share prices. 
A phenomenological approach was not followed, which could have begun with variables 
identified from interviews with key executives staff of privatised companies, for example, 
because this would have resulted in a loss of objectivity. The reader may note that potential 
variables/factors have been reviewed already in chapter 3 (section 3.5). Some other 
variables could have been chosen, perhaps: liquidity, return on sales, interest cover, or 
sales to capital employed; but these are not normally found in stock price studies. 
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In the regressions that follow the identification of privatised and non-privatised companies 
is achieved through the use of a dummy variable. The critical result is whether this dummy 
variable significantly contributes to the combination of factors, affecting the performance 
of all companies, in the multiple regressions. In the analysis that follows, the dummy is 
referred to a 'P/Non', representing privatised and non-privatised companies. 
4.4 Data-set 
A data set has been built using balance sheet data for a seven-year period. The information 
on the privatised companies and non-privatised companies has been extracted, primarily 
via the Datastream database for the reason of data availability. Some other sources are 
used, such as annual reports, Internet and secondary sources. Naturally by using the 
telecoms market for this study, it is recognised that there are limitations enforced by the 
fact that the privatisation process is fairly recent and there are few private companies with 
which to compare. Most of the companies in the 27 companies series have only recently 
been privatised, so this has led to a constrained 7 year period for this analysis (see tables 
4.33-4.39 at the end of this chapter for the study variables). 
4.5 Problems associated with using financial models 
The privatisation timing was a chosen variable for this comparison of privatised and non- 
privatised groups to find if there was any difference between the time of privatisation and 
the dummy variable (P/Non). It has been found that there is no difference between the time 
of privatisation and performance. It has therefore been decided that the dummy variable for 
privatised and non-privatised groups is to be used instead of using the privatisation time as 
a measure against the non-privatised group. 
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4.6 Testing the model 
In order to make the test more sophisticated, international telecommunications companies 
with different markets and economies are used, from Europe, Asia, America, Latin 
America, Canada and Australia. 
The financial performance of these companies across the globe is interesting, firstly, as to 
whether or not the privatised and non-privatised groups are similar or different, and 
secondly, regarding which variable is the most influential determinant of the financial 
performance among these companies. 
A data sample is taken in several countries: 18 companies in 1995 (11 privatised, 7 non- 
privatised); 20 companies in 1996 (13 privatised, 7 non-privatised); 24 companies in 1997 
(16 privatised, 8 non-privatised); 25 companies in 1998 (17 companies privatised, 8 non- 
privatised); 26 companies in 1999 (18 privatised, 8 non-privatised); 27 companies in 2000 
(18 privatised, 9 non-privatised); and 27 companies in 2001 (18 privatised, 9 non- 
privatised). See table 4.32 for the privatised companies' sample. Note that both 1995 and 
1996 samples are small. 
There is a problem with two variables due to the lack of information. These variables were 
beta and capital gearing. The main problem was the lack of information about capital 
gearing in some years. An annual average from the data available across the time period 
was chosen for the companies where the individual years were not available. A monthly 
historical beta is used for some of the companies. 
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In using the beta calculation, the telecoms companies requiring a beta calculation were as 
follows: Japan (1995,1996); Thai (1995 and 1996); Aliant (2000,2001); Telstra (1999); 
France (1998,1999); Greece (1998); Cesky -Czech republic (1996); Deutsche (1997,1998); 
Singapore (1995); KPN Netherland (1995,1996); TDC- Tele Denmark (1995,1996); 
Telefons Peru (1995); Portugal Telekom (1996,1997); and Indonesia Telecom (1996, 
1997). 
The large telecoms companies such as the American, Canadian, Latin American and some 
Asian companies had full annual betas. The reason why some of these other companies did 
not have annual betas, might be due to the fact that some information on these companies 
were incomplete for such a purpose. 
There were also problems with the data on capital gearing in some years. The calculation 
for 2001 was based on using all the period spread (1995-2000), and calculating the average 
in order to produce a result for 2001. 
The only telecom company for which the 2001 capital gearing calculation was necessary 
was Greece Telecom (OHE-HLC). 
Capital gearing was also a difficult variable to collect where there were gaps for this item 
in the following countries: Argentina 1995 (1996+1997)/2,1996 (1997+1998)/2,1999 
(1998+2000)/2,2001 (1999+2000)/2; BCE-Canada 1999 (95+96+97+98)/4; Chile 1999 
(1998+2000)/2; New Zealand 2000 (98+99+2001+2002)/4; Peru 1998 (97+99)/2,2001 
(1999+2000)/2; Sprint 1998 (95+96+97)/3,1999 (98+2000)/2; and Tele Denmark 1995 
(1996+1997)/2. Two and three years average have been applied, because of the difficulties 
associated with gaps in data collection from published sources (certain missing years). 
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The standard deviation is important, because it is a statistical measure of the dispersion 
around the expected value. It even provides a common yardstick to use when comparing 
the dispersions of possible outcomes for a number of projects (see Arnold, 1998: 202). 
The standard deviation has been calculated to find the yearly standard deviation for a 
whole sample set of privatised and non-privatised groups. The first of January is the 
starting day and 3 1St of the same month is the second raw data day. Thereafter, the end of 
each month is used. After the raw data has been entered, the 31 St of January figure has been 
divided by the 1St of January figure to get the results of the first month. The figure for each 
month has been divided by the previous month's figure to get the results. 
To avoid scale-distortions, the LN has been used throughout with almost every variable. It 
was used with the market to book value (MTBV) ratio, for 2000 and 2001, note that there 
were a few negative numbers in those years (-68.0) for Japan. A constant was added to 
each sample for 2000 and 2001 to deal with a negative figure in MTBV. 
N. B. The (£) exchange rate against all the currencies has been used in yearly bases in the 
LN of market value variable. 
4.7 Results 
The general hypothesis 1 states that the privatised telecoms companies perform differently 
from their non-privatised (private) counterparts, given the present contestability. The 
results of the ANOVA test are presented in the following tables, which show how each one 
of these six variables is significant or not, and which of the variables is the most 
significant. For example, if the mean of the capital gearing is stated to be significant, then 
the researcher is 95% confident that the mean capital gearing of the privatised group is 
different from the mean capital gearing of the non-privatised group. 
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4.7.1 LN (Return) 
Table 4.1: The result of the log of the return 
LN (Return) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Mean Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Median Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Standard deviation Sig. Sig. Sig. Not Not Not Sig. 
There is no statistically significant difference in the mean and the median in the LN of the 
return index at the 95% confidence level, but the standard deviation of return index is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in 1995,1996,1997 and 2001. 
In 1995 and 1996, the non-privatised group exhibited a wider dispersion of LN (Returns), 
but a smaller dispersion in 2001 (see table 4.40). 
However, where the standard deviations of privatised and non-privatised companies are 
statistically significantly different, the assumption of a constant variance, underpinning the 
mean test in the ANOVA table, is violated. 
This suggests that more weight should be attached to the median test instead. The results 
clearly show that the medians of the two groups are not different, so it indicates that the 
performance of privatised and non-privatised groups is similar. 
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4.7.2 Standard deviation (risk 
Table 4.2: The standard deviation result 
Standard deviation 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Mean Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Median Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Standard deviation Not Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Not Not 
The mean and median of the risk are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level. 
The standard deviation of the standard deviations is statistically significant in 1996,1997, 
1998 and 1999 with a smaller variation in risk for privatised group. But this violates an 
underlying assumption of ANOVA test, which suggests a preference for the medians, but 
the medians are not significant (see table 4.41). 
In turn, this implies that there is no significant difference in risk between the privatised and 
non-privatised groups. 
The standard deviation result is about the same as in the standard deviation of the LN 
(return index), where both the mean and the median are not statistically significantly 
different, but the standard deviation is significant for both of them, which in turn has 
violated the ANOVA rule. 
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4.7.3 Capital gearing 
Table 4.3: The result of the capital gearing variable 
Capital gearing 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Mean Sig. Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Median Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Standard deviation Sig. Sig. Not Not Not Sig. Not 
Capital gearing shows no statistically significant difference at the 95% confidence level for 
the mean and median except for the mean in 1995 when the non-privatised group were 
more highly geared. The standard deviation is significantly different at the 95% confidence 
level in 1995,1996 and 2000 when the privatised group exhibited a wider dispersion in 
capital gearing (see table 4.42). 
The capital gearing outcomes have shown the same insignificant statistical result in the 
mean and the median as before the previous result for LN of the return index and the 
standard deviation variables, and hence SD has violated the ANOVA test rule. 
Capital gearing is not significant and previous studies agreed with the results (Miles and 
Timmermann, 1996; Clare, Priestley and Thomas, 1998). 
Other studies found that capital gearing was significant, but they used a different approach 
multiple regression (Dufresne, Goldstein and Spenser, 2001; Fama and French, 1992; 
Strong and Xu, 1997). 
It can be said that capital gearing shows no significant difference at the 95% confidence 
level for both privatised and non-privatised groups, even though the capital gearing for the 
non-privatised group was higher at the beginning of the study period. Nevertheless, the 
privatised group's gearing had increased steadily after then, which makes both privatised 
and non-privatised groups the same. 
-90- 
4.7.4 LN (MV) 
Table 4.4: The log of the market value result 
LN (MV) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Mean Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Median Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Standard deviation Sig. Not Sig. Not Not Not Not 
Both the mean and the median are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
The standard deviation of market value is statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level in 1995 and 1997. In these two years, the privatised group exhibited a wider 
dispersion of LN (MV) (see table 4.43). 
The following studies found that market value (LN MV) was not significant: Chan and 
Chui, 1996; Miles and Timmermann, 1996. Others found that market value was significant 
(Banz, 1981). 
The case for market value (LN MV) had the same result as the same for the previous 
variables, where both the median and the mean were not significant, but the market value 
standard deviation was only significant in two of the years, which makes the result 
different from previous years, where there were more than two years that show a 
significant difference in standard deviation. 
The market value is not statistically significantly different in privatised and non-privatised 
firms, which implies there are some privatised groups also with a large market value. 
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4.7.5 MTBV 
Table 4.5: The result of the MTBV variable 
MTBV 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Mean Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Median Not Not Not Not Not Not Not 
Standard deviation Sig. Sig. Sig. Not Sig. Sig. Sig. 
The MTBV's mean and the median are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level. 
The standard deviation of MTBV is largely statistically significant for all the years except 
1998. In the remaining years, except 2000, the privatised group had a lower dispersion in 
MTBV (see table 4.44). The violation of the ANOVA test has indicated that the mean 
MTBV is to be ignored. However, it has just been stated that the medians are not 
significantly different. 
It is thought that MTBV would be significantly different among the privatised and non- 
privatised groups, because previous studies have shown that MTBV is a significant 
variable (see methodology in chapter 3, section 3.5, Miles and Timmermann, 1996; Chan 
and Chui, 1996; strong and Xu, 1997; Kothari and Shanken, 1997; Berk and Berk, 1995), 
but our study has shown that MTBV is not statistically significant different at the 95% 
confidence level. 
The results, however, agree with a previous study that MTBV is not significant (see Clare, 
Priestly and Thomas, 1998). 
It can be argued from MTBV is not significant, for it indicates that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the privatised and non-privatised groups. 
-92- 
4.7.6 Beta 
Table 4.6: Beta variable result 
Beta 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Mean Not Not Not Sig. Sig. Sig. Not 
Median Not Not Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Not 
Standard deviation Not Sig. Sig. Sig. Not Not Sig. 
Beta seems a very important variable. This shows a statistically significant outcome in 
some years for the mean, median and the standard deviation. In the mean, the beta is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in 1998,1999 and 2000. In 1998, the 
mean beta for each group were substantially reduced. In fact, the beta for the privatised 
group became negative, indicating that the share prices moved in a different direction from 
the overall stock market movement (see table 4.45). However, the constant variance 
assumption of the ANOVA-mean test is violated in several years (1996,1997,1998 and 
2001). 
In 1998, the significant mean is therefore questionable. In this instance, the median test 
should carry more weight. In fact, the median is indeed statistically significant in 1997, 
1998,1999 and 2000. 
According to Clare, Priestley and Thomas, 1998; Chan and Lakonishok, 1992; Kothari, 
Shankin and Sloan, 1995; Roll and Ross, 1992 (refer to the methodology in chapter 3, 
section 3.5), beta was a significant variable at the 95% confidence level, whereas in some 
studies such as Chan and Chui, 1996; Miles and Timmermann, 1996; Fama and French, 
1992 (refer to the methodology in chapter 3), they found that beta was not a significant 
variable. 
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The study has shown that beta is the only variable that is strongly statistically significantly 
different in its median (or mean) in several years, at the 95% confidence level when 
comparing the privatised and non- privatised groups. 
4.7.7 Conclusion 
The systematic (beta) risk differed between the two groups. Thus, the role of beta in this 
study has been confirmed, due to the statistically significant difference between the 
privatised and non-privatised groups, the study confirming the results of some, but not all, 
previous studies where the beta was significant (see the methodology in chapter 3 section 
3.5). It needs to be noted, however, that the betas are based on each company's own stock 
market rather than on a global index. Some of the markets may be quite small and their 
indices may not be based on a large dataset. 
4.8 Applying the correlation matrix 
The correlation matrix shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in the fitted 
model. These correlations can be used to detect the presence of serious multicollinearity 
amongst the predictor variables. The correlations have been detected using all the variables 
except the LN (return index) and the constants. Each year has been presented to show the 
correlation matrix between them and to identify whether there is any multicollinearity 
problem. The variables are: standard deviation; capital gearing; market value; MTBV; 
beta; and dummy variable (P/Non). 
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4.8.1 Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates (1995) 
Table 4.7: Correlation matrix result of 1995 
S. D. Gearing LN(MV) MTBV Beta P/Non 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing 0.1916 1.0000 
LN (MV), 0.4138 0-5179/,: 'A 1.0000 
MTBV -0.3710 0-, l 1-13 0.1564 1.0000 
Beta -0.4366 -0.0412 -0.0420 ö 766"-'r1ý, 1.0004 
P/Non 0.1389 -O. 646 ??: 29 ' 0.1649 -0.1121 1.0000 
The correlation matrix for coefficient estimates for 1995 shows that there are four 
correlations with absolute values greater than 0.50 (0.50 is a cut off rate recommended by 
Statgraphics package). The multicollinearity problems are between (gearing, LN (MV)), 
(MTBV, beta), (P/non, LN (MV)) and (gearing, P/non). 
The capital gearing and the market value (LN-MV) have been taken out in the first 
instance, because both these variables have a correlation problem with the dummy 
variable, so it has been decided to leave (P/non), which is the dummy variable (Privatised 
and non-privatised). 
(MTBV) is used for the second case, and beta is taken out. 
4.8.2 Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates (1996) 
Table 4.8: Correlation matrix result of 1996 
'1996 Si. ' Gearing LN(MV) MTBV Beta P/Non 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing, -. 1307, 1.0000, 
LN(MV) 1758 . 4407 1.0000 
MTBV -. 1025 . 0979 -. 1614 1.0000 
Beta . 0850 . 1,044 . 2532 ., 9282 1.0000 P/Non 
. 2077 . 4182 . 4673 . 0234 . 0117 
1.0000 
The correlation matrix for coefficient estimates for 1996 show the presence of serious 
multicollinearity in one case, which indicates there is one correlation with an absolute 
value greater than 0.5. The multicollinearity problem is between the MTBV and beta. 
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However, MTBV has caused another correlation with an absolute value greater than 0.5, 
when it was chosen for the first time and we run the test, it was found that the MTBV had a 
problem with another variable, and a correlation matrix has been provided to present the 
problem as expressed in the following table (4.9): 
Table 4.9: The second correlation matrix of 1996 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing -0.1408 1.0000 
LN(MV) 0.1600 0.4305 1.0000 
MTBV -0.0637 0.5266 0.2047 1.0000 
P/Non 0.2074 0.4193 0.4800 0.0920 1.0000 
After having the problem with MTBV, it has been decided to take it out and use the beta 
instead. After testing using the beta it indicates no correlations with absolute values greater 
than 0.5. 
4.8.3 Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates (1997) 
Table 4.10: Correlation matrix of 1997 
1997 S. D. Gearing LN(MV) MTBV Beta P/Non 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing -. 1355 1.0000 
LN(MV) . 1488 -. 0060 1.0000 
MTBV -. 1438 . 0137 -. 2885 1.0000 
Beta . 1897 . 1789 -. 0768 -. 1116 1.0000 
P/Non . 1125 . 0595 . 3912 -. 2702 . 3050 
1.0000 
The estimated correlation coefficient of the correlation matrix in 1997, shows there is no 
serious multicollinearity in this year, so there are no correlations with absolute values 
greater than 0.5. 
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4.8.4 Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates (1998) 
Table 4.11: Correlation matrix of 1998 
1998 S. D. Gearing LN(MV) MTBV Beta P[Non 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing" .:. 4628 1.0000 
. 2885 0178 1.0000 
MTBV '. 3352 -. 2893 -. 0878 1.0000 
Beta -x238 . 3667 -. 3852 . 0851 1 . 0000 
P/Non : 0775 . 1183 
3556 -. 2454 -. 0639' 'I". 0000 
In the 1998 correlation matrix, there is no serious multicollinearity in this year, since there 
are no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.5. 
4.8.5 Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates (1999) 
Table 4.12: Correlation matrix of 1999 
=1.999 S. D. Gearing LN(MV), MTBV Beta P/Non 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing '-, 54767 _ oo 
LN(MV) 1325 1126 1: 0000 
MTBV . 4926 W. 4304 -. 1558 1.0000 
Beta . 4114 1395 -. 0866 
. 2422 1.0000 
P/Non -. 1639 1525 3512 -. 3312 7.6015 1.0000 
When estimating the coefficient for correlation matrix to find any presence of serious 
multicollinearity in 1999, it has been found that there are 2 serious multicollinearity 
problems, as in this case, there are 2 correlations with absolute value greater than 0.5. The 
multicollinearity problems are between (S. D. and gearing) and (beta and P/non). It has 
been decided to use standard deviation from the first case, and P/non variable from the 
second case. 
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4.8.6 Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates (2000) 
Table 4.13: Correlation matrix of 2000 
2000 S. D. Gearing LN(MV) MTBV Beta '/Non 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing', -. 5220 10000 
LN(MV) -. 0186 . 1235 1.0000 
MTBV . 3877 -. 2788 . 
0194 1.0000 
Beta -. 1756 . 0962 . 0521 . 1513 1.0000 
P/Non . 2429 -. 1931 . 1735 -. 2113 1.4432 1.0000 
In the estimation of coefficients of the correlation matrix in 2000, there is no serious 
multicollinearity problem, as there are no correlations with absolute values greater than 
0.5. 
4.8.7 Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates (2001) 
Table 4.14: Correlation matrix of 2001 
2001 S. D. Gearing ' LN(MV) MTBV Beta P/Non 
S. D. 1.0000 
Gearing -. 5773 1.0000 
LN(MV) 0.0239 0.0705 1.0000 
MTBV 0.0090 -0.0145 0.1171 1.0000 
Beta -0.2101 0.0753 0.1174 0.3709 1.0000 
P/Non 0,0081 -0,0733 0.2108 -0.2671 -0.3429 1.0000 
The correlation matrix in 2001 indicates that there is no serious multicollinearity problem, 
as there are no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.5. 
4.8.8 Observation 
It can be observed, from the correlation matrices for coefficient estimates of the 7 year 
period, that there are only 3 years out of 7 that have a multicollinearity problem. These 
years are 1995,1996 and 1999. It is obvious that the 1997,1998,2000 and 2001, for the 
privatised and non-privatised groups, do not have any multicollinearity problems. 
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4.9 Introducing the multiple regression test 
4.9.1 Multiple regression (coefficient) 
The multiple regression test will use LN (return index) as the dependent variable and all 
the other variables as the independents. The multiple regression test will explain which 
variable is the most significant and may be the financial performance indicator for 
privatised and non-privatised groups. (see section 4.2). 
The variables with serious multicollinearity problems have been dealt with by taking them 
out and running the multiple regression with the remaining ones. The years 1995,1996 and 
1999, are the ones with multicollinearity problems. Each year is discussed individually in 
the next section. 
4.9.1.1 Key words appropriate to the test 
The R-squared statistic indicates by how much the combined independent variables in the 
model, as fitted, explain the variability of the LN of the return index. 
The adjusted R-squared statistic is more suitable for comparing with different numbers 
of independent variables. 
Six variables are chosen as the independent variables. The LN (return index) has been used 
as the dependent variable. See table (4.46) for the multiple regression coefficient table of 
the 7 years period. 
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4.9.1.2 1995 results 
There are only three variables in 1995 after taking out the variables with a correlation 
problem, and the remaining variables are (standard deviation, MTBV and dummy 
variable). 
" The estimated coefficient for the standard deviation is -7.92211, which, since it is 
negative, indicates that the low risk firms have performed better than the high risk 
firms. Some of these low risk firms are privatised firms, because they are new to the 
market and they have not been exposed to market risk as much as the non-privatised 
group. 
" The MTBV coefficient is 0.0135923 and positive, which indicates that where book 
values undertake market values more strongly, returns are lower. 
" Since the dummy variable coefficient is -0.0207268, i. e. negative, it implies that the 
non-privatised group outperformed the privatised group in 1995. 
" The R-squared in 1995 is 27.93 percent, which indicates that only 27.9% is captured by 
the variables (standard deviation, MTBV and the dummy variable) it explains that only 
27.9% of variation in performance is explained by these variables, and 72% of 
performance is explained by other factors outside this model. 
" This model is not a very good model, since the ANOVA P-value is 0.1918, this tells us 
that the dependent and the combined independent variables have not a statistically 
significant relationship between them at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
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" The standard deviation is individually strong at the 15% level of significance (85% 
confidence level). 
" In 1995, the MTBV is the strongest variable among the independent variables. 
4.9.1.3 1996 results 
There are five variables (standard deviation, capital gearing, LN (market value), beta and 
the dummy variable). 
9 The standard deviation has a negative coefficient (-57.6589), which indicates that low 
risk firms have out-performed high-risk firms, i. e. they have generated higher returns 
and maintained a safer investment. 
" The gearing coefficient is positive (0.000553308), which explains that more highly 
geared firms perform better in terms of the log-returns to shareholders. The geared 
relationship is consistent with the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of capital 
structure that shareholders are compensated for financial risk. 
" The market value coefficient is negative (-0.0641857), which indicates that the smaller 
firms perform better than the larger firms. 
" With a negative estimated coefficient for the beta (-0.0453167) as an independent 
variable, the low systematic risk firm performs better than riskier firm. 
9 The dummy variable has (0.101938) coefficient, which, being positive, indicates that 
the privatised group has outperformed the non-privatised group in 1996, but not in the 
1995 year. 
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" The R-squared is very strong in 1996 at 75.45%, which explains that this model is a 
good model, and it shows that the variables are related to each other with a variation in 
performance of 75.45% compared with 24.55% of variation from other variables 
outside the selected model. 
" Since the AVOVA P-value is 0.0007, which is less than 0.01, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the five independent variables and the dependent 
variable at the 99% confidence level. 
" The standard deviation is very strong with an ANOVA P-value of less than 0.01 that 
makes the standard deviation a critical variable at the 99% confidence level. 
4.9.1.4 1997 results 
In 1997, all the variables are used because there is no serious multicollinearity problem as 
there are no correlations with absolute values more than 0.5. 
" The standard deviation shows that the low risk firms outperform the high-risk firms, 
since the coefficient for the standard deviation is negative (-22.6909). 
9 The capital gearing indicates that more highly geared firms produce superior returns to 
shareholders. Although the coefficient is not significant, this is consistent with the 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) propositions. 
" The market value again shows that larger firms perform worse than smaller firms. 
Market value has a negative coefficient (-0.0249172) in 1997. The result is consistent 
with Fama and French (1992), although it is not statistically significant. 
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" For 1997, though not statistically significant, the greater the undervaluation of the 
accounting book value compared with the market value, the worse the performance as 
revealed by a negative coefficient (-0.026147). 
9 The beta in 1997 is (-0.194479), which indicates that for 1997 firms with greater 
systematic risk performed worse, although again it was not statistically significant. 
" The 1997 results show that the privatised group outperformed the non-privatised as was 
the case in 1996, but not in 1995. The coefficient was positive (0.192985) in 1997. 
Nevertheless, it is not statistically significant. 
" The model is fitted in 1997 as in 1996 with a R-squared of 66.26%, which indicates 
that more than 66% of shareholders log-returns are related to the joint performance of 
these independent variables that are tested in 1997. Only 33% of returns are related to 
outside variables or factors. 
" The 1997 model is good overall, since the ANOVA P-value is 0.0024, which is less 
than 0.01. So, there is a statistically significant relationship between the six variables 
and the dependent variable at the 99% confidence level. 
9 The standard deviation is a strong determinant factor with a significant probability less 
than 0.01, indicating more than a 99% confidence level. 
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4.9.1.5 1998 results 
In 1998, none of variables are related to each other, nor is there a strong candidate variable 
to be more efficient than the others. Hence, a part from a brief comment on privatisation, 
the individual variables are not discussed. 
" In 1998, the non-privatised group has performed better than the privatised group 
because the coefficient for the dummy variable is negative. Nevertheless, at the 90% 
confidence level it is not significant. 
" The model is not good with R-squared of 20%, which shows that more than 80% of 
variation in performance is related to other factors, i. e. variables outside the model, and 
only 20% is related to the variation in performance of these variables in the study. The 
R-squared (adjusted) is 0.0%, which implies that this model is not good at all in 1998. 
" Since the ANOVA P-value is 0.6116, which is greater than 0.10, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable and the combined 
independent variables at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
9 The 1998 model is not a good model and there is no variable that is significant. 
4.9.1.6 1999 results 
" There are four variables in 1999, yet even at a 20% significance probability only one is 
significant, namely the standard deviation. Its coefficient is positive, which implies the 
high risk firms have performed better than low risk firms. 
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" The privatised group has performed better than the non-privatised group with a positive 
dummy variable coefficient of (0.128618). Nevertheless, it is not significant at the 90% 
confidence level. The other variables are not significant at this level either. 
" The model is not good in 1999 with R-squared of 21.85% and an R-squared (adjusted) 
of only 6.97%, which shows more than 78% of performance variation belongs to other 
factors and variables outside the study, and only 21.85% is related to the performance 
of the four variables. 
" Since the ANOVA P-value is 0.2474, which is greater than 0.10, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between the four variables and the dependent 
variable at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
4.9.1.7 2000 results 
" All the variables are used in year 2000. This is a negative (-19.2323) standard 
deviation coefficient, which implies that high-risk firms perform worse than low-risk 
firms, even though the high risk firms are expose to more risk. Nevertheless, it is not 
significant at the 10% significant level (although it is at 15%). 
9 The capital gearing result shows that low geared firms perform better than high firms 
with a negative coefficient (-0.005595). Again it is significant at 15%, but not at 10%. 
9 The other variables are not significant, even at 15%. 
" The non-privatised group outperformed the privatised group according to the 
coefficient result of the dummy variable in 2000 (-0.0655034), although it is not 
significant, even at 15%. 
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" The R-squared is somehow healthier and better than the previous years in 1995,1998 
and 1999, but not as good model as in 1996 and 1997 years. 
" The R-squared is 34.85% indicates that more than 65% of the variation in performance 
is explained by outside variables and factors away from the study variables in the 
model. With only a 34.85% variation in performance, this model indeed is not a good 
model. 
" Since the ANOVA P-value is 0.1538, which is greater than 0.10, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship overall at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
4.9.1.8 2001 results 
" There is no serious multicollinearity in 2001 and all the variables are used in the model. 
With a negative standard deviation coefficient (-7.71458) the high-risk firms have 
performed worse than the low-risk firms. The standard deviation is significant at that 
the 90% confidence level. 
9 The non-privatised group has outperformed the privatised group with dummy variable 
coefficient of -0.0159998, although this is not significant at the 90% confidence level. 
The remaining variables are not significant at this level either. 
" The model is not good in 2001 with a slight decrease in R-squared from 2000 of 
33.6142%, and 65% of the variation in performance from outside factors and variables. 
" Since the ANOVA P-value (0.1758) is greater than 0.10, there is not a statistically 
significant relationship overall at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
-106- 
4.9.1.9 Conclusion 
Despite the relationship among the variables in the multiple regression, there are only two 
years in 1996 and 1997 that show there is a statistically significant relationship among the 
variables, but in 1996, MTBV is taken out because of the multicollinearity problem, 
whereas in 1997, all the variables were used in the test. Perhaps some problems with the 
international stock markets in 1997 may have caused the model to be sensitive in that year. 
The multiple regressions have shown that there is no particular difference among the 
privatised and non-privatised groups. 
However, the standard deviation has been shown to be a strong indicator variable to be 
used as the financial performance determinant for both the privatised and non-privatised 
groups. 
4.9.2 Multiple regressions (reduced version) for each year 
4.9.2.1 Introduction 
The multiple regression (reduced version) comprises an inclusion of the privatisation 
dummy and every variable that was significant at 20% in any of the previous models of 
section (4.8). The significance probabilities of this new version are given in table (4.15): 
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Table 4.15: Multiple regression reduced version 1995-2001 
Components 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
S. D. 01.166 0.0001 0.0000 0.4298 0.1966 0.1327 0.0748 
MTBV 0.0882 --------- 0.9610 0.6486 0.2622 0.8870 0.4029 
Gearing 0.7424 0.8855 0.7304 0.1756 --------- 0.1412 0.7155 
LN MV 0.4449 0.8975 0.6819 0.9170 0.2480 
P/non 0.9982 0.4817 0.2725 0.3816 0.5074 0.7545 0.9120 
From the multiple regressions table (4.15) it seems clear that the standard deviation is the 
most suitable variable that can be used to determine the financial performance among the 
privatised and non-privatised groups. The multiple regression table (4.15) shows that the 
standard deviations are strong in 6 years out of the 7 years study period. 
Since market-to-book-value, gearing and size (LN-MV) also play a role in some years, 
some further regression tests have been applied to finalise, which variable could be the best 
one to be the financial performance determinant. 
4.9.2.2 1995 results 
Three regression tests have been used to identify the best candidate variable for 1995. In 
the first test, three variables (S. D., MTBV, and dummy variable (P/non)) are examined 
including the LN (return index) as the dependent variable for all cases. In the second test, 
both the standard deviation and the dummy variable are tested. In the third test, the MTBV 
and the dummy variable are examined. 
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4.9.2.2.1 First test 
Table 4.16: First test result of 1995 
1995, S. D. MTBV P/non 
P-value . 1069 . 
0647 
. 8425 
The MTBV is slightly better than the standard deviation with a significant probability of 
0.0647 over 0.1069. 
4.9.2.2.2 Second test 
Table 4.17: Second test result of 1995 
1995 S. D. P/non 
P-value . 3125 . 9688 
Both the standard deviation and the dummy variable probabilities are high, which indicates 
they are not strong determinants of performance of the dependent variable. 
4.9.2.2.3 Third test 
Table 4.18: Third test result of 1995 
1995 MTBV P/non 
P-value . 1690 . 6241 
The MTBV is still high when it is tested with the dummy variable. 
4.9.2.2.4 Overview 
The test shows the MTBV is better than the standard deviation, but since there is not much 
difference between them, it has been decided to record both the results in the final table 
(4.31) to show how each one of them is comparable with each other, yet it can be 
concluded that both the MTBV and the standard deviation affect performance more than 
the dummy variable (privatised and non-privatised), because the dummy variable has the 
highest P-value in all three tests. 
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4.9.2.3 1996 results 
The standard deviation has been chosen, as the best one with a P-value of 0.00, which 
indicates that the standard deviation in 1996 is statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level. The market value (LN-MV) in 1996 also shows a strong confidence level 
of more than 97%. 
Three tests were run. The first test utilises the standard deviation with the LN (MV) and 
the dummy variable. The second test takes the standard deviation with the dummy variable 
and the third test is to run the LN (MV) with just the dummy variable. 
4.9.2.3.1 First test 
Table 4.19: First test result of 1996 
1996 S. D. LN (MV) P/Non 
P-value 0.0001 0.0143 0.7163 
The first test of the standard deviation and the market value (LN-MV) shows a stronger 
relationship between the performance and the standard deviation, and between 
performance and market value, more than between performance and the dummy variable. 
Nevertheless, the ANOVA P-value (0.003) shows a strong statistically significant 
relationship between the dependent and (combined) independent variables at the 99% 
confidence level. 
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4.9.2.3.2 The second test 
Table 4.20: Second test result of 1996 
1996 S. D. P/Non 
P-value 0.0006 0.9845 
The standard deviation is very statistically significant with more than a 99% confidence 
level, but the dummy variable again has a high P-value, which indicates that the 
performance (the dependent variable) is not related to the dummy variable. 
According to the ANOVA P-value (0.0016), there is, nevertheless, a statistically 
significant relationship overall at the 99% confidence level. 
4.9.2.3.3 Third test 
Table 4.21: Third test result of 1996 
1996 LN (MV) P/Non 
P-value 0.3646 0.3783 
The 1996 third test between the performance and the market value and the (P/Non) dummy 
variable show that neither the market value nor the dummy variable is individually 
significant. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.4296) is greater than 0.10, which indicates there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between the variables overall at the 90% or higher 
confidence level. 
4.9.2.3.4 Overview 
The standard deviation proved to be the most significant variable in 1996 financial year. 
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4.9.2.4 1997 results 
The standard deviation is significant at the 99% confidence level when included with the 
MTBV, gearing, size (LN-MV) and the dummy (P/Non), but a further test is needed to 
regress the performance against the standard deviation and the dummy variable to show if 
it is still really significant. 
4.9.2.4.1 Test of 1997 
Table 4.22: The test result of 1997 
1997 S. D. P/non 
P-value 0.0000 . 2875 
The test shows that the standard deviation is again strongly significant at the 99% 
confidence level, yet the dummy variable probability is not high. The privatised group does 
not perform differently from the non-privatised group. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.0001) shows a strong statistically significant relationship overall 
at the 99% confidence level. This is clearly driven by the effect of the standard deviation 
on performance rather than by the privatisation categorisation, because the dummy variable 
P-value is higher than the standard deviation P-value. 
4.9.2.4.2 Overview 
Table (4.22) indicated that the standard deviation is the most significant variable among all 
other tested independent variables as of 1997. 
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4.9.2.5 1998 results 
The capital gearing is the variable that has the lowest P-value among all other variables. 
Nevertheless, the capital gearing has a P-value of 0.1756, which is not too low, compared 
with the standard deviation in previous years, but it is the lowest among all the tested 
variables in 1998. A test has been performed to regress performance against capital gearing 
and the dummy variable. 
4.9.2.5.1 Test of 1998 
Table 4.23: 1998 test result 
1998 Capital Gearing P/non 
P-value . 
3438 
. 
3250 
The test shows that the capital gearing and the dummy variable are not individually related 
to performance. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.1381) is greater than 0.10, so there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between the variables overall at the 90% confidence level. 
4.9.2.5.2 Overview 
Table 4.23 showed that none of the tested variables is significant, even though the capital 
gearing had the lowest P-value, but after running the test, the result indicated that none of 
the variables is significant. 
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4.9.2.6 1999 results 
The standard deviation has the lowest P-value among four variables, including the dummy, 
which suggests it might be the better one to be used as the financial performance 
determinant for the 1999. Because the MTBV has a moderately low P-value of (0.2622), 
which is not much different from the P-value of the standard deviation (0.1966). Three 
tests are run to check whether or not the standard deviation or the MTBV is the best 
variable for 1999. The LN (MV) is ignored because of its high P-value. 
4.9.2.6.1 First test 
Table 4.24: First test result of 1999 
1999 S. D. MTBV P/Non 
P-value 0.1361 0.2327 0.3732 
It can be noted that the standard deviation is the one with the lowest P-value, which 
identifies it as the better variable. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.1473) shows, however, no significant relationship between 
performance and the combined variables at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
4.9.2.6.2 Second test 
Table 4.25: Second test result of 1999 
1999 S. D. P/Non 
P-value 0.0513 0.5094 
The second test indicates that the standard deviation is very strong at the 95% confidence 
level, unlike the dummy variable. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.1381), however, explains that there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between the variables at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
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4.9.2.6.3 Third test 
Table 4.26: Third test result of 1999 
1999 MTBV P/Non 
P-value 0.0852 0.4671 
The third test indicates that the MTBV is significant at the 91% confidence level, but not 
the dummy variable. The privatised group does not affect performance differently from the 
non-privatised group, even allowing for the MTBV variations, because the P-value for the 
dummy variable is high. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.2115) is not statistically significant, however, at the 90% or 
higher confidence level. 
4.9.2.6.4 Overview 
The results indicated that the standard deviation was a significant variable, having 
compared the MTBV to discover which one was more significant than the other. 
4.9.2.7 2000 results 
Because the P-values of the standard deviation and the capital gearing are almost the same, 
three tests were performed to distinguish between the three variables (the standard 
deviation, the capital gearing and the dummy variable). 
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4.9.2.7.1 First test 
Table 4.27: 2000 first test result 
2000 S. D. Capital gearing P/non 
P-value . 1078 . 0882 . 8961 
The first test in 2000 shows a moderate relationship between performance and both the 
standard deviation and the capital gearing, but not the dummy variable. Once again 
privatisation (P/Non) is not an issue affecting performance, because again the dummy 
variable has a high P-value. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.0277) shows there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the variables overall at the 95% confidence level. So, performance is determined 
by the combined factors (although not individually affected by the privatisation dummy). 
4.9.2.7.2 Second test 
Table 4.28: Second test result of 2000 
2000 S. D. P/non 
P-value . 0137 . 7338 
The standard deviation is strongly significant at the 99% confidence level, but the 
dependent variable is not individually related to the dummy variable. Privatisation is not an 
issue affecting performance (noting the high P-value). 
The ANOVA P-value (0.0444) reveals a statistically significant relationship between the 
variables overall at the 95% confidence level. 
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4.9.2.7.3 Third test 
Table 4.29: Third test result of 2000 
2000 Capital gearing P/non 
P-value 0.0114 . 5294 
The third test in 2000 indicated a strong significance at the 99% confidence level for 
capital gearing. The dummy variable is lower when combined with the capital gearing than 
with the standard deviation. 
There is a statistically significant relationship between the combined independent variables 
and performance at the 95% confidence level according to ANOVA P-value (0.0374). 
4.9.2.7.4 Overview 
It appears that the capital gearing and the standard deviation P-values are almost the same, 
in terms of P-values, for capital gearing (. 0114) compared with (. 0137) for standard 
deviation. Both of them appear in the final table (4.31). 
4.9.2.8 2001 results 
The standard deviation is the lowest P-value variable of five (including the dummy), and a 
test is performed to see if any change might occur to the standard deviation after the test. 
A test is taken to examine the standard deviation impact of one independent variable, plus 
the dummy variable. 
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4.9.2.8.1 The test of 2001 
Table 4.30: 2001 test result 
2001 S. D. P/non 
P-value 0.0102 0.7575 
The 2001 test of the standard deviation indicates that it is a strongly significant variable to 
be used in 2001 with a 99% confidence level. The privatisation dummy (P/Non) is not 
significant, because it has a high P-value. 
The ANOVA P-value (0.0283) explains a statistically significant relationship between the 
combined independent variables and the dependent performance variable at the 95% 
confidence level. This is driven by the standard deviation and not by the privatisation 
dummy. 
4.10 Final comments 
The results of the previous reduced tests have revealed that the standard deviation is the 
best variable as financial performance determinant when a distinction is made by the use of 
a dummy variable to indicate privatised and non-privatised groups. See table (4.31): 
Table 4.31: Chosen variable 
Components 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
S. D. . 1069 . 0001 . 
0000 --------- . 0513 . 0137 0.0102 
MTBV -. 0674 ------- ------- ------- ---------- ------- -------- 
Gearing -------- -------- ------- . 3438 -------- . 
0114 ------- 
P/non 0.6241 0.7163 0.2807 0.3250 0.5094 0.5294 0.7575 
Note: figures reveal significance probabilities of explanatory variables in multiple regressions 
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Table (4.31) shows that the standard deviation is a strong candidate that might be used as 
financial performance determinant and it is the best variable in the multiple regression 
tests. It shows it is the only variable that has a low P-value throughout the years, except 
for 1998, where all the variables had a high P-value. 
Table (4.31) shows that the standard deviation is also strongly significant at the 99.99% 
confidence level in 1996 and 1997. It is strongly significant at more than 98% in 2000 and 
2001. In 1995, the standard deviation is significant at the 89% confidence level, but in 
1998 none of the variables were significant. 
From table (4.31) the MTBV is significant at the 93% confidence level in 1995 and the 
capital gearing is significant at the 98% confidence level in 2000. 
The standard deviation is the most important variable that predicts the financial 
performance, when there is a dummy for privatised and non-privatised groups. The results 
have supported the argument and many tests have been run to finalise the conclusion. 
The multiple regression test indicated that the standard deviation is statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level in the majority of years. It is to be observed that the standard 
deviation is not normally used as a variable outside the usual portfolio analysis (Kroll, 
Levy and Markowitz 1984; Markowitz 1991; and others (see chapter 3)). It can be used as 
a financial performance determinant when including a dummy for the differences between 
privatised and non-privatised groups. 
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It can be observed that the beta, in the one way ANOVA test, was a significant variable, 
but it is not significant when used in the multiple regression test, because of the greater 
range of variables included in this test. So, risk structure may differ between the two 
groups, yet performance is not substantially affected. However, risk might change between 
these two groups, because the privatised group is newly enterd the market. 
4.11Overall conclusion 
The general hypothesis 1 states that the privatised telecoms companies perform differently 
from their non-privatised (private) counterparts, given the present contestability. The most 
important part of the analysis as far as this thesis is concerned, however, is that the 
multiple regression tests show that there is no statistically significant difference between 
performance and the privatisation dummy, to reflect any distinction between the privatised 
and non-privatised groups. Therefore, our hypothesis is rejected. 
The results in chapter 4 indicated that in the regressions there were not any statistically 
significant financial performance differences between the privatised and non-privatised 
groups. However, ignoring this distinction and looking at the sector as a whole, betas of the 
individual firms were shown to be statistically significantly different in the single ANOVA 
test. The role of the betas suggests some importance attached to the national stock markets, 
which will be investigated further in chapter 5 (section 5.9). However, the standard 
deviation was a significant explanatory variable in the multiple regressions test as far as the 
combined group was concerned. 
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The next chapter (5) will examine three of the most influential players in the 
telecommunications market (BT, AT&T and NTT). These companies meet the requirement 
for comparison: one being fully privatised (BT), one being partially privatised (NTT), and 
one being a wholly private company (AT&T). 
A longer period of 16 years will be used: from the beginning of 1987 to the end of 2002. 
The multiple regression tests have been applied to establish where BT stands compared 
with the other two telecoms companies. The multiple regression test exclusively examines 
whether or not these three companies are related to each other (Hypothesis 2) or related 
more to their stock market indices (Hypothesis 3). The reason for examining this condition 
is in part fulfilment of the first hypothesis that private and privatised telecoms companies 
are not different from each other. Also, each telecoms sector, which has been chosen to 
examine, would be a representative sector of its stock market. A second part of this test 
will regress each company's performance against the others to find out which company of 
the three performs better within that data-set. 
Additionally, the model used for multiple regression will give a value for the downside- 
risk, and this can be used to give some indication of the risk exposure of the three 
companies. A further analysis will be done to forecast performance for these three 
companies using a random walk model with drift, and the reasons for using the random 
walk model with drift have been explained in chapter 3. 
The second part of this thesis, namely, the links between performance and the degree of 
interrelationship between the companies and their local stock market performance over a 
set period, is examined in the following chapter 5. Chapter 6 will continue this analysis 
with an examination of their competitive advantage. 
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Chapter Five: The Main Players 
In The Telecoms Market 
Chapter Five: Three main players in the telecoms market 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the inter-relationships and the stock market relationships between 
the three telecoms companies. The main aim is to test hypotheses 2 and 3 for three of the 
biggest telecoms companies: British Telecom (BT), AT&T and Japan NTT . 
However, in 
order to examine these three companies, a few questions need to be answered (see 
appendix 6 for the three companies' history): 
1. Are they statistically normal? Which normality test will be performed? This is 
examined in section (5.4). The importance of the test is to determine whether 
certain types of statistical analysis are appropriate. 
2. Are there any auto-correlations in performance for each company? This is 
examined in section (5.5). This test is to identify if there is any time series 
problem associated with the dependent variable. 
3. What are the downside risks for the three companies? This is examined in section 
(5.6). This test is assess the risk level associate with stock price declines. 
4. What can be inferred from a test against the forecasted figures for all of the three, 
measuring their performance against each other? This is determined in section 
(5.7). This test simply evaluates relative performance. 
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5. Are financial performances of these companies related to each other or not? This is 
determined in section (5.8). This test is important in order to examine hypothesis 
2 in this thesis. 
6. Are these companies related more to each other or more to their individual stock 
market indices? This is determined in section (5.9). This test is important to 
examine hypothesis 3, which relates to the industry versus market effects. 
7. Where does BT stand in comparison with the other two companies? This is 
examined in section (5.10). In this instance, BT is used as a bench mark. 
5.2 Industry effects 
Because the study is investigating companies in the same industry, but in different national 
stock markets, this requires to briefly consider issues relating to country and industry 
effects. 
Lessard (1974,1976) suggested that country factors are the dominant drivers in security- 
price returns. Solnik (1974) demonstrated that diversification across countries provides 
greater risk reduction than diversification across industries. 
Grinold et al (1989) decomposed global stock returns with a seven-factor model that 
included country, currency, and industry. They found that, although both country and 
industry effects were significant, country effects were clearly more important. Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994) refined the Grinold et al. model to three influential factors: global, 
country, and sector. For 12 European countries, they found that sectors accounted for less 
than 1 per cent of stock return volatility. Beckers et al. (1996) expanded this model to look 
at various combinations of global, country, industry, and sector (grouped industries) 
effects. They were unable to find statistically significant evidence of increasing global 
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integration. They did, however, find strong and statistically significant evidence of 
increasing integration within the European Union. 
One of the most surprising empirical characteristics in international equity markets is the 
low correlations between country portfolio returns. For example, between 1970 and 1998, 
the average correlation between the MSCI index returns of Japan and United States was 
0.25 and the correlation between the United Kingdom and the United States was 0.50. 
These correlations are low because the country indices correspond to portfolios that are 
well diversified in terms of the number of securities that they contain (Rouwenhorst, 
1999: 57). 
Griffin and Karolyi (1998) extended the Heston-Rouwenhorst (1994) model to study index 
returns from 25 countries. For the two-year period ending April 1995, they found that little 
stock return variation could be explained by industrial composition. However, Baca et al. 
(2000: 34) studied the rise of sector effects in major equity markets and found evidence that 
country effects no longer dominate sector effects in explaining variations in the stock 
returns of the world's seven major equity markets. 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994,1995), Griffin and Karolyi (1998), and Rouwenhorst 
(1999) show that country effects, on average, dominated industry effects during the 1975- 
1998 period. Cavaglia, Brightman, and Aked (2000), Kerneis and Williams (2000), and 
Hopkins and Willer (2001), however, point out that industry effects have grown so 
markedly in importance that they have sublimated country effects in the variation of 
international stock returns (L'Her el al, 2002: 70). 
According to Rouwenhorst (1999: 61) the country effects have been more variable than 
industry effects: the standard deviation of the country effects of 8 of the 12 countries is 
higher than that of the most volatile industry effect (energy). 
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Brooks and Del Negro (2002) construct a new data-set that covers virtually the entire 
global stock market and find for this more comprehensive data-set, that industry effects 
have grown so dramatically in recent years that they have gone from less than half to 
almost twice as important, as country effects, since the mid-1990s. According to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (2002: 2) there may be significant differences across 
regions, in the degree to which capital markets are becoming integrated within regions, a 
perspective that is lost in a purely global analysis. In hypothesis 3, which follows shortly, 
the country effects is proxied by the stock market. 
5.3 The two hypotheses 
In part fulfilment of hypothesis 1: 
H2: The financial performance of each company is positively related to that of the other 
companies. The rationale is that, in the telecoms market, companies would be affected by 
similar technological factors. This can be represented by 02, ß3 >0 where the financial 
performance of company j at time t is given by f j, t. So, for the first company: 
f 
l, t a+ 
ß2, f 
2, t+ 
ß3f 
3, t (Equation 5.1) 
H3: In a global market, company performance is related more closely to the sector (i. e. 
other respective companies) than each respective stock market. This can be represented by: 
f i, t =a+ 
ß2f 2, t+ 
ß3f 3, t+y Fl, t 
(Equation 5.2) 
where Fl, t represents the performance of the stock market index of the chosen company 1, 
and the y coefficient is less significant than ß2 and ß3, i. e its significance probability is 
larger. 
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The answers for each one of these questions is generated from the financial tests. The LN 
(return index) is used all through the tests because the sample set is very large and 
distortions have to be eliminated. The sample period begins 01/03/1987 and runs to 
01/03/2002, i. e. for 180 months. 
5.4 Are these companies statistically normal or not? 
5.4.1 Single variance test 
The normality analysis is to test a single sample of data to determine whether or not it is 
likely to be a sample taken from a normally distributed populations. A single variance test 
has been run to identify some key points for each one of these companies to have a basis 
for further analysis. This test is designed to summarise a single sample of data, and 
examines the normality situation for the samples. If they were not normally distributed, the 
test applied will be less relevant as a means of comparing each of the companies. Three 
tests will be run later for each company to give figures for interpretation. Each company is 
presented in turn to show its statistical figures and results: 
5.4.2 BT summary analysis of log of returns 
The summary statistics are helpful when one needs to determine if other statistical analyses 
might be appropriate to use with the data, or when one needs to determine if one should 
transform the data. Each company will be presented with the summary statistics to find out 
more about each of them: 
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Table 5.1: BT summary analysis of log of returns 
ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Count 180 
Average . 00667953 
Variance . 00672237 
Standard deviation . 08199 
Minimum -. 248604 
Maximum . 217113 
Range . 465717 
Stnd. Skewness -1.88492 
Stnd. Kurtosis 2.75964 
Table (5.1) shows summary statistics for BT. It includes measures of central tendency, 
measure of variability, and measures of shape. The standardised skewness and standardised 
kurtosis are used to determine whether the sample comes from a normal distribution and 
the values of these statistics test if they lie outside the range of -2 to +2, it indicates 
significant departures from normality, which would tend to invalidate any statistical test 
regarding the standard deviation. 
In the BT case, the standardised skewness value (-1.89) is within the range expected for 
data from a normal distribution, whereas the standardised kurtosis value (2.76) is not 
within the range expected for data from a normal distribution, but near enough (see figure 
5.1 at the end of this chapter). 
Hypothesis tests for BT are used to examine the centre of the population from which the 
sample of BT comes. The sample mean return for BT is 0.00667953 and the sample 
median return is 0.0 154033. 
Three tests for each one of the examined telecoms companies will be performed to 
investigate if there are any differences in the log of returns of the sample-data for each one 
of the companies. 
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5.4.2.1 The first test 
The first test is a t-test (which is to assess the statistical significance of the differences 
between the two sample mean returns for a single dependent variable) of the null 
hypothesis that the mean of BT's return equals to 0.0 versus the alternative hypothesis that 
the mean of BT's return is not equal to 0.0. Since the P-value for this test (. 275862) is 
greater than (or equal to) 0.05, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95.0% 
confidence level. 
5.4.2.2 The second test 
The second test is a sign test (which is to assess the statistical significance of the 
differences between the two sample median returns for a single dependent variable) of the 
null hypothesis. That the median of BT's return equals to 0.0 versus the alternative 
hypothesis that the median of BT's return is not equal to 0.0, and it is based on counting 
the number of values above (102) and below (77) of the hypothesised median. Since the P- 
value for this test (0.0728377) is greater than (or equal to) 0.05, so the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
5.4.2.3 The third test 
The third test is a signed rank test ((which is to assess the statistical significance of the 
differences between the two sample median returns for a single dependent variable, it is a 
more powerful alternative to the Sign test (see Statgraphics Plus 5, section 14-21,2000), 
but does assume that the population probability distribution is symmetric)), of the null 
hypothesis. That the median of BT's return equals 0.0 versus the alternative hypothesis that 
the median of BT's return is not equal to 0.0, and this is based on comparing the average 
ranks of values above (89.799) and below (92.5909) of the hypothesised median. Since the 
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P-value for this test (. 147481) is greater than (or equal to) 0.05, so the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
5.4.2.4 The results 
Both the sign test and signed rank test are less sensitive to the presence of outliers, but are 
somewhat less powerful than the t-test if all data comes from a single normal distribution. 
BT has passed all the three tests and therefore, there are no significant differences in BT's 
return sample. 
The result shows that BT is not normally distributed although it was close even to be 
normally distributed, but it fails the standard kurtosis test (see figure 5.1). 
5.4.3 NTT summary analysis of log of returns 
The results of the statistical figures show the situation with NTT: 
Table 5.2: NTT summary analysis of log of returns 
ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Count 180 
Average -. 00847566 
Variance . 00840765 
Standard deviation . 0916932 
Minimum -0.223558 
Maximum 0.441172 
Range . 66473 
Stnd. Skewness 6.57396 
Stnd. Kurtosis 10.0053 
In the NTT case, the standardised skewness value (6.57) is not within the range expected 
for data from a normal distribution, and the standardised kurtosis value (10.0) is not within 
the range expected for data from a normal distribution (see figure 5.2 at the end of this 
chapter). 
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Table (5.2) indicates that NTT is not normally distributed because it invalidates any 
statistical test regarding the standard deviation and it fails both standard skewness and 
standard kurtosis test. 
The sample mean return for NTT is -. 00847566 and the sample median return is - 
0.0176835. Regarding central tendency test, three tests are examined. 
5.4.3.1 The first test 
Since the P-value for this test (. 216545) is greater than (or equal to) 0.05, so the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95.0% confidence level. 
5.4.3.2 The second test 
The values above (74) and below (104) of the hypothesised median are found. Since the P- 
value for this test (0.0297318) is less than 0.05, so the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
95.0% confidence level. 
5.4.3.3 The third test 
This is based on comparing the average ranks of values above ( 88.1554) and below 
(93.8798) of the hypothesised median. Since the P-value for this test (. 0208165) is less 
than to 0.05, so the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95% confidence level 
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5.4.3.4 The results 
NTT is not normally distributed according to the standard skewness and standard kurtosis 
results (see figure 5.2). NTT failed to pass the three tests (the first test was accepted, but 
the last two were rejected), because of the presence of outliers such as erratic results in this 
data- set. Ignoring these results, it is possible to accept near normality. 
5.4.4 AT&T summary analysis of log of returns 
Table 5.3: AT&T summary analysis of log of returns 
ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Count 180 
Average . 00629954 
Variance . 00762761 
Standard deviation . 0873362 
Minimum -. 333153 
Maximum . 349209 
Range . 682362 
Stnd. Skewness -1.24261 
Stnd. Kurtosis 6.1707 
In the AT&T case, the standardised skewness value (-1.24261) is within the range 
expected for data from a normal distribution, but the standardised kurtosis value (6.1707) 
is not within the range expected for data from a normal distribution (see figure 5.3 at the 
end of this chapter), and so the performance measure for AT&T is not normally 
distributed. 
The sample mean return for AT&T is . 00629954 and the sample median return 
is 
0.00925244. 
5.4.4.1 The first test 
Since the P-value for this test (. 334489) is greater than (or equal to) 0.05, so the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95.0% confidence level. 
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5.4.4.2 The second test 
Counting the number of values above (98) and below (82) of the hypothesised median. 
Since the P-value for this test (0.263551) is greater than (or equal to) 0.05, so the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95.0% confidence level. 
5.4.4.3 The third test 
Comparing the average ranks of values above (93.102) and below (87.3902) of the 
hypothesised median. Since the P-value for this test (. 16218) is greater than (or equal to) 
0.05, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
5.4.4.4 The results 
According to the summary analysis of AT&T's log of returns in table (5.3), the company is 
not normally distributed (see figure 5.3), but AT&T passed all the three tests. 
5.4.5 Conclusion 
The results show that none of the three companies is normally distributed even though their 
normal distribution plots visually suggest so. They failed to pass both standard kurtosis test 
in all cases and standard skewness test additionally in the case of NTT. However, an 
assumption has been made for the benefit of further analysis that the three companies can 
be considered to lie within a reasonable range of normal distribution. 
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5.5 Are there any auto-correlations in performance for each company? 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The basic idea of correlation is to report the strength of the association between the two 
variables. Auto-correlation often happens when data are collected successively over a 
period of time. In a time series, the value of a variable at a particular moment in time can 
be affected by the `level' of the data. For example, a highly-valued variable at the previous 
point in time may infer a highly-valued variable at the next point in time. To include 
previous values in a multiple regression can help deal with the impact of the previous value 
on the current level as well as the impact of other explanatory variables. 
Without including auto-correlation, a spurious relationship through time may otherwise be 
found between the dependent variable and the other explanatory variables. So the auto- 
correlation is a common tool used by researchers to understand the properties of a time 
series. In this test, the intention is to examine if there is any auto-correlation for each of the 
three companies. Before moving to a multiple regression, a simple regression test is used to 
identify if there is any relationship between a company's LN (return index) and its lagged 
value. This is to show if there is any auto-correlation with the previous month's value for 
each one of them. 
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5.5.2 AT&T 
Table 5.4: AT&T simple regression test result 
AT&T Estimate T-statistics P-value Overall results 
Intercept . 00607144 
0.92863 0.3543 
Slope 0.0386364 0.515062 0.6071 
Correlation coefficient 0.0385768 
R-squared % 0.148817 
R-squared 
(adjusted) % 
-0.412145 
P-value (ANOVA) 0.6071 
F-ratio (ANOVA) 0.27 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (1.98316) 
P=0.4686 
5.5.2.1 The results 
The output shows the results of fitting a linear model to describe the relationship between 
LN (return index) and the lagged of LN (return index). 
Since the P-value (0.6071) in the ANOVA table is greater or equal to 0.10, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between the LN (return index) and LN (return index) 
lagged at the 90.0% or higher confidence level. 
The R-squared statistic indicates that the model as fitted explains 0.148817% of the 
variability of LN (return index). The correlation coefficient equals to (0.0385768), 
indicating virtually no relationship between the variables. 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic tests the residuals to determine if there is any 
significant correlation based on the order in which they occur in our data file. Since the P- 
value (. 4686) is greater than 0.05, there is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the 
residuals. 
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5.5.2.2 Overview 
The AT&T LN (return index) is not auto-correlated using a one-month lag. 
5.5.3 BT 
Table 5.5: BT simple regression test result 
BT Estimate T-statistics P-value Overall results 
Intercept 0.00661497 1.07592 . 2834 Slope 0.00972655 0.129777 0.8969 
Correlation coefficient 0.0972673 
R-squared % 0.00946092 
R-squared 
(adjusted) % 
-0.552284 
P-value (ANOVA) 0.8969 
F-ratio (ANOVA) 0.02 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (1.98316) 
P=0.4552 
5.5.3.1 The results 
According to the P-value in the ANOVA table (0.8969), which is greater than or equal to 
0.10, there is not a statistically significant relationship between BT's LN (return index) and 
BT's LN (return index) lagged at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
The R-squared statistic indicates that the model as fitted explains 0.00946092% of the 
variability in BT's LN (return index), which is virtually nothing! This is a favourable result 
since, if identical results hold for the other companies, a lack of autocorrelation will allow 
a sensible time series analysis (to follow) between the companies. 
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The correlation coefficient describes the strength of the relationship between the two set of 
interval-scaled or ratio-scaled variables, and in this case the correlation coefficient for BT 
is 0.00972673, indicating effectively no relationship between the LN (return index) and 
BT's LN (return index) lagged. This is not used as an input in next chapter, because mainly 
the random walk with drift model is used for forecasting purpose in chapters 5 and 6. 
Since the P-value (0.4552) in the Durbin-Watson test is greater than 0.05, there is no 
indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
5.5.4 NTT 
Table 5.6: NTT simple regression test result 
NTT Estimate T-statistics P-value Overall results 
Intercept -0.00846067 -1.2275 0.2213 
Slope 0.00155887 0.0204774 0.9837 
Correlation coefficient 0.00153484 
R-squared % 0.000235574 
R-squared 
(ad j usted)% 
-0.561561 
P-value (ANOVA) 0.9837 
F-ratio (ANOVA) 0.00 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (1.98316) 
P=0.3947 
5.5.4.1 The results 
The P-value (0.9837) in the ANOVA table is greater than or equal to 0.10, which indicates 
that there is not a statistically significant relationship between NTT's LN (return index) 
and NTT's LN (return index) lagged at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
The R-squared statistic indicates that the model as fitted explains 0.000235574% of the 
variability in NTT's LN (return index), which is virtually zero. 
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The correlation coefficient is 0.00153484, indicating effectively no relationship between 
the NTT's LN (return index) and its return index lagged. 
There is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals, because the Durbin- 
Watson's P-value is 0.3947, which is greater than 0.05. 
5.5.5 Conclusion 
The results show no autocorrelation between the LN (return index) and its lagged one for 
all the three companies. 
5.6 Measuring downside risk 
5.6.1 Introdution 
The down-risk has been used for the first time by Markowitz (1952) who provided a 
quantitative framework for measuring portfolio risk and return. Markowitz developed his 
complex structure of equations after he was struck by the notion that "you should be 
interested in risk as well as return. " (Bernstein, 1993 : 41). Later, a second article on 
portfolio theory by Roy (1952) was published to develop the practical method for 
determining the best risk-return trade-off. 
Markowitz (1959) recognised the importance of this idea. Investors are interested in 
minimising downside risk for two reasons: (1) only downside risk or safety first is relevant 
to an investor; and (2) securities' distributions may not be normal. Therefore, a downside 
risk measure would help investors make proper decisions when faced with non-normal 
security return distributions. So, according to Markowitz, if the distributions are normal, 
both downside risk measures and the variance provides the correct answer. If the 
distributions are not normal, only the downside risk measure provides the correct answer. 
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Downside risk generally means risk defined only over a restricted part of the distribution of 
returns, most generally those returns lying below a pre-specified target, or where risk 
significantly decreases for large positive returns (Pedersen, 2001: 258). 
The downside risk is important for the comparison reason for the three telecoms 
companies. It will give an indication to the investors about the risk level in each one of the 
three examined telecoms companies. However, more extreme negative values suggest an 
exposure to greater risk. The analysis here indicates which company of the three is more 
riskier than the others? Three companies are AT&T, NTT and BT. 
Table 5.7: Downside risk result 
Percentiles Lower 5% Lower 10% Lower 25% 
BT -0.129536 -0.0855632 -0.0451487 
AT&T -0.133913 -0.102759 -0.0344812 
NTT -0.136504 -0.11206 -0.0674496 
BT has lower downside risk as indicated by the lower 5% of LN (returns), which are better 
for BT and worse for AT&T and NTT, and it is better for AT&T than for NTT. 
BT has lower downside risk given by the lower 10% of LN (returns), which are better for 
BT and worse for AT&T and NTT, and it is even better for AT&T than for NTT. 
AT&T has lower downside risk with a slight decrease from BT at the lower 25% of LN 
(returns), which are worse for NTT. 
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5.6.2 Overall conclusion 
The downside risk shows that BT has lower downside risk at the 5 and 10 percentile; and 
AT&T at the 25 percentile. NTT ranks the worst one with highest downside risk among the 
three companies. The writer concludes that BT proves to be generally a safer investment 
than the other two companies, and NTT the worst. The focus here is on risk not on the risk- 
return relationship. For the latter purpose, the coefficient of variation could have been used 
(see section 5.7.2 for different approach). 
5.7 Forecasting 12 months ahead (4/02-3/03) 
5.7.1 Introduction 
A simple regression test has been used to compare the forecasted monthly LN (return 
index) values from 1/4/2002 to 1/3/2003 for the three companies BT, NTT and AT&T. The 
Random walk with drift model is used to forecast the LN (return index) for the three 
companies. The reason for this technique is to give a set of figures for comparison based 
upon a random walk with drift model rather than making guesses or relying upon a 
specialists in the forecasting field all of which will be market biased. 
For BT 12 values range from 0.131564 to 0.139143, AT&T's from -0.0979803 to - 
0.0882323 and NTT's range from 0.114236 to 0.119505. Table (5.8) shows the forecasted 
LN (return index) for the three companies: 
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Takle 5.8: F orecas ed 12 months figures for the three companies 
BT AT&T NTT 
01/04/2002 0.131564 -0.0882323 0.119505 
01/05/2002 0.132253 -0.0891185 0.119026 
01/06/2002 0.132942 -0.0900047 0.118547 
01/07/2002 0.133631 -0.0908909 0.118068 
01/08/2002 0.134320 -0.0917770 0.117589 
01/09/2002 0.135009 -0.0926632 0.117110 
01/10/2002 0.135698 -0.0935494 0.116631 
01/11/2002 0.136387 -0.0944356 0.116152 
01/12/2002 0.137076 -0.0953217 0.115673 
01/01/2003 0.137765 -0.0962079 0.115194 
01/02/2003 0.13 8454 -0.0970941 0.114715 
01/03/2003 0.139143 -0.0979803 0.114236 
5.7.2 The results of the simple comparison test 
Table (5.9) below shows the statistical figures for the simple comparison test: 
Table 5.9: Simple comparison test result of the three companies 
BT AT&T NTT Overall results 
Mean 0.135353 -. 0931063 0.116871 
Standard deviation 0.00248422 0.00319516 0.00172706 
ANOVA Table 
F-Ratio 29941.13 
P-Value 0.0000 
Cochran's test 0.157828 
Kruskall-Wallis 0.000000173417 
The forecasted data shows that BT is outperforming the other companies, although the 
returns for NTT are not too different. By contrast, AT&T is performing worse than the 
other two companies in terms of both mean return and risk. 
Since the P-value of the ANOVA is 0.0000, which is less than 0.05, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the means of the BT, AT&T and NTT variables at the 
95.0% confidence level. 
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The Cochran's C Test P-value is 0.157828, which is greater than (or equal to) 0.05, and so 
there is not a statistically significant difference amongst the standard deviations at the 
95.0% confidence level. 
Since the Kruskall-Wallis Test P-value is 0.000000173417, which is less than 0.05, there is 
a statistically significant difference amongst the medians at the 95.0% confidence level. 
5.8 Are they nevertheless related to each other? 
5.8.1 Introduction 
Hypothesis 2 states that the financial performance of each company is positively related to 
that of the other companies. The rationale is that, in the telecoms market, companies would 
be affected by similar technological factors. Two tests are performed here. In the first test, 
each of the telecoms companies' performance is examined as a dependent variable 
regressed against the other two telecoms companies' performances with an inclusion of an 
auto-regressive term, i. e. a lagged value of the dependent variable, to accommodate 
possible auto-correlation as explained in section 5.5.1. In the second test, the same 
technique is applied without an auto-regressive term. 
A further examination has been done to whether the performance of the companies chosen 
was likely to be a function of the telecoms sector generally using as they do, a common 
technology, similar customer base, product range and market environment at that time. 
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Applying the formula 
Yt=a+ßi Xt+ß2Wt+YYt-i 
where: 
Yt = is the dependent variable of a company 
(Equation 5.3) 
P, xt = is the first independent variable company component to be tested 
P2 Wt = is the second independent variable company component 
Y Yt-1 = is lagged value of the dependent variable company component 
Multiple regression analysis has been used to compare the three companies with each other 
and to see if they are related to each other or not. Two tests of multiple regression have 
been used, one with a lag and the other without a lag using the LN (return index). With the 
financial data, an efficient stock market would suggest that the share prices is auto- 
correlated with its previous value. For example, a current price of £6.50 suggests this is the 
best estimate of the next day price. To introduce greater lags, it is less meaningful in terms 
of economic rationale (Fama, 1970). 
5.8.2 Companies with lags 
5.8.2.1 BT 
Using this formula 
YtBT = a+ l Xt 
AT&T+ P2 Wt 
NTT 
,+7 Yt-1 
BT (Equation 5.4) 
In the first test, BT is the dependent variable and AT&T, NTT and BT lagged are 
independent variables. Table (5.10) will show the results: 
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Table 5.10: Multiple regression test using BT as dependent variable 
Parameter Estimate T statistic P-value Overall results 
Constant 0.00650693 1.14174 0.2551 
AT&T 0.295908 04.42632 0.0000 
NTT 0.174031 2.71865 0.0072 
BT lagged -0.0326101 -0.470405 0.6386 
R-squared % 16.6989 
R-squared (adjusted) 15.279 
ANOVA -F-ratio 11.76 
ANOVA- P-value 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson statistic (P=0.2807) 
Since the P-value in the ANOVA table is 0.0000, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the variables at the 99% confidence level. Since the P-value of the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.2807, which is greater than 0.05, there is no indication of 
serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
From the individual P-values in table (5.10), the P-value for BT lagged is 0.6386, which is 
greater than 0.10, which indicates that BT lagged is not statistically significant at the 90% 
or higher confidence level, which is an indication of no need to use BT lagged. 
5.8.2.1.1 Conclusion 
The conclusion from the test is that these companies have a statistically significant 
relationship to each other at the 99% confidence level. It is worth noting and using the tests 
for lags for both NTT and AT&T to prove (in the next section) the theory that there is no 
need to use the lagged values in the formula (see equation 5.3,5.4). 
The overall P-value can be broken down into its constituent components for the respective 
variables: 
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Table 5.11: Breakdown of ANOVA P-values result 
Source F-ratio P-value 
AT&T 27.86 0.0000 
NTT 7.20 0.0080 
BT lagged 0.22 0.6386 
Table (5.11) shows that both AT&T and NTT are individually statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level, whereas the BT lagged is not. 
The multicollinearity is a correlation among the independent variables, which would lead 
to incorrect conclusion as to which independent variables are statistically significant, so the 
multicollinearity problem has been checked using the correlation matrix for coefficient 
estimation, for which in this case, there are no correlations with absolute values greater 
than 0.5. Table (5.12) shows the result: 
Table 5.12: Correlation matrix using BT as dependent variable 
Constant AT&T NTT BT lagged 
Constant 1.0000 -0.0953 0.1224 -0.0886 
AT&T -0.0953 1.0000 -0.2514 -0.0315 
NTT 0.1224 -0.2514 1.0000 -0.1074 
BT lagged -0.0886 -0.0315 -0.1074 1.0000 
5.8.2.2 AT&T 
Using this formula 
t 
AT&T 
= a+ ßl Xt 
BT 
+ ß2 't 
NTT 
+7 yt4 
AT&T Y (Equation 5.5) 
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Table 5.13: Multiple regression test result using AT&T as dependent variable 
Parameter Estimate T statistic P-value Overall results 
Constant 0.00531689 0.873339 0.3837 
BT 0.334008 4.33353 0.0000 
NTT 0.165414 2.39972 0.0175 
AT&T lagged 0.0260222 0.371446 0.7108 
R-squared % 15.9385 
R-squared (adjusted) 14.5057 
ANOVA -F-ratio 11.12 
ANOVA- P-value 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson statistic (P=0.4421) 
The P-value in the ANOVA table is 0.0000, which indicates that there is a statistically 
significant relationship overall at the 99% confidence level. Since the P-value of the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.4421, which is greater than 0.05, there is no indication of 
serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
5.8.2.2.1 Conclusion 
The individual insignificance of the lagged variable is again demonstrated, on this occasion 
regarding AT&T, because AT&T's lagged variable has the highest P-value (0.7108). 
Further ANOVA decomposition reveals: 
Table 5.14: Breakdown of ANOVA P-values 
Source F-ratio P-value 
BT 27.61 0.0000 
NTT 5.63 0.0188 
AT&T lagged 0.14 0.7108 
Table (5.14) shows that both BT and NTT are individually statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level, whereas AT&T lagged is not. 
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Multicollinearity has been checked using the correlation matrix for coefficient estimation, 
which in this case reveals no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.5. Table 
(5.15) shows the full results: 
Table 5.15: Correlation matrix result using AT&T as dependent variable 
Constant BT NTT AT&T 
Constant 1.0000 -0.1033 0.1114 -0.0456 
BT -0.1033 1.0000 -0.2827 -0.1229 
NTT 0.1114 -0.2827 1.0000 0.1243 
AT&T lagged -0.0456 -0.1229 0.1243 1.0000 
5.8.2.3 NTT 
Using this formula 
Yt NTT = a+ Pi xt 
BT 
+ R2 W 
AT&T 
+7 Yt-i 
NTT (Equation 5.6) 
Table 5.16: Multiple regression result using NTT as a dependent variable 
Parameter Estimate T statistic P-value Overall results 
Constant -0.0111339 -1.68844 0.0931 
BT 0.229651 2.67853 0.0081 
AT&T 0.191257 2.37391 0.0187 
NTT lagged 0.00837623 0.115342 0.9083 
R-squared % 10.2478 
R-squared (adjusted) 8.71791 
ANOVA -F-ratio 6.70 
ANOVA- P-value 0.0003 
Durbin-Watson statistic (P=0.3939) 
Since the P-value in the ANOVA table is 0.0003, there is a statistically significant 
relationship overall at the 99% confidence level. The P-value of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is 0.3939, which is greater than 0.05, so there is no indication of serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals. 
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5.8.2.3.1 Conclusion 
As before the lagged variable has the highest P-value, and indicates that the term is greater 
than or equal to 0.10, which is not statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
Further ANOVA decomposition indicates: 
Table 5.17: Breakdown of ANOVA P-values result 
Source F-ratio P-value 
BT 14.46 0.0002 
AT&T 5.62 0.0188 
NTT lagged 0.01 0.9083 
Table (5.17) shows that both BT and AT&T are individually statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level, whereas NTT lagged is not. 
Multicollinearity has been checked using the correlation matrix for coefficient estimation, 
which in this case shows that there are no correlations with absolute values greater than 
0.5. Table (5.18) shows the results: 
Table 5.18: Correlation matrix result using NTT as a dependent variable 
Constant BT AT&T NTT lagged 
Constant 1.0000 -0.0614 -0.0401 0.1042 
BT -0.0614 1.0000 -0.3638 -0.0240 
AT&T -0.0401 -0.3638 1.0000 0.0497 
NTT lagged 0.1042 -0.0240 0.0497 1.0000 
5.8.2.4 Overall conclusion 
Lagged values for BT, AT&T and NTT do not have any statistically significant 
relationship and have the highest P-values. For this reason, the writer believes it is worth 
taking them out and running the test again against the three companies to see if there are 
related to each other or not. In the next section (5.8.3), the unlagged tests will prove that 
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the three companies are individually statistically significantly related to the dependent 
variable at the 99% confidence level. 
5.8.3 The independent variables for companies without using lags 
5.8.3.1 BT 
Using the formula without the lag 
YtBT_ a+ p1 XtAT&T+ 02 Wt 
NTT (Equation 5.7) 
The BT is the dependent variable, whereas AT&T and NTT are independent variables. 
Table (5.19) shows the results: 
Table 5.19: Multiple regression test using BT as a dependent variable 
Parameter Estimate T statistic P-value Overall results 
Constant 0.0062693 
1 
1.10683 0.2699 
AT&T 0.294918 4.42344 0.0000 
NTT 0.170798 2.68958 0.0078 
R-Squared % 16.5942 
R-squared (adjusted) % 15.6518 
ANOVA F-ratio 17.61 
AVONA P-value 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson statistic (P=0.1774) 
Given the ANOVA P-value is 0.0000, which is less than 0.01, there is a statistically 
significant relationship overall at the 99% confidence level. Since the P-value for the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.1774, which is greater than 0.05, there is no indication of 
serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
NTT has the highest P-value of 0.0078, which is less than 0.01, so the highest order term is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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Further ANOVA decomposition for variables can be seen in the following table (5.20): 
Table 5.20: Breakdown of ANOVA P-values result 
Source F-Ratio P-value 
AT&T 27.98 0.0000 
NTT 7.23 0.0078 
Table (5.20) shows how NTT and AT&T are individually statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level. 
There is no multicollinearity problem among these variables, which can be seen through 
table (5.21) of the correlation matrix for coefficient estimates: 
Table 5.21: Correlation matrix result using BT as a dependent variable 
Constant AT&T NTT 
Constant 1.0000 -0.0985 0.1140 
AT&T -0.0985 1.0000 -0.2564 
NTT 0.1140 -0.2564 1.0000 
There are no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.5, which indicates no 
presence of serious multicollinearity. 
5.8.3.2 AT&T 
Using the formula without the lag 
YtAT&T = a+ pi xtBT+ R2 Wt 
NTT (Equation 5.8) 
The AT&T is the dependent variable, whereas BT and NTT are independent variables. 
Table (5.22) shows the results: 
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Table 5.22: Multiple regression using AT&T as a dependent variable 
Parameter Estimate T statistic P-value Overall results 
Constant 0.00542004 0.893388 0.3729 
NTT 0.162233 2.37775 0.0185 
BT 0.337527 4.42344 0.0000 
R-Squared % 15.8726 
R-squared (adjusted) % 14.9221 
ANOVA F-ratio 16.70 
AVONA P-value 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson statistic (P=0.3173) 
Since the ANOVA P-value is 0.0000, which is less than 0.01, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the variables at the 99% confidence level. The P-value for 
the Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.3173, which is greater than 0.05, which indicates that there 
is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Since the highest P-value for the independent variables for NTT is 0.0 185, which is less 
than 0.05, the outcome is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Further ANOVA decomposition for variables can be seen in the following table (5.23): 
Table 5.23: Breakdown of ANOVA P-values result 
Source F-Ratio P-value 
NTT 13.83 0.0003 
BT 19.57 0.0000 
Table (5.23) shows how NTT and BT are individually statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level. 
There is no multicollinearity problem among these variables and it can be seen through the 
correlation matrix for coefficient estimates table (5.24): 
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Table 5.24: Correlation matrix result using AT&T as a dependent variable 
Constant NTT BT 
Constant 1.0000 0.1181 -0.1099 
NTT 0.1181 1.0000 -0.2715 
BT -0.1099 -0.2715 1.0000 
There are no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.5, which indicates no 
presence of serious multicollinearity. 
5.8.3.3 NTT 
Using the formula without lag 
YtNTT = a+ ßi Xt 
BT + ß2 Wt 
AT&T +7 Yt-i 
NTT (Equation 5.9) 
The NTT is the dependent variable, whereas AT&T and BT are independent variables. 
Table (5.25) shows the results: 
Table 5.25: Multiple regression using NTT as a dependent variable 
Parameter Estimate T statistic P-value Overall results 
Constant -0.0112131 -1.71455 0.0882 
BT 0.229888 2.68958 0.0078 
AT&T 0.190794 2.37775 0.0185 
R-Squared % 10.241 
R-squared (adjusted) % 9.22677 
ANOVA F-ratio 10.10 
AVONA P-value 0.0001 
Durbin-Watson statistic (P=0.3532) 
Because the ANOVA P-value is 0.0001, which is less than 0.01, there is a statistically 
significant relationship overall at the 99% confidence level, and the P-value for the Durbin- 
Watson statistic is 0.3532, which is greater than 0.05, which indicates that there is no 
indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The the highest P-value (0.0185) belongs to AT&T, which is less than 0.05, so the 
outcome is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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Further ANOVA results for variables can be seen in the following table (5.26): 
Table 5.26: Breakdown of ANOVA P-values result 
Source F-Ratio P-value 
BT 14.54 0.0002 
AT&T 5.65 0.0185 
Table (5.26) shows how BT and AT&T are each statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level. 
There is no multicollinearity problem among these variables and it can be observed 
through the correlation matrix for coefficient estimates table (5.27): 
Table 5.27: Correlation matrix result using NTT as a dependent variable 
Constant BT AT&T 
Constant 1.0000 -0.0592 -0.0456 
BT -0.0592 1.0000 -0.3631 
AT&T -0.0456 -0.3631 1.0000 
There are no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.5, which indicates no 
presence of serious multicollinearity according to the result of table (5.27). 
5.8.4 Overall conclusion 
Hypothesis 2 states that the financial performance of each company is positively related to 
that of the other companies. The rationale is that, in the telecoms market, companies would 
be affected by similar technological factors. In this section, the three separate analyses 
have demonstrated that at the 95% confidence level each company's performance is 
significantly positively related to the combined performance of the other two companies. 
So, hypothesis 2 is supported. 
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5.9 Are they related to their own indices or not? 
The investigation here, under hypothesis 3 ((which states that in a global market, company 
performance is related more closely to the sector (i. e. other respective companies) than 
each respective stock market)) if these telecoms companies are more related to their stock 
market index or to each other. However, each one of the examined telecoms companies 
have a different market structure, but the intention is to find out if they are more related to 
their stock market indices than to each other. 
The FTSE all share is used for BT, S&P 500 is used for AT&T, and Nikkei is used for 
NTT. The multiple regression test is performed for each company with each other and with 
its own stock market index in order to identify whether each companies performance is 
closely related to its own stock market index. 
Yt-a+ßI Xt+ß2 't+7Y 
where: 
Yt = is the dependent variable of a company 
Xt = is the first company variable to be tested 
Wt = is the second company variable 
y= is the dependent variable's stock market index 
a, ßl, ß2 and y are estimated coefficients 
(Equation 5.10) 
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5.9.1 Introduction 
In this sub-section, BT is presented as a dependent variable, whereas AT&T, NTT and 
FTSE All share run as independent variables and similarly in subsequent sections for NTT 
and AT&T. 
5.9.2 The first test 
YtBT = a+ p1 XtAT&T+ P2 Wt 
NTT +y yFTSE 
ALL SHARE (Equation 5.11) 
where: 
YtBT = is the BT performance as a dependent variable 
AT&T PI 1 xt = is the AT&T component 
(32 Wt NTT = is the NTT (Japan) component 
y yFrSE ALL SHARE = FTSE All Share index (for BT) component 
In the first test, BT is dependent and NTT, AT&T and FTSE all share are independent 
variables. It appears from the first test and table (5.28) that BT is more related to its own 
FTSE all share index than to NTT and AT&T. 
Table 5.28: First test result of multiple regression using BT as a dependent variable 
Estimate T Statistic P-value Overall results 
AT&T 0.189118 3.16641 0.0018 
NTT 0.095457 1.6986 0.0912 
FTSE All share 0.779724 7.57166 0.0000 
R-squared % 37.0873 
R-squared (adjusted) % 36.0149 
F-Ratio 34.58 
P-value 0.0000 
Durbin- Watson statistic (P=0.2334) 
Since the P-value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.2334, which is greater than 0.05, there 
is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
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Since the P-value in the ANOVA table (0.0000) is less than 0.01, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the dependent variable and the combined independent 
variables at the 99% confidence level. 
5.9.3 The second test 
Taking this formula for AT&T 
YtAT&T _ a+ p1 XtBT+ P2 wtNTT+ 7 yS&P 
500 (Equation 5.12) 
In the second test, AT&T is dependent and NTT, BT and S&P 500 share index are 
independent variables. It indicates that AT&T is more related to its own S&P 500-share 
index than to NTT and BT according to the table (5.29) result. The statistical figures show 
the results: 
Table 5.29: Second result of multiple regression using AT&T as a dependent variable 
Estimate T Statistic P-value Overall results 
NTT 0.105531 1.61714 0.1076 
BT 0.164224 2.04989 0.0419 
S&P 500 0.733528 4.88064 0.0000 
R-squared % 25.9015 
R-squared (adjusted) % 24.6384 
F-Ratio 20.51 
P-value 0.0000 
Durbin- Watson statistic (P=0.3480) 
There is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals, because the P-value of the 
Durbin-Watson is 0.3480, which is greater than 0.05. 
Given the P-value in the ANOVA table of 0.0000, which is less than 0.01, there is a 
statistically significant relationship overall at the 99% confidence level. 
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5.9.4 The third test 
Taking this formula for NTT 
t 
NTT 
= a+ Pi xtBT+ R2 wtAT&T + ,t yNIKKEI (Equation 5.13) 
In the third test, NTT is dependent and AT&T, BT and Nikkie Exchange share index are 
independent variables. It appears from the third test's result that NTT is more related to its 
own stock market index than to AT&T and BY The statistical figures show the results: 
Table 5.30: Third test result of multiple regression using NTT as a dependent variable 
Estimate T Statistic P-value Overall results 
BT 0.0654153 0.960453 0.3381 
AT&T 0.118463 1.88975 0.0604 
Nikkei 0.926095 10.8323 0.0000 
R-squared % 46.1457 
R-squared (adjusted) % 45.2277 
F-Ratio 50.27 
P-value 0.0000 
Durbin- Watson statistic (P=0.1723) 
The P-value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.1723, which is greater than 0.05, which 
indicates that there is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
On account of the P-value in the ANOVA table of only 0.0000, which is less than 0.01, 
there is a statistically significant relationship overall at the 99% confidence level. 
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5.9.5 Overall conclusion 
Hypothesis 3 states that in a global market, company performance is related more closely 
to the sector (i. e. other respective companies) than to each respective stock market. In 
concluding whether or not our three telecoms companies are related to their own stock 
market indices, the writer observes that these companies are more strongly related to their 
own stock market indices than to each other. The hypothesis is rejected. 
5.10 Which one performs better? 
5.10.1 Introduction 
In order to investigate the financial performance of the examined telecoms companies to 
find, which one of the companies performs better than the others, a summary statistics are 
needed to be provided in order to show the whole picture. 
Table 5.31: Summary statistics of the three companies 
Count Average Variance Standard 
Deviation 
Stnd. 
Skewness 
Stnd. 
Kurtosis 
BT 180 0.00667953 0.00672237 0.08199 -1.88492 2.75964 
AT&T 180 0.00629954 0.00762761 0.0873362 -1.24261 6.1707 
NTT 180 -0.00847566 0.00840765 0.0916932 6.57396 10.4054 
Table (5.31) shows that BT has a better average level of performance than AT&T and NTT 
and with a smaller a standard deviation. In a Markowitz (1959) sense it is mean-variance 
efficient. On the normality issue, BT is more closely normally distributed than the other 
two because the standard kurtosis is 0.76 above the critical value of 2, whereas for AT&T 
it is larger at almost 4.0 above the 2, and NTT's more than 8.0 above the 2 threshold. 
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5.10.2 Observarion 
Table (5.31) shows that BT performs better than both AT&T and NTT with a close link 
between AT&T and BT. This might suggest that both of these markets are almost alike. 
The earlier test for downside risk showed that BT is generally better than the other two 
companies. 
5.10.3 Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that BT has outperformed both AT&T and NTT, but with only a 
slight margin over AT&T. 
5.11 Overall conclusion and comment on previous chapters 
The previous chapters 4 and 5 examined the financial performance of telecoms companies 
in privatised and non-privatised groups. Chapter 4 examined telecoms companies in a 
global sense where the most important privatised telecoms companies in Asia, Europe, 
Canada and Australia, and non-privatised telecoms companies from USA, Canada and 
Japan were tested. The results showed no statistically significant differences in 
performance between privatised and non-privatised groups, although there were 
significantly different betas in the ANOVA test. 
In the multiple regression tests, in which the standard deviation in performance (and not 
beta) proved to be a critical factor affecting overall performance, there were no significant 
differences between privatised and non-privatised groups. 
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Chapter 5 examined three of the most important telecoms companies in the telecoms 
industries worldwide. The results showed that these three telecoms companies are related 
to each other in their financial performance over the same period and react the same way 
to external events. Thus, hypothesis 2 was confirmed. Despite this, and more importantly, 
the results also show that the extent to which these telecoms companies are related to each 
other is less than the impact of local market conditions upon individual company 
performance. Hypothesis 3 was rejected. In the industry effects section 5.2, the stock 
market indices are more related to the macroeconomic conditions within the national 
market rather than reflecting the performance of the industries individually. Capital flows 
within the economy from savings into investments are subject to investor sentiment, which 
arises from the overall optimism or pessimism about share values. The results of the study 
on the industry effects agree with previous research (see Solnik, 1974; Grinold at al, 1989; 
Heston and Rouwenhost, 1994 and 1995; Griffin and Karolyi, 1998). Although, some 
studies suggest a stonger role for the industry effects (Baca et al, 2000). This does not 
appear to apply to the telecoms sector. Therefore, any game play polices that may be 
enacted in order to gain advantage viz-a-viz their competitors are not as influential as local 
financial markets. 
In the next chapter (6), the competitive advantage model will be empirically used, which 
was introduced by Pointon (2002b). The assumptions in this model will be derived from 
the original formula of this concept, which will be supplied. A1Shafi's method is a new 
method derived from Pointon's formula, by which it will examine the financial 
performance of the three telecoms companies (BT, AT&T and NTT). 
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A further examination of the degree to which these three telecoms companies have 
competitive advantage over each other will be tested. Additionally, from the stakeholders' 
perspective, the WACC will be tested using the dividend growth model and the year-ahead 
earnings model instead of using the CAPM. This analysis is in fulfilment of the second 
issue in the thesis: part (c) the degree of competitive advantage. 
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Figure 5.1: BT's Normal Distribution Plot 
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Figure 5.2: NTT's Normal Distribution Not 
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Figure 5.3: AT&T's Normal Distribution Plot 
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Chapter Six: Analysing the Dynamics of 
Competitive Advantage in Telecoms 
Chapter Six: Analysing the dynamics of competitive advantage 
in telecoms 
6.1 Introduction 
For decades, telecoms services have been provided by a secure monopolist, i. e. a state 
enterprise in most of the world, and a private regulated corporation ((AT&T) and the Bell 
Corporation in the United States). The absence of competition was motivated by the 
existence of large fixed costs (land lines) in all parts of the network, whose duplication was 
either prohibitively expensive or socially undesirable; the telecoms industry was deemed to 
be a "natural monopoly" (Laffont and Tirole, 2000: 3). So, the competition in telecoms 
provides a conceptual apparatus for thinking through the key issues facing the new 
competitive environment. 
Over the last ten years in the economics literature, the concept of competence (economic 
capability) has emerged as a central concept for competitive strategy. Several rich 
theoretical streams have contributed an extensive array of frameworks, definitions and 
papers using this concept. The practical importance of the competitive advantage concept 
is a firm's endurance through difficult times, a valuable characteristic, and the most 
frustrating challenge for competitors that do not acquire such a prized asset. The source of 
these advantages lie in a firm's competences, which exist within the firm and are important 
at the product/market interface where firms typically compete (Bogner and Thomas, 
1999: 275). 
Meaningfully, the contestability (competition in the market) market is a market that enjoys 
competitors and the companies in that market feel free to compete with each other. The 
state-owned telecoms companies have a monopoly situation even after the privatisation 
process. Although the governments are aware of the problems that might be caused by the 
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lack of competition, they are more concerned about the success of the process and the 
proceeds of the privatisation, which takes these companies `off their backs. ' Many 
economists have emphasised the importance of the level of competition (Schotter, 2001; 
Taylor, 1995; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). 
There is a considerable amount of literature in current economic texts, which relates to the 
contestability of markets. Von Neumann teamed up with Oskar Morgenstern and named 
their subject "the theory of games" to draw an analogy between games such as chess, 
poker, backgammon and others, with that of business decisions and the handling of 
uncertainty, risk and competition (Emett, 1997; Fred, 1997; Anderson, Sweeney and 
Williams, 1998). 
Competition is at the core of the success or failure of firms. According to Porter (1985: 1) 
competition determines the appropriateness of a firm's activities that can contribute to its 
performance, such as innovations, a cohesive culture, or good implementation of strategy. 
Competitive strategy is the search for a favourable competitive position in an industry, the 
fundamental arena in which competition occurs. Competitive advantage aims to establish a 
profitable and sustainable position against the forces that determine industry competition. 
In 1983, John Moore- the UK Financial Secretary, concluded that: 
"The long-term success of the privatisation programme will stand or fall by the 
extent to which it maximises competition " (Moore, 1983). 
However, competition is a common market structure that has very desirable properties, so 
it is useful to compare other market structures to competition. Economists say that a 
market is competitive if each firm in the market is a price taker: a firm that cannot 
significantly affect the market price for its output or the prices at which it buys its inputs 
(Perloff, 2001: 224). 
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For Beesley and Littlechild (1983) competition is seen as the most important mechanism 
for maximising consumer benefits, and limiting monopoly power. In essence it is rivalry 
and freedom to enter the market. 
Littlechild (1983) stated that: 
"Competition is indisputably the most effective means perhaps ultimately the only 
effective means of protecting the consumer against monopoly power. " 
Competence in corporate performance plays an importance in creating sustainable 
competitive advantage (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece, Pisano 
and Schuen, 1997). 
Porter's contribution to the competitive advantage arises from his seminal works on the 
concept of national advantage (1990), in which there is a cross study of nations identifying 
their comparative advantages. His second work on competitive advantage identifies the 
five key characteristics, which demonstrates organisation and market strengths needed for 
superior performance (Porter, 1985,1990 and 1998). He indicates that the value chain is 
the basic tool for understanding and knowing the competitive advantage. The value chain 
disaggregates a firm into its strategically relevant activities in order to understand the 
behaviour of costs and the existing and potential sources of differentiation. A further 
discussion of the competitive advantage can be seen in section 6.6. 
Porter's (1985: 26) competitive advantage describes the way a firm can choose and 
implement a generic strategy to achieve and sustain competitive advantage. It addresses the 
interplay between the types of competitive advantage-cost and differentiation-and the 
scope of a firm's activities. 
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While the approach in the literature seems to be drawn from the internal management 
perspective, in this thesis, competitive advantage will be inferred from external market data 
(see chapters 3 and 6). It is for this reason that another model of competitive advantage 
will be employed later in this chapter, which focuses more on stock market returns. 
Technological change is one of the principal drivers of competition. It plays a major role in 
industry structural change, as well as in creating new industries. It is also a great equaliser, 
eroding the competitive advantage of even well-entrenched firms and propelling others to 
the forefront. The rate of technological change will be embodied in the analysis that 
follows, affecting the time period of superior rate of return. 
Because of the importance of the competition concept in the telecoms competitive sector, it 
has been decided to examine the competition situation for the three companies, for which 
each one of them has a different market structure in the competition policy procedure. BT 
was privatised in 1984 and the telecoms market in UK was liberalised in the 1991 after the 
duopoly review. BT situation in the UK market can be classified as an oligopoly. NTT is a 
monopolistic company in the Japanese telecoms market and the Japanese government still 
retains more than 50 per cent of the company as of today. AT&T is a company that has a 
near perfect competition and has been private always. 
However, it was found the competition category for each one of the examined companies 
interesting and useful for the study of the telecoms market in measuring the competitive 
advantage in these three companies. A company who holds a monopoly privilege would 
automatically hold a competitive advantage over the others. So, the three examined 
companies have different competition levels, even though both BT and NTT are almost 
alike because they are privatised companies and they came from a state-owned 
environment. It is important to examine whether or not the privatised companies would 
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have a competitive advantage over the private-based one and that is because of the possible 
monopoly situation. 
This chapter will introduce a new method called the competitive advantage model 
approach, which has been introduced recently by Pointon (2001,2002b), and the 
importance of this method is to examine the strength and the sustainable growth of a 
company. More precisely, the new method will indicate, in years (N), how many years a 
company can earn superior returns and sustain its future growth within an environment of 
technological uncertainty. A new formula (Pointon, 2001) has been used in applying the 
competitive advantage model, and a new approach has been introduced following from 
Pointon's formula to examine the competitive advantage model for BT, AT&T and NTT. 
To operationalise Pointon's formula, a new method will be introduced called Al Shafi's 
method, and this new method might not be suitable for other industries or different 
companies in different sectors. 
The introductory part of this chapter explains what the reader will expect from this chapter, 
and what techniques will be used in the rest of this chapter. More importantly, it will 
highlight some methods that have been used in measuring the cost of equity and the cost of 
debt. The new approach will be presented for the first time in this thesis. 
Table (6.1) is presented in detail to show the calculation of each method of the cost of 
equity and the cost of debt, and it will show how and where some of these figures are 
generated. Each method will have a narrative and formulas. 
The three telecoms companies will be examined, BT, AT&T and NTT. This chapter is the 
continuation of the analysis of financial performance from the previous chapter and more 
precisely chapter five, where these three companies were examined. 
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6.2 The hypotheses 
In part fulfilment of hypothesis 1: 
H4: In terms of competitive advantage, NTT exhibits through time a superior position 
compared with BT and AT&T on account of its monopoly position. 
H5: Of the three global players, AT&T is more adversely affected, in its competitive 
advantage position, by the other two companies on account of its having a weaker 
monopoly position. 
6.3 Estimating the cost of equity 
Table (6.1) presents the important factors in calculating the cost of equity. Each one of 
these factors will be discussed to show how it can be calculated. 
Table 6.1: Critical Factors 
Dividend Yield 
Forecasted DY Growth 
Dividend Yield +Growth 
Earnings Yield (1/PE) 
Competitive market model of earnings 
Actual earnings (EPS) 
Forecasted earnings (EPS) 
Share price 
Year ahead earnings Yield 
Risk free rate 
Risk premium 
Beta 
CAPM 
Competitive advantage model 
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The cost of equity capital is the rate of return, which investors require from their 
investments in equity capital. It is an important variable in company valuation, in actuarial 
pension calculations, in capital budgeting, in performance target setting and in rate of 
return regulations (O'Hanlon and Steele, 2000: 1051). 
6.3.1 Dividend yield 
Dividend yield is the expected dividend divided by the current market price of a share of 
stock (see, for example, Mills and Robertson, 1999: 141). The calculation of the dividend 
yield, using the year-ahead dividend and the current price, is: 
Dividend yield = D1/Po 
where: 
D1 = Dividend per share in one year's time 
Po = current market price of share 
(Equation 6.1) 
The dividend yield for the firm can be considered as a factor in calculating the cost of 
equity. Some financial analysts use the dividend yield to examine the cost of equity of a 
firm (Barker 1999b). McLaney et al (1998) selected around 200 companies from the 
London stock market, and found that more than 27.5 per cent of company executives use 
the dividend model, with or without a growth factor to estimate the cost of equity. 
By comparison, Al-Ali and Arkwright (2000) sampled the largest UK companies by 
turnover, and they found that 21 per cent used a dividend valuation model (DVM). 
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6.3.2 Forecasted DY growth 
The forecasted dividend growth relates to the growth in dividend next year. The next year 
growth is estimated by forecasting from the previous years. If one knows the actual 
dividends for a number of years, then the next year's forecast can be estimated. Different 
techniques can be used to calculate the forecasted growth, but a specific method has been 
applied in this thesis. 
The method used here is based on time-series applying a random walk with drift model to 
forecast the dividend yield growth (see, for example, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The study 
period starts from 1985 to 1989 in order to forecast 1990, and then the actual dividend 
yield for 1990 has been added to the period to forecast the 1991 dividend yield, and so on. 
6.3.3 Dividend growth (g) 
If the firm does not have any growth prospects, the dividend yield will be one way of 
estimating the cost of equity, but if a firm generates some growth, it would be better to 
estimate the dividend yield plus the dividend growth. The growth rate is the expected rate 
of change in dividends per share (Besley and Brigham, 2000: 301). 
However, if the dividend yield has been used individually without anticipating the growth, 
it might underestimate the cost of equity if a firm intends or expects to pay higher 
dividends in the future (Pointon, 2002b: 24). 
The expected rate of return on a common stock that an individual stockholders expects to 
receive is equal to the expected dividend yield plus the growth factor, g, and so the formula 
for the cost of equity, Kei is: 
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Ke=d1/po+g (Equation 6.2) 
This implicitly assumes perfect capital markets and sustainable growth, in which case the 
capital gains yield is identical to the dividend growth rate. The model is known as the 
Gordon growth model (Gordon, 1962; Gordon and Shapiro, 1956), although it was also 
derived by Williams (1938)). 
6.3.4 Earnings yield 
The formula for the price- earning ratio is: 
PE = Po / eo (Equation 6.3) 
where: 
Po = the market price of share 
eo = current earnings per share 
This is the original formula for PE, but to be consistent with a cost of equity formulation in 
calculating the earnings yield, the formula must be: 
Earnings ahead yield =1/(Po: el) (Equation 6.4) 
According to Barker (1999a), both the price- earnings ratio (PE) and the dividend yield 
model are two popular approaches to share valuation. 
Barker (1999a) presents evidence from questionnaire and interviews with analysts, that the 
price- earnings ratio is used for valuation purposes in services, and industrial and consumer 
goods sectors, whereas the dividend yield is applied in the financial and utilities sectors. 
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The price-earnings ratio is a popular parameter for providing an initial estimate of the cost 
of equity. A price-earnings of 10 would suggest that the earnings per share are one-tenth of 
share price. 
6.3.5 Competitive market model of earnings 
In this section, an indirect competitive market model of earnings is used in the discussion 
leading to the competitive advantage model. The key assumption in the model is that the 
firm earns the required rate of return on equity with a zero net present value on retentions. 
The reason for this is that if there were perfect competition in products and services, the 
rate of return generated would be the competitively determined equity cost of capital. 
Hence, the firm can expect to earn its cost of capital in the sense of a perfectly competitive 
market for its goods and services. The formula to calculate the competitive market model 
for the cost of capital is (see Pointon, 2002b: 10): 
Ke = k,, / (1-bk,, ) 
where: 
k,, = PE inverse 
(Equation 6.5) 
b= the retention ratio, and it can calculated as = (PAT-Div)/PAT 
where; PAT= profit after tax 
Div = total in value £ of payable dividends 
d1= ei (1-b) 
The proof of the formula proceeds as follows: 
Ke = e1 (1-b)/ Po + bk., 
Ke (1-b) =e1 (1-b)/ Po 
Ke=et/Po=eo (1+bke)/Po 
KK Po=eo+eobke 
K (Po - eo b) = eo 
(Equation 6.6) 
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Ke = [eo / Pol /[ 1-beo /Pol 
Ke = kv / (1-bkv) 
6.3.6 Actual earnings (EPS) 
The formula of EPS: 
EPS = ein 
e= profit attributed to shareholders 
n= number of shares 
(Equation 6.7) 
Shapiro and Balbirer (2000) argue that firms with good investment opportunities retain 
more earnings. Lamont (1998) found that, in exploring dividend payout ratios from 1947- 
1994, both earnings and dividends contain information content concerning expected 
returns. 
By contrast, earnings are more important than dividends, in multinational share price 
determination, depending upon the investment opportunity set of the firm, as measured by 
a factor score of the earnings to price ratio, the market to book value of assets and the 
market to book value of equity (Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur, 2001). 
6.3.7 Forecasted earnings 
Forecasted earnings are needed for the year-ahead earnings yield method. The random 
walk with drift method has been implemented to calculate the forecasted earnings (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). The same calculation method for forecasted dividend yield has been 
applied to calculate the forecasted earnings. The reason for using only 1 year's of earnings, 
is that the model requires only el. 
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6.3.8 Year ahead earnings Yield 
The year-ahead earnings yield will indicate the forecasted earnings for the next year, scaled 
by the current share price. The forecasted earnings will be divided by the share price. The 
formula of the forecasted earnings yield is: 
Year-ahead earnings yield =ej /po 
el = forecasted earnings per share 
po = the market price of the share 
(Equation 6.8) 
Claus and Thomas (1997) use an earnings forecast to calculate the equity risk premium 
(see the methodology chapter 3 for more details). 
The year-ahead earnings will be used as a component when calculating the competitive- 
advantage cost of capital and this model will be the key aspect of this chapter. The 
competitive advantage approach will be discussed later. 
6.3.9 Risk free rate 
Investors in shares require a return, which provides for two elements. First they need a 
return equal to the risk free rate (usually taken to be that on government securities). 
Second, there is the risk premium (to be discussed later), which for the individual company 
rises with the degree of systematic risk. The risk-free rate gives a return sufficient to 
compensate for both impatience to consume and inflation (Arnold, 1998: 708). 
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The risk free rate is a part of the calculation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
and the risk free rate differs in an international dimension. 
The government's 10 year bond yield is used as a surrogate for the risk free rate. For 
instance, for the UK the 10 year rates for gilts have been used to calculate the risk free rate. 
6.3.10 Risk premium 
The single most important contemporary issue in finance is the perhaps equity risk 
premium. The risk premium is the expected reward for bearing the risk of investing in 
equities, rather than in low-risk investments in such as bills or bonds and is usually 
estimated from historical data (Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, 2000: 1). 
Risk premium is measured in one of two ways. It is the overall market portfolio equity rate 
of return over the surrogate risk free rate. The first way uses treasury bills (short term, 
default-free, fixed income government securities) as the risk-free or safe benchmark. The 
second way measures the risk premium relative to long-term government bonds (see 
Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, 2000: 8). 
The risk premium is probably the most important factor in calculating the CAPM equity 
cost of capital. Internationally, every country has a different risk premium, which, indeed, 
needs some refining if the right risk premium to be used properly. 
Many studies have showed different risk premium estimates. Claus and Thomas (1997), 
using earnings forecasts and a growth model within a residual income-based valuation 
framework, suggested that the equity risk premium in UK, US and other developed 
markets is in the region of 3% (for the abnormal earnings model). 
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Jenkinson (1994), using the dividend growth model, estimates that the UK equity risk 
premium is 4%. The UK competition authorities appear to have adopted an assumed equity 
premium in the range 3.5% to 5% (MMC, 1996,1997a, 1997b, and 1999). 
Other studies have estimated the UK risk premium to range from 4% to 5% (Omran and 
Pointon, 2002). Buckley (1999) estimates the UK risk premium to be 3% to 5%, whereas 
other studies in the US have similar results as in the UK (McKinsey et al. 2000). The risk 
premium ranges from 4.5% to 5.0%, whereas other US studies have a higher risk premium 
than the UK estimate (Ibbotson, 1998). It is estimated that the equity risk premium of 8.2% 
to 8.5 % in the US. As mentioned earlier, the calculation of risk the premium is a part of 
the CAPM calculation (see equation 6.9). 
6.3.11 Beta (ß) 
According to Jenkinson (1999: 115) the beta is the estimate of the (undiversifiable) risk of 
the particular equity used by Sharpe (1964). 
Besley and Brigham (2000: 201) explain that the beta factor measures the stock volatility 
relative to an average stock (or the market). 
According to Davies al et. (1999: 16) the beta of the firm's equity summarises how, on 
average, the market perceives the firm will react to changes in growth and other broad 
economic movements, and it is a measure of how the firm's equity is expected to react to 
movements in the average level of the market, and a beta of zero indicates that the firm has 
no market-related element of risk. 
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A larger beta implies that on average the share is more sensitive than the market. In general 
terms, a beta of 1 indicates that the share generally moves with the overall market by the 
same proportion. 
For example, if a market increases or improves by 8%, then a share with beta 1.2 would 
expect to improve by (1.2 X 8%) = 9.6%, which is higher than the market level. 
Interestingly, if the beta is low, for instance 0.85, and the market improves by 4%, then the 
share would be likely to rise to (0.85 X 4%)= 3.4%, lower than the market level. It 
highlights how beta is an important factor in determining the share movement and 
performance. 
Beta is a very important factor in the calculation of CAPM, and the beta level will reflect 
the increase and decrease of the CAPM rate, but Pointon (2002a) argues that the beta level 
does not affect the CAPM rate as much as the risk premium rate does. The formula for beta 
in CAPM is calculated by multiplying beta by the risk premium and adding the result to the 
risk free rate to get CAPM (see equation 6.9). 
6.3.12 CAPM 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), for which Sharpe (1964) received a Nobel prize 
in 1990, is used to determine the price of risky assets such as equities. Both the riskless 
rate of return and the equity risk premium are exogenous parameters, and because of this, 
in common with other models, CAPM is essentially static in nature and considers investors 
arranging their portfolio such that they are mean variance efficient at a single point in time 
(Jenkinson, 1999: 115). CAPM provides a relevant equity cost of capital measure if 
investors hold a very widely diversified portfolio. The CAPM is used because it is well 
known model. 
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CAPM has influenced the calculation of the cost of capital for a firm, or to express it 
another way, the required rate of return on projects. By providing a target figure of the 
return required by shareholders, the CAPM has enabled management to vary the discount 
rate by which project cash flows were discounted, depending on the perceived level of 
systematic risk defined by beta (Arnold, 1998: 285). 
The CAPM calculation is part of the competitive advantage model of this chapter. CAPM 
is one of the three factors that will be used to calculate the cost of equity in the calculation 
of competitive advantage and in the cost of capital calculation as well. 
The formula of CAPM is: 
re rj + (rm - rj1 ß 
where: 
re denotes expected equity returns 
r1= is the riskless rate of return (risk free rate) 
rm = is the expected return on the market portfolio 
ß= is the systematic risk measure. 
(Equation 6.9) 
Even taking account of the shortcomings of the CAPM as a static model (see Campbell and 
Cochrane, 1999), it still remains a standard tool for estimating the cost of capital, see the 
methodology chapter 3 for more details of CAPM. 
6.4 Estimating the cost of debt 
The cost of debt capital is the current market rate of return for a risk class of debt. 
According to Mills and Robertson (1999: 377) the cost of debt is the rate of return that 
debt-holders require to hold debt. The cost of debt has two elements in calculating the debt: 
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6.4.1 Cost of debt before tax 
The yield to maturity rate for the debt must be calculated, often by drawing on the 
principles of discounted cash flow analysis and particularly the internal rate of return 
(IRR). The maturity of this debt depends on the type of debt and currencies relating to this 
debt. 
Multinational companies such as telecoms companies would have a very wide range of 
borrowings and different maturity dates. Meanwhile, the corporate bonds yield is used 
extensively in calculating the debt yield. 
The after tax cost of debt (kdt) is simply the interest rate on debt after tax. 
The formula for debt after tax is estimated by Kd (1-Td (Equation 6.10) 
where: kd = is the maturity yield of the loans (use of corporate bond yield); 
or the bondholders' required rate of return. 
Tý = the marginal tax rate 
(1-Td =1 minus the marginal corporate tax. 
The after tax cost of debt is used because the value of the firm's equity and debt depend on 
the after tax cash flows. The bond value is calculated as: 
Bond value = ENrl INT/ (1+kd) + MJ (1+kd)N (Equation 6.11) 
where: 
INT = is the sterling (say) coupon interest paid per period 
M= is the face value repaid at maturity 
N= is the number of interest payments remaining until maturity 
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6.4.2 Marginal tax rate 
The marginal corporate tax rate is the rate that is applied to the company's last earned slice 
income. 
The calculation of the marginal tax effect is (I-Td (see equation 6.10) 
where: 
TT = is the marginal tax rate. 
After the estimation of both the cost of equity and the cost of debt components of the cost 
of capital, the calculation of cost of capital will be presented in the next section. 
6.5 Weighted Average of Cost of Capital (WACC) 
The weighted average of cost of capital (WACC) procedure has three steps. These three 
steps are explained in an early discussion. A figure 6.1 of the three steps are displayed 
below: 
Figure 6.1: WACC steps 
d 
WACC 
% EQUITY (Step 3) % DEBT 
Cost of quity Cost of Debt 
(Step 1) (Step 2) 
The estimation of both the first step and second step are presented already, and the third 
step is the value of debt and the value of equity according to the overall value of the firm. 
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The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the expected return on a portfolio of all 
the company's securities and is used in capital budgeting decisions to find the net present 
value of projects that would not change the business risk of the firm (Brealey and Myers, 
2000: 484). 
The formula to calculate the weighted average cost of capital is: 
ko = KQ (S/[S+DJ) +i (D/[S+DI) 
where: 
ko = WACC 
ke = the cost of equity. 
S= the equity value in £ 
S+D = the equity value in £ plus the debt value in £ 
i= the cost of debt 
(Equation 6.12) 
Different approaches will be used to calculate WACC. The CAPM, the dividend growth 
model and the PE inverse method will be used to calculate the cost of equity component of 
the WACC. The corporate bonds yield will be used to calculate the cost of debt. Before 
multiplying the result by one minus the marginal tax rate to arrive at the after- tax cost of 
debt. 
The calculation of WACC for the three companies will be provided in a table (see tables 
6.28-6.30 at the end of this chapter) and some illustration of the calculation will be 
presented in a later discussion. The next section will be entirely devoted to a discussion of 
the competitive advantage model, which is the main key theme of this chapter. 
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6.6 Competitive advantage model 
6.6.1 Introduction 
Some competitive advantage can be seen clearly in the main telecoms companies, where 
most of them, if not all, hold a high market share and a private or public monopoly of 
networking and services. A good example is BT, where today, more than 50 per cent of 
the market share is held by them in the UK. BT has a private monopoly of the networking 
and the rule of regulator (OFTEL) is trying to shrink this monopoly through putting a cap 
on the prices charged and to regulate its behaviour. 
Because of the importance of competitive advantage, it is important for the calculation of 
the equity cost of capital to reflect competitive advantage. Such a model will be used all 
through this chapter and applied to three important telecoms companies, namely BT, 
AT&T and NTT. 
The competitive advantage model has been used for the first time, and the importance of 
this model and its formula has been introduced by Pointon (2002b). The assumptions 
behind Pointon's model (2001,2002b) are: 
I. There is a constant retention ratio, b= (E-D)/ E. (Equation 6.13) 
Assumption 1 is identical to the retention assumption in the famous Gordon Growth Model 
(1962). When the period of competitive advantage comes to an end, as explained in 
assumption 5, it makes no difference to the cost of equity what level the retention ratio 
takes. The reason for this is that the factor (1-b) cancels out in the derivation as given in 
the preceding section on the competitive market model of earnings (section 6.3.5). Clearly, 
until the period of competitive advantage ends, the value of the retention ratio parameter is 
important. In later simulations, a period of competitive advantage for a given retention 
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ratio has been predicted. However, each prediction uses a different retention ratio 
according to the empirical observation. The consequential periods of competitive 
advantage are given in chart form (see chart 6.1). 
II. During the period of competitive advantage the trend in the rate of return on the equity- 
financed portion of reinvested funds is equal to a constant rate r. 
Assumption 2 refers to a position of the competitive advantage in which the company earns 
a rate of return superior to the cost of equity. Once again this is another identical 
assumption to the Gordon Growth Model (1962). However, the difference between the 
models in this regard is that in the competitive advantage model, the period, during which 
a super-normal rate of return is earned, is finite. This may be a proper choice for a quasi- 
monopoly. 
III. During the period of competitive advantage, the earnings follow a geometric Brownian 
motion with a growth trend hr and instantaneous variance a2. 
Assumption 3 is the assumption of a geometric Brownian Motion (after Robert Brown a 
botanist around 1910), which follows the principle that increments in the share price are 
log-normally distributed. This means that the log of the share price follows a normal 
distribution. This same assumption is also inherent in the famous Black-Scholes option- 
pricing model (1972). If we exclude any growth trend, then the implication is that share 
price increments are unpredictable. There is some evidence, however, that the extreme 
values of log share price increments have `fatter tails' than those suggested by a strictly 
normal distributions (Harris and Kucukozmen, 2001). Nevertheless, the approximation 
may be reasonable at least for comparative purposes. 
-199- 
IV. Competitive advantage remains for an exponentially distributed period of time, of 
mean N, which implies a Poisson jump representing the rate of competitive change with 
mean X=1 /N. 
Poisson jumps have been used in other financial contexts. For example, in tax risk 
(Pointon, 1998), technological change (Boston and Pointon, 1999), take-overs (Pointon, 
1997), and other examples are given in (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). It is well known that the 
period until a Poisson jump occurs follows an exponential distribution (see, for example, 
Wagner, 1969). The Poisson jump represents a random switch from a position of 
competitive advantage to one of perfect competition. It could be argued such a switch does 
not occur so precisely, although in a highly technological environment it may be a 
reasonable approximation. 
V. When the competitive change occurs, the mean rate of return on the equity financed 
portion of reinvested funds switches from r to the true cost of equity, ke. 
As argued under assumption 2, a position of competitive advantage implies a superior rate 
of return on retentions, denoted r, which would exceed a normalised rate of return equal to 
the cost of equity capital, ke. In a truly competitive environment, the firm should not 
expect to earn on its retentions an amount in excess of the cost of equity, otherwise it 
would expect to generate positive net present values. By contrast a zero net present value is 
consistent with perfect competition. A parallel argument would suggest that under CAPM, 
for example, prices are such that excess returns are eliminated. 
The lambda (? ) in the model below expresses the rate of technological change as it affects 
the competitive advantage position. Basically, this factor is the `unknown' parameter that 
is solved by the model. 
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Pointon's model (his Appendix A) shows that: 
Ke =A k3 /ke +kl-A. (Equation 6.14) 
In which case 
N= 1/k= ([ke - k3 ]/ [k1-ke])/ ke (Equation 6.15) 
where: N= the period of competitive advantage (1/X, ); and where 
A, dt is a random probability of a switch in competition during time dt. 
ke =true cost of equity 
k1= upper estimate (Dividend-growth based) 
k3 = lower estimate (PE inverse) 
Pointon's model (2001) uses the dividend-growth model as an upper estimate, and the PE 
inverse as the lower estimate. However, Pointon (2001) does not consider CAPM. Now, 
the KQ is the true cost of equity consisting of three factors, which can be estimated from: 
Ke = [kl + k3 + kcAPM] /3 (Equation 6.16) 
Which is a simple average of the three individually determined estimates. 
6.6.2 Adaptation of the competitive advantage model 
However, for the three telecoms companies, it is the CAPM, which produces an upper 
estimate. But, if the growth rate in the dividend model were sufficiently high to make the 
cost of equity consistent with the CAPM rate, then that growth rate is likely to be 
unsustainable. So, kl can be reinterpreted as the cost of equity based on the year-ahead 
dividend yield plus the rate of capital growth implied by CAPM rather than dividend 
growth. 
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The main reason for adopting the CAPM data in the model, was that the dividend data 
suggested by Pointon's model proved to be somewhat eclectic. The NTT's dividend 
distribution was well below any scale for comparison with other telecoms companies, 
reflecting the Japanese market which has, over the past ten years, been seriously distorted 
by the general economic performance of the Nikkei registered companies. The CAPM data 
gives a better reflection of the relative efficiencies between the major telecoms competitors 
without undue reliance on dividend expectations, which differs considerably between 
countries. 
In theory, the two models, CAPM and the dividend growth model, should give the same 
results. If the CAPM-derived cost of equity is realised on the stock market, then the capital 
gains yield, G, would be given by the overall return less the dividend yield component of 
that overall return: 
G= [rr+(rm-rf) ßl - di/p (Equation 6.17) 
Where di/p is the dividend to price ratio, i. e. dividend yield. If the price is correctly 
evaluated by the market, then the capital gains yield should equal the dividend growth rate: 
G=Ke - dl/p 
Ke=dl/p+G 
(Equation 6.18) 
(Equation 6.19) 
= dl/p + g, if correctly priced, as argued by Pointon (2002b: 35), where 
G= the capital gains yield 
g= the dividend growth rate 
d1= dividend per share on the end of year one 
P= current share price 
Ke = cost of equity 
rf= risk-free rate 
rR, = mean rate of return on efficient market portfolio 
ß= beta coefficient 
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However, a secondary reason for substituting CAPM for the dividend model is a survey by 
McLaney et al (1998) of nearly 200 UK companies, which revealed that firms that use 
CAPM state that their overall cost of capital is higher than that of firms that use a dividend 
model instead. This suggests that it is the CAPM model that would produce the higher cost 
of capital estimate rather than the dividend growth model in the original formula. 
Hence, Al-Shafi's method (2002) takes: 
N= ([Ks - kearningsJ 
/ [KCAPM 
-K J) /Ke (Equation 6.20) 
where: 
KQ = the average of three factors; 
Kearnings = the year-ahead earnings- based cost of equity; 
KcAPM = the rate using the CAPM. 
Al-Shaft's method has been derived from Pointon's formula, and because of the telecoms 
industry situation, Al Shafi's method has been constructed in a way that would suit the 
calculation of the competitive advantage model. Al Shafi's method might not be suitable to 
other industries with a different structure from the telecoms industry. 
Each of the three telecoms companies' competitive advantage from applying the model 
will be calculated and the results of this calculation will be presented in a table (see tables 
6.28-6.30 at the end of this chapter). A multiple regression test will be used to record some 
results of this test through using the figures of the competitive advantage model of each 
company, and a graph will be displayed and some comments will be provided. 
Since the risk premium has been estimated differently according to previous studies, where 
some of these studies estimated the risk premium ranging from 3.5% to 5% (MMC, 1996); 
and Claus and Thomas (1997) estimated the risk premium of 3% for UK, USA and other 
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developed markets; and where Omran and Pointon (2002) agreed with 0' Hanlon and 
Steele (2000) that risk premium ranged from 4% to 5% in the UK, it has been decided to 
accommodate most of the studies and measure the CAPM using the range of 3% to 6% risk 
premium. 
The results of each of the risk premium will be recorded and the competitive advantage 
model will be tested against all the range of risk premia. Various statistical tests will be 
used for each case and the results will be recorded in tabular and graphical form (for the 
calculation of competitive advantage, see tables 6.28-6.30). 
6.6.2.1 Testing Al-Shaft's model 
6.6.2.1.1 Risk premium applied to the competitive advantage model 
Hypothesis 4 states that in terms of competitive advantage, NTT exhibits through time a 
superior position compared with BT and AT&T on account of its monopoly position. 
6.6.2.1.1.1 Competitive advantage of 4% risk premium 
Table (see tables 6.28-6.30) of results is provided for each company on the basis of a 4% 
risk premium, and a graph of this comparison in terms of the implied period of competitive 
advantage is worth displaying in order to show the competitive advantage of each company 
over the others. 
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Chart 6.1: Competitive advantage of 4% risk premium 
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The competitive advantage chart (6.1) shows a historical story of the three telecoms 
companies. The chart indicates an early superior period of competitive advantage for 
AT&T over BT and NTT. 
In 1991; 1993; 1995; and 1997 the competitive advantage is broadly similar for 3 
companies. In 1996, there is divergence in relative competitive advantage. From 1990 to 
1993, AT&T has superior competitive advantage; whereas from 1994 to 2000 BT has 
superior competitive advantage over AT&T and NTT. In 2001, there is a wide divergence 
in competitive advantage, where NTT > BT> AT&T. 
Since 1996, AT&T has the lowest competitive advantage. BT has the highest competitive 
advantage, but in 2001 NTT took the lead from BT. 
Now, can the passage of time, during which competition between BT, AT&T and NTT has 
existed, be predicted from the combined results from the individual periods of competitive 
advantage for each company? 
For this reason (and somewhat unusually) time is treated as the dependent variable and the 
periods of competitive advantage of BT, AT&T and NTT as independent variables. If the 
answer is yes, then it will be instructive to consider future estimates of competitive 
advantage. 
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6.6.2.1.1.2 Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic test 
First, let us test for serial autocorrelation, which could otherwise be causing a trend 
through time. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the residuals to determine if there is any 
significant correlation based on the order in which they occur in our data file. 
Using the risk premium of 4% in the estimates of the period of competitive advantage, the 
figures indicate that the Durbin-Watson's P-value is 0.3000, which is greater than 0.05, so 
there is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The trend through time (measured by the chosen year) was regressed against the period of 
competitive advantage for each company. The R-squared result shows that 69% of the 
proportion of variation through time explained by the combined degree of competition (and 
the R-squared (adjusted) was 58.58). There is a statistically significant relationship 
between the variables at the 95% confidence level, because the ANOVA's P-Value is 
0.0 176, which is less than 0.05. 
6.6.2.1.1.3 Correlation matrix 
The correlation matrix indicates if there is any correlation between the variables for the 
period of competitive advantage of the three companies. 
Table 6.2: Correlation matrix of 4% risk premium 
BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T 0.2460 1.0000 
NTT -0.1567 -0.1860 1.0000 
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There is no indication of the presence of a serious multicollinearity problem using the 4% 
risk premium, because there are no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.50. 
6.6.2.1.1.4 Forecasted competitive advantage model (4% risk premium) 
The random walk with drift method has been used to forecast the competitive advantage 
from 2002 to 2005 for the three companies. 
Chart 6.2: Forecasted competitive advantage model of 4% risk premium 
The forecasted competitive advantage model shows that both BT and NTT are increasing 
and have superior competitive advantage over AT&T. The forecasted figures indicate that 
AT&T will have a negative competitive advantage. NTT has superior competitive 
advantage over BT (NTT > BT> AT&T). 
6.6.2.1.2 Competitive advantage model (5% risk premium) 
Next, 5% has been used for the risk premium to calculate the time period of competitive 
advantage, and the results of this test are provided in a table for each one of the three 
telecoms companies. The chart (6.3) of the competitive advantage model is: 
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6.6.2.1.2.1 Comparison of the three companies 
Chart 6.3: Competitive advantage of 5% risk premium 
The competitive advantage model shows that in 1991; 1993; and 1995, the three telecoms 
companies have a broadly similar competitive advantage. 
After 1995, there is a divergence in relative competitive advantage. From 1995 to 1999, 
BT has superior competitive advantage years since BT> NTT> AT&T. 
From 1990 to 1993, AT&T has a better competitive advantage over BT and NTT. In 2000, 
there is a wide divergence in competitive advantage, where NTT has superior competitive 
advantage years over BT and AT&T. In 2001, NTT > BT> AT&T, indicating that AT&T 
since 1996 has the lowest competitive advantage. 
6.6.2.1.2.2 Durbin-Watson statistic test 
Since the P-value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.1637, which is greater than 0.05, there 
is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The ANOVA's P-value is 0.0116, which is less than 0.05, and so there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the variables at the 95% confidence level. 
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The R-Squared is 72.9887% and the R-squared (adjusted) is 62.8595%, which indicates a 
significant model with only 27% being explained by outside forces. 
6.6.2.1.2.3 Correlation matrix 
Table 6.3: Correlation matrix of 5% risk premium 
BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T 0.6220 1.0000 
NTT 0.3390 0.635 1.0000 
There are 2 correlations with absolute values than 0.5. The serious multicollinearity is 
present in BT versus AT&T and the second case is AT&T versus NTT. The deeply shaded 
areas show the problems. 
As to AT&T, it was decided to take it out and run the test again to see if there is any 
serious multicollinearity problem among BT and NTT. 
The ANOVA's P-value is now 0.0016, which is less than 0.01, and so there is a 
statistically significant relationship between BT and NTT at the 99% confidence level. The 
Durbin-Watson's P-value is 0.2964, indicating no serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
6.6.2.1.2.4 The forecasted competitive advantage model (5%) 
The random walk with drift method has been used to forecast the competitive advantage in 
all the estimation of risk premium ranges. 
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Chart 6.4: Forecasted competitive advantage of 5% risk premium 
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The forecasted competitive advantage shows the same results as the forecasted competitive 
model of 4% risk premium. AT&T's position is going down, whereas BT and NTT's are 
going up. 
6.6.2.1.3 Conclusion 
Both the 5% and 4% estimates indicate that BT has a superior competitive advantage over 
NTT and AT&T. BT was doing better and had a superior performance over NTT and 
AT&T in previous years. However, the forecasted year 2000 and after 2001, showed that 
NTT was, and should be, performing better than BT and AT&T. This is largely because 
NTT was just starting to spread globally and the competition in the Japanese market started 
later than the UK. A further factor was that the USA's market liberalisation and 
competition hampered the performance of AT&T. 
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6.6.2.1.4 The competitive advantage model (6%) 
6.6.2.1.4.1 Comparison of the three telecom companies 
Chart 6.5: Competitive advantage model of 6% risk premium 
The competitive advantage model chart (6.5) indicates a broadly similar competitive 
advantage model for the three companies in 1991; 1993 and 1995. 
In 1994, there is a divergence in relative competitive advantage. From 1994 to 1999, BT 
has superior competitive advantage over AT&T and NTT. 
AT&T has better competitive advantage in 1990 to 1993. In 2000 and 2001, NTT has 
superior competitive advantage over both BT and AT&T. 
AT&T has the lowest competitive advantage since 1996. 
NTT has the lead over both BT and AT&T in 2000 and 2001 and indeed the forecast 
competitive situation reveals a similar performance in which NTT> BT> AT&T. 
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6.6.2.1.4.2 Durbin-Watson statistic test 
Since the Durbin-Watson's P-value is 0.2358, there is no indication of any serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The R-squared is 71.6917% and the R-squared (adjusted) is 61.0761%, and since the 
ANOVA's P-value is 0.0139, which is less than 0.05, there is a statistically significant 
result at the 95% confidence level. 
6.6.2.1.4.3 Correlation matrix 
Table 6.4: Correlation matrix of 6% risk premium 
BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T 0.7434 1.0000 
NTT 0.3912 0.6258 1.0000 
The deeply shaded areas show that there are two serious multicollinearity problems, when 
applying the 6% estimated risk premium exhibiting the same pattern as the 5% scenario. 
The problems are between BT versus AT&T and in the second case between AT&T and 
NTT. It has been decided to take AT&T out and leave both BT and NTT and run the test 
again to make sure that there is no more presence of a multicollinearity problem. 
The second test now indicates that BT and NTT have a statistically significant relationship 
between them at the 99% confidence level (according to 0.0076 of the ANOVA's P-value). 
There is no indication of any serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
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6.6.2.1.4.4 Forecasted competitive advantage model (6%) 
Chart 6.6: Forecasted competitive advantage model of 6% risk premium 
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The random walk with drift method has been used to forecast the period of competitive 
advantage using a 6% risk premium. The results show that both BT and NTT are 
improving their competitive advantage according to the forecasted period from 2001 to 
2005. 
The forecasted figures indicate the same results as for a risk premium of 5% and 4% that 
AT&T is experiencing a lower and even a negative competitive advantage. NTT has 
superior competitive advantage over both BT and NTT especially from 2000 to 2005, and 
this implies that NTT has a better sustainable growth more than BT and AT&T. In turn, BT 
does have some sustainable growth for the coming years, but lower than for NTT. 
6.6.2.1.5 Extending the analysis 
After estimating the competitive advantage period using a 4%, 5% and 6% risk premium, it 
was decided to run a new test using 3% to accommodate all the previous studies. 
Especially taking account of Claus and Thomas (1997) who estimated the risk premium to 
be 3% for UK and USA and other developed countries, such as Japan. 
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6.6.2.1.5.1 Competitive advantage model (3%) 
6.6.2.1.5.1.1 Comparison of the three telecom companies 
Chart 6.7: Realised competitive advantage of 3% risk premium 
realised Competitive advantage (3%) 
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The 1991 and 1995 figures reveal a broadly similar competitive advantage for BT, AT&T 
and NTT. In 1994, there is a shift in relative competitive advantage among the three 
companies. 
AT&T has a superior competitive advantage from 1990 to 1993. From 1994 to 1999, BT 
had the leading competitive advantage over AT&T and NTT. 
From 2000 to 2001, NTT has improved its competitive advantage and took the lead from 
BT. 
From 1996 to 1998, there is a wide divergence in competitive advantage, whereby BT has 
the lead: BT> NTT> AT&T. 
6.6.2.1.5.1.2 Durbin-Watson statistic test 
There is no indication of serial autocorrelation in the individual residuals for BT, AT&T 
and NTT because the Durbin-Watson's P-value is 0.2763, which is greater than 0.05. 
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There is a statistically significant relationship between the passage of time during which 
competition has existed and the combined results for the competitive advantage periods for 
BT, AT&T and NTT at the 95% confidence level, because ANOVA's P-value 0.0247 is 
less than 0.05. The R-squared is 67.1182 and the R-squared (adjusted) is 54.7875. 
6.6.2.1.5.1.3 Correlation matrix 
Table 6.5: Correlation matrix of 3% risk premium 
BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T 0.4746 1.0000 
NTT 0.2630 0.6159 1.0000 
The deeply shaded area indicates a serious multicollinearity problem between AT&T and 
NTT with an absolute value greater than 0.50. Therefore, a second test will be run for both 
AT&T and NTT against BT individually to find out where the real problem lies. 
6.6.2.1.5.1.3.1 The first test 
The first test is between BT and NTT: 
There is no sign of a serious multicollinearity problem between BT and NTT. According to 
ANOVA's P-value of 0.0083, since the P-value is less than 0.01, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the passage of time during which competition has existed 
and the combined results for BT and NTT at the 99% confidence level. The Durbin- 
Watson's P-value of (0.3014) indicates no serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
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. 6.2vI ., W7 , 3,2 The second 
test 
The second test is between BT and AT&T: 
According to the correlation matrix, there is no significant presence of a serious 
multicollinearity problem between BT and AT&T. Interestingly, there is no statistically 
significant relationship in the revised model at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
However, the Durbin-Watson test indicates that there is a possible serial autocorrelation in 
the residuals. 
6.6.2.1.5.1.4 Forecasted competitive advantage model (3%) 
Chart 6.8: Forecasted competitive advantage of 3% risk premium 
Forecasted Competitive Advantage (3%) 
47 
37 
o 27. 
17 
a7 
-3 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Years 
0 BT -" AT&T A NTT 
The forecasted competitive advantage model for the 3% risk premium shows that both BT 
and NTT are improving their competitive advantage, whereas AT&T is having a problem 
evidence by a decrease in its competitive advantage. 
The forecasted competitive advantage model for all the estimated risk premia indicates that 
BT and NTT are increasing their competitive advantage, whereas for AT&T it is 
decreasing over the forecasted years. 
__-- ý_ 
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6.6.2.1.6 Dominant firm 
In section 6.6.2.1.1, the dominant firm in terms of competitive advantage has been 
identified. This indicates, which telecoms company has an advantage over the others. 
Table (6.6) shows each estimated risk premium, and therefore which company is dominant 
at that time. 
Table 6.6: Competitive advantage model of the dominant firm 
Years 3% 4% 5% 6% 
1990 AT&T AT&T AT&T AT&T 
1991 AT&T AT&T AT&T AT&T 
1992 AT&T AT&T AT&T AT&T 
1993 
1994 
AT&T 
BT 
AT&T 
BT 
AT&T 
BT 
AT&T 
BT 
1995 BT AT&T BT AT&T 
1996 BT BT BT BT 
1997 BT BT BT BT 
1998 BT BT BT BT 
1999 BT BT BT BT 
2000 NTT BT NTT NTT 
2001 NTT NTT NTT NTT 
The darker shaded areas, indicating the firm with the highest competitive advantage, show 
that BT is superior to AT&T and NTT with almost 50 per cent dominance for all the 
estimated risk premia. The second company is AT&T with more than 33 per cent 
dominance and NTT has the 17 per cent remainder of the whole 100 per cent share. 
6.6.2.1.6.1 Conclusion 
Hypothesis 4 states that in terms of competitive advantage, NTT exhibits through time a 
superior position compared with BT and AT&T on account of its monopoly position. The 
conclusion that is derived from the competitive advantage approach is that BT is the 
dominant firm of the three. This conclusion agrees with the previous chapter 5, where BT 
performed better than both AT&T and NTT, and also had a lower investment risk ratio, 
which allowed it to be a more safe investment than AT&T and NTT. 
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The hypothesis is rejected for the most of the study periods until 2000, but is supported for 
the forecasted periods (2002-2005). 
6.6.2.1.7 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
To take more of a stakeholder perspective rather than a shareholder approach, then returns 
to both shareholders and debtholders are considered in this subsection. The perspective 
will be in the form of the weighted average cost of capital. In assessing the shareholder 
returns, dividend- or earnings-based models would reflect the performance of the firm. 
However, the CAPM reflects the risk. In this section performance is measured by the 
average of the dividend- and earnings-based equity cost of capital estimates. To adjust 
for gearing a WACC approach is adopted using this averaging process. 
Chart 6.9: WACC result of the three companies 
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The WACC graph indicates a `superior performance' for BT over AT&T and NTT. BT's 
stakeholder performance decreases after 1998, but still outperforms both AT&T (but not in 
2000) and NTT. In 2000, AT&T had higher WACC than BT, but BT recovers in 2001, and 
had the lead over AT&T. NTT has consistent WACC over the years. BT has outperformed 
both AT&T and NTT from this stakeholder perspective. 
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6.6.2.1.8 Competitive advantage model using multiple regression analysis 
Hypothesis 5 states that of the three global players, AT&T is more adversely affected in its 
competitive position by the other two companies on account of its having a weaker 
monopoly position. In the multiple regression tests, the competitive advantage estimates 
(in years) are used. Each one of the companies, in turn, becomes the reference point for the 
dependent variable, whilst the other two company figures are independent variables. 
6.6.2.1.8.1 Competitive advantage model (3%) 
6.6.2.1.8.1.1 BT 
BT =a+ b1AT&T+ b2NTT 
BT = the dependent variable in the multiple regression test 
where; 
both AT&T and NTT are independent variables. 
(Equation 6.21) 
Table 6.7: BT competitive advantage model of 3% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 137.014 2.15861 0.0592 
AT&T -2.23868 -1.61769 0.1402 
NTT -1.23042 -0.81793 0.4345 
R-squared % 22.665 
R-squared (adjusted) % 5.47947 
F-ratio 1.32 
ANOVA P-value 0.3146 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.0224 
Most of the key words that are mentioned in the table are already discussed and explained 
in chapter 4 (section 4.3). AT&T's estimated coefficient is -2.23868 and NTT is -1.23042, 
which indicates that BT's competitive advantage is negatively associated with of AT&T 
and NTT. 
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The R-squared is 22.665%, which implies that only 22.665% of the variation in BT's 
position is captured by both AT&T and NTT, and the rest of 77% from outside forces. The 
R-squared is low for this model. 
This is not a good model because the P-value of the ANOVA test is 0.3146, which 
indicates no statistically significant relationship overall in this model. 
The Durbin-Watson P-value is 0.0224, which is an indication of serious serial 
autocorrelation. 
Additionally, there is a serious multicollinearity problem between AT&T and NTT, since 
there is an absolute correlation value greater than 0.50 (not shown). 
This model is not good when an account is taken of the performance of AT&T and NTT 
against each other. 
6.6.2.1.8.1.2 AT&T 
AT&T =a+ b1NTT+ b2BT (Equation 6.22) 
Table 6.8: AT&T competitive advantage of 3% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 42.4812 4.92735 0.0008 
NTT -0.610832 -2.34554 0.0436 
BT -0.100625 -1.61769 0.1402 
R-squared % 48.4364 
R-squared (adjusted) % 36.9779 
F-ratio 4.23 
ANOVA P-value 0.0508 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.1492 
This model fits better than the previous model, because the R-squared is higher. 
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The estimated constant is lowered for AT&T, whereas the estimated constant for BT was 
137.014. 
The ANOVA P-value is 0.0508, which indicates a relationship between AT&T and the 
other two combined at the 94% or lower confidence level. 
There is no serial autocorrelation in this model according to the Durbin-Watson statistic 
test because the P-value for this is greater than 0.05. 
Also, there is no serious multicollinearity problem between NTT and BT (not shown). 
6.6.2.1.8.1.3 NTT 
NTT = a+ b1BT+ b2AT&T (Equation 6.23) 
Table 6.9: NTT competitive advantage of 3% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 42.3349 4.72369 0.0011 
BT -0.0562337 -0.81793 0.4345 
AT&T -0.621084 -2.34554 0.0436 
R-squared % 38.0485 
R-squared (adjusted) % 24.2815 
F-ratio 2.76 
ANOVA P-value 0.1159 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.2610 
The R-squared of 38.0485% is low, and only 38% of the variation in NTT's competitive 
advantage is captured by the variation in competition from BT and AT&T. 
The ANOVA P-value is 0.1159, indicating that there is no relationship between NTT 
against the other two companies at the 90% or lower confidence level. 
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There is no indication of serial autocorrelation according to the Durbin-Watson test, and no 
presence of any serious multicollinearity problem (not shown). 
6.6.2.1.8.1.4 Conclusion 
The conclusion is that the competitive advantage models for BT(a), AT&T(b) and NTT('), 
respectively, for the 3% risk premium show a significant result for model (b), i. e. a 
significant relationship between the competitive advantage for AT&T being negatively 
associated with BT and NTT combined. 
6.6.2.1.8.2 Competitive advantage model (4%) 
6.6.2.1.8.2.1 BT 
BT = a+ b1AT&T + b2NTT (Equation 6.24) 
Table 6.10: BT competitive advantage model of 4% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 39.8779 4.79556 0.0010 
AT&T -1.4431 -2.801 0.0207 
NTT 0.229157 1.3707 0.2037 
R-squared % 48.8991 
R-squared (adjusted) % 37.5434 
F-ratio 4.31 
ANOVA P-value 0.0487 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.4666 
The ANOVA P-value is less than 5%, therefore the null hypothesis, that the estimated 
coefficient are all zero, is rejected at the 95% confidence level. Looking to the individual 
P-values, the multiple regression indicates a significant result at the 95% confidence level 
between BT and AT&T (P-value = 0.0207). 
The R-squared is moderate and it demonstrates that only 48.899% of variation in 
competitive advantage is captured by regressing BT against AT&T and NTT. 
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There is no indication of serial autocorrelation according to the Durbin -Watson test. 
Furthermore, the correlation coefficient regarding AT&T and NTT, is less than 0.50, which 
indicates no serious multicollinearity problem (not shown). 
6.6.2.1.8.2.2 AT&T 
AT&T = a+ b1NTT + b2BT (Equation 6.25) 
Table 6.11: AT&T competitive advantage model of 4% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 20.0233 6.19944 0.0002 
NTT 0.105507 1.3273 0.2171 
BT -0.322733 -2.801 0.0207 
R-squared % 48.343 
R-squared (adjusted) % 36.8637 
F-ratio 4.21 
ANOVA P-value 0.0512 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.0757 
According to the ANOVA P-value of (0.0512), there is a statistically significant 
relationship between AT&T's competitive advantage and those of other two companies, 
BT and NTT, at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
According to the individual P-values of the model, there is a significant relationship 
between AT&T and BT, at the 95% level of confidence. 
The R-squared is moderate and indicates 48.343% of AT&T's variability in competitive 
advantage is captured by NTT and BT. 
There is no serial autocorrelation and no serious multicollinearity between BT and NTT 
(not shown). 
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6.6.2.1.8.2.3 NTT 
NTT =a+ b1BT + b2AT&T (Equation 6.26) 
Table 6.12: NTT competitive advantage model of 4% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant -27.051 -1.00311 0.3420 
BT 0.753653 1.3707 0.2037 
AT&T 1.55157 1.3273 0.2171 
R-squared % 20.0105 
R-squared (adjusted) % 2.23509 
F-ratio 1.13 
ANOVA P-value 0.3661 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.0179 
According to the ANOVA P-value, there is no statistically significant relationship between 
NTT and the other two companies combined at the 90% or higher confidence level. Also, 
according to the individual P-value, there is no relationship between NTT's competitive 
advantage and either BT's and AT&T's. 
Furthermore, the R-squared is low, and it indicates the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables is relatively weak. 
There is some serial autocorrelation according to the result of the Durbin-Watson statistic 
test. Also, there is a serious multicollinearity problem between BT and AT&T (not shown). 
6.6.2.1.8.2.4 Conclusion 
The conclusion for competitive advantage modelling, using a risk premium of 4%, points 
to a problem for both BT and AT&T, where there is serial autocorrelation and a 
multicollinearity problem. 
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6.6.2.1.8.3 Competitive advantage model (5%) 
6.6.2.1.8.3.1 BT 
BT =a+ b1AT&T + b2NTT (Equation 6.27) 
Table 6.13: BT competitive advantage model of 5% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 39.3911 3.71043 0.0048 
AT&T -1.17119 -2.57968 0.0297 
NTT -0.312857 -1.08108 0.3078 
R-squared % 43.6163 
R-squared (adjusted) % 31.0865 
F-ratio 3.48 
ANOVA P-value 0.0759 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.0154 
According to the ANOVA P-value, there is a statistically significant relationship between 
BT's competitive advantage and those for NTT and AT&T combined at the 90% or higher 
confidence level. 
According to the individual P-value of the fitted model, there is a relationship between BT 
and AT&T at the 95% or higher confidence level. 
The R-squared is moderate and it shows there is more than 43% of BT's variation in 
competitive advantage captured by the variations in competitive advantage of AT&T and 
NTT. 
However, there is serial autocorrelation, and also a serious multicollinearity problem 
between AT&T and NTT (not shown). 
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6.6.2.1.8.3.2 AT&T 
AT&T =a+ b1NTT + b2BT (Equation 6.28) 
Table 6.14: AT&T competitive advantage model of 5% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 25.8686 6.91238 0.0001 
NTT -0.330581 -2.52198 0.0327 
BT -0.362961 -2.57968 0.0297 
R-squared % 62.6733 
R-squared (adjusted) % 54.3785 
F-ratio 7.56 
ANOVA P-value . 0119 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.2741 
The overall P-value shows that BT and NTT together have a statistically significant 
relationship with AT&T at the 95% or higher confidence level. 
The fitted model indicates that there is a relationship between AT&T and BT at the 95% 
confidence level, and a relationship between AT&T and NTT also at the 95% confidence 
level. 
According to the Durbin-Watson statistic test, there is no indication of serial 
autocorrelation. Furthermore, the correlation matrix for BT and NTT shows no sign of any 
serious multicollinearity problem (not shown). 
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6.6.2.1.8.3.3 NTT 
NTT =a+ b1BT + b2AT&T 
Table 6.15: NTT competitive advantage of 5% risk premium 
(Equation 6.29) 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 42.5531 3.68157 0.0051 
BT -0.367372 -1.08108 0.3078 
AT&T -1.25258 -2.52198 0.0327 
R-squared % 42.5357 
R-squared (adjusted) % 29.7659 
F-ratio 3.33 
ANOVA P-value . 0827 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.3188 
There is a statistically significant relationship, from regressing NTT against BT and 
AT&T, at the 90% or higher confidence level according to the result of ANOVA P-value. 
The fitted model presents some relationship between NTT and AT&T at more than a 95% 
confidence level (P-value = 0.0327). 
In this case, there is no particular indication of serial autocorrelation, although there is 
some correlation between BT and AT&T, which presents a serious multicollinearity 
problem between them (not shown). 
6.6.2.1.8.3.4 Conclusion 
For the models (a), (b) and (c) the final result for the competitive advantage model using a 
risk premium of 5%, indicates that the BT model (a) exhibits serial autocorrelation and that 
there are serious multicollinearity problems between AT&T and NTT and between AT&T 
and BT. 
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6.6.2.1.8.4 Competitive advantage model (6%) 
6.6.2.1.8.4.1 BT 
BT =a+ b1AT&T + b2NTT (Equation 6.30) 
Table 6.16: BT competitive advantage model of 6% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 33.1094 4.67526 0.0012 
AT&T -1.13393 -3.334473 0.0087 
NTT -0.275421 -1.27534 0.2341 
R-squared % 56.1703 
R-squared (adjusted) % 46.4304 
F-ratio 5.77 
ANOVA P-value 0.0244 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.0166 
There is a statistically significant relationship between BT, AT&T and NTT combined at 
the 95% confidence level according to the ANOVA P-value. 
Individually, there is a relationship between BT and AT&T at the 99% confidence level 
according to the P-value of the model. 
R-squared is more than half and it indicates more than 56% of the variation in BT's 
competitive advantage is explained by the movement of competition in the market, 
whereas 44% is from other factors. 
According to the Durbin-Watson test, there is some serial autocorrelation. Also, there is a 
serious multicollinearity problem according to the correlation matrix result (not shown). 
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6.6.2.1.8.4.2 AT&T 
AT&T =a+ b1NTT + b2BT (Equation 6.31) 
Table 6.17: AT&T competitive advantage model of 6% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 24.0079 7.64103 0.0000 
NTT -0.288854 -2.40718 0.0394 
BT -0.487412 -3.33473 0.0087 
R-squared % 68.5184 
R-squared (adjusted) % 61.5224 
F-ratio 9.79 
ANOVA P-value 0.0055 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.1528 
According to the AVOVA P-value, there is a statistically significant relationship between 
AT&T and the combined competitive advantage of BT and NTT at the 99% confidence 
level. 
Specifically, there is a relationship between AT&T and BT at the 99% confidence level. 
AT&T has a relationship with NTT at the 95% confidence level. 
There is no sign of serial autocorrelation according to the Durbin-Watson statistic test. 
Also, there is no correlation with absolute values greater than 0.5 between the independent 
variables, BT and NTT (not shown). 
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6.6.2.1.8.4.3 NTT 
NTT =a+ b1BT + b2AT&T (Equation 6.32) 
Table 6.18: NTT competitive advantage model of 6% risk premium 
Coefficient Estimate 
Coefficient 
T- statistics P-value Overall 
result 
Constant 42.0293 3.42378 0.0076 
BT -0.555733 -1.27534 0.2341 
AT&T -1.35593 -2.40718 0.0394 
R-squared % 40.3921 
R-squared (adjusted) % 27.1459 
F-ratio 3.05 
ANOVA P-value 0.0975 
Durbin-Watson P= 0.2925 
The ANOVA P-value indicates a statistically significant relationship between NTT's 
competitive advantage and that of BT and AT&T only at the 90% confidence level. 
According to the individual P-value of the fitted model, there is a relationship between 
NTT and AT&T at the 95% confidence level. 
The R-squared is relatively low and implies that 40% of NTT's degree of competition is 
explained by the BT and AT&T variables. 
There is no indication of serial autocorrelation according to the Durbin-Watson P-value. 
But there is a particular correlation (not shown) between BT and AT&T with an absolute 
value greater than 0.5, which presents a serious multicollinearity problem. 
6.6.2.1.8.4.4 Conclusion 
According to the competitive advantage model of the 6% risk premium, AT&T had a serial 
autocorrelation and multicollinearity problem with both BT and NTT. 
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6.6.2.1.8.5 Final qualitative observations of the various multiple regressions 
Table 6.19: Comparison result of 3% risk premium 
3% BT AT&T NTT 
BT - 
AT&T No relationship - 
NTT No relationship Relationship - 
There is no significant relationship between BT and NTT. BT and AT&T have no such 
relationship either. AT&T and NTT do have a significant relationship and there were no 
serial autocorrelation or multicollinearity problems for the AT&T and NTT models using 
the 3% risk premium. 
Table 6.20: Comparison result of 4% risk premium 
4% BT AT&T NTT 
BT - 
AT&T Relationship - 
NTT No relationship No relationship - 
The competitive advantage model of 4% shows a significant relationship between BT and 
AT&T at the 95% confidence level, and there was no serial autocorrelation and no 
multicollinearity problem for the BT and AT&T models. BT and NTT have no significant 
relationship at the 95% confidence level. Also, there is no relationship between AT&T and 
NTT at the 95% confidence level. 
Table 6.21: Comparison result of 5% risk premium 
5% BT AT&T NTT 
BT - 
AT&T Relationship - 
NTT No relationship Relationship - 
BT and AT&T have a relationship at the 90% confidence level, but when BT is a 
dependent variable, there is a serious multicollinearity problem between the other two 
companies. There is no significant relationship between BT and NTT. Both AT&T and 
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NTT have a significant relationship at the 95% confidence level, although there is some 
autocorrelation in the residuals for the NTT model and a multicollinearity problem with 
that model between the other two companies. 
Table 6.22: Comparison result of 6% risk premium 
BT AT&T NTT 
BT 
AT&T Relationship - 
NTT No relationship Relationship 
There is no significant relationship between BT and NTT. However, BT and AT&T have a 
relationship at the 99% confidence level, although the BT model exhibits serial 
autocorrelation and multicollinearity between the other two companies. Moreover, a 
significant relationship between AT&T and NTT exists at the 95% confidence level and 
neither of these two models suffer from auto correlation, although there is a 
multicollinearity problem in the NTT model. 
6.6.2.1.8.6 Overall conclusion 
Hypothesis 5 states that of the three global players, AT&T is more adversely affected in its 
competitive position by the other two companies on account of its having a weaker 
monopoly position. Overall, considering the assumed risk premia of 3,4,5 and 6 per cent: 
1) Using either AT&T or BT as the dependent variable, the multiple regression analyses 
indicate a strong significant relationship between AT&T and BT at the 4,5 and 6 per 
cent risk premia. 
2) Correspondingly, there is a relationship between AT&T and NTT at the 3,5 and 6 per 
cent risk premia. 
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3) BT and NTT have no relationship whether using the 3,4,5 or 6 per cent risk premium. 
4) The conclusion indicates that no matter the risk premium, NTT is independent of BT in 
terms of competitive advantage, whereas AT&T is negatively related to both BT (and 
vice verse) and NTT (and vice versa) at three out of the four risk premium levels (see 
figure 6.2). Hypothesis 5 is supported. 
Figure 6.2: Relationships (all negative) between periods of competitive advantage in 
multiple regressions 
3= significant using a 3% risk premium 
4= ditto (4%) 
5= ditto (5%) 
6= ditto (6%) 
From the figure (6.2), it has been noted that, from the analysis of competitive advantage, 
the relationships that exist between BT and AT&T, and between AT&T and NTT are 
particularly strong. This can be explained by the fact that AT&T, which was originally part 
of the Bell company in the USA, had established strong trading relationships in both 
Britain and Japan before the privatisation process in telecoms. AT&T has established a 
market position in both countries often as a supplier of technology and also as a competitor 
in that they had invested in local firms or quoted themselves on these markets. There is no 
apparent linkage between BT and NTT, since they were both originally state-owned 
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companies with little foreign investment prior to privatisation and for many years 
afterwards. Therefore, the competitive advantage factors cannot be identified, which have 
enabled us to make a direct comparison between the two companies. To this day there is 
little linkage or cross investments between BT and NTT, despite the fact that, in the cable 
business, BT had invested for a brief period in the Japanese market. 
6.6.2.2 Applying a new estimation of risk premium 
Omran and Pointon (2002), in their manuscript: "A simulation analysis of the risk premium 
in G7 countries", find that the estimation of the risk premium for UK is 4.4%, USA 5.4% 
and Japan 3.3%. Regarding this estimation, a multiple regression test has been run to see if 
there is any new result from the previous risk premium estimations. 
6.6.2.2.1 Competitive advantage model 
Chart 6.10: The new estimation competitive advantage model 
The competitive advantage chart (6.10) shows a large competitive advantage from 1995 to 
2001. AT&T is superior to BT and NTT from 1990 to 1994. From 1995 to 1999, BT took 
the lead from AT&T. In 2000 and 2001, NTT was the leader. The overall picture is the 
same as demonstrated earlier. 
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6.6.2.2.2 Durbin-Watson statistic test 
According to the Durbin-Watson statistic test, there is no serial autocorrelation among the 
residuals between BT, AT&T and NTT (not shown). 
6.6.2.2.3 Correlation coefficient 
Table 6.23: Correlation matrix of new estimation of competitive advantage 
BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T 0.6315 1.0000 
NTT -0.1810 0.5670 1.0000 
The correlation matrix shows that AT&T has a positive number against both BT and NTT. 
It indicates that AT&T is affected by external forces of competition and not by other 
competitors (BT, NTT). 
AT&T enjoys a very competitive market in the USA, and many competitors are competing 
against AT&T. The other reason could be related to the fact that AT&T has been private 
since its establishment and it has not been subjected to any intervention from the 
government. Both BT and NTT were state-owned companies, and later they were 
privatised. 
NTT has a negative coefficient against BT, which implies that BT gains at NTT's expenses 
and vice versa, in theory. 
NTT has a positive sign against AT&T, which indicates that AT&T does not lose out to 
Japan. 
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0 
NTT is moving strongly against BT and has taken the lead from BT both in 2000 and 2001. 
In terms of shareholders returns, all these three companies have enjoyed competitive 
advantage except for a few years, where BT lost competitive advantage in 1992, and 
AT&T in 1996. This was confirmed in previous models. 
However, two correlation coefficients exceed 0.5 and so there is a multicollinearity 
problem. 
6.6.2.3 Change in competitive advantage 
6.6.2.3.1 Introduction 
The intention here is firstly, to examine the dynamics of competitive advantage and 
secondly, to eliminate multicollinearity problem. Essentially the regressions are of the 
form: 
Ayt= «* + ß`, AXIt+ P"2 exit + E`t (Equation 6.33) 
Each one of the competitive advantage percentages will be tested to examine both the 
Durbin-Watson statistic test for any autocorrelation and the correlation matrix for the R2 to 
find the correlation coefficients between BT, AT&T and NTT. 
6.6.2.3.2 Change in competitive advantage (3%) 
Table 6.24: Correlation matrix of change in competitive advantage of 3% risk 
3% BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T . 4805 1.0000 
NTT -. 1837 . 2410 1.0000 °-: 
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6.6.2.3.2.1 Observation 
According to the Durbin-Watson test, there is no indication of any serial autocorrelation 
between the variables, because the Durbin-Watson P-value (not shown) is greater than 
0.05. 
The correlation matrix shows a negative figure, which indicates that any favourable 
changes in BT or NTT adversely affects the other. 
The correlation between (BT, NTT) = R2 = (-. 1837)2 = . 
0338 
< 4% (approx. ) of variation in BT's reduction in competitive advantage explains gains in 
NTT's competitive advantage. However, there is a negative association between the 
degrees of competitive advantage of the two companies, if the risk premium is correctly 
assessed at 3 per cent. Nevertheless, the degree of association is relatively small. 
The correlation between (BT, AT&T) = R2 = (0.4805) = 0.231 
< 24% of variation in BT's change in competitive advantage explains AT&T's change in 
competitive advantage. Here the association is positive, so they are not direct competitors. 
Correlation between (AT&T, NTT) = R2 = (0.24 10)2 = 0.0581 
< 6% of variation in AT&T's change in competitive advantage explains NTT's change in 
competitive advantage. Again the association is positive. 
6.6.2.3.3 Change in competitive advantage (4%) 
Table 6.25: Correlation matrix of change in competitive advantage of 4% risk 
4% BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T 0.7102 1.0000 
NTT -0.1527 -0.1055 1.0000 
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6.6.2.3.3.1 Observation 
There are no serial autocorrelation issues among BT, AT&T and NTT, because their values 
(not shown) are greater than 0.05. 
There are some negative numbers representing cross-correlations between BT and NTT 
and AT&T and NTT. 
(BT, NTT) = R2 = (-0.1527)2 = 0.0233 
< 3% of variation in BT's decline in competitive advantage (discussed earlier) explains the 
gain in NTT's competitive advantage. 
(BT, AT&T) = R2 = (0.7102)2 = 0.5044 
< 51% of variation in BT's change in competitive advantage explains AT&T change in 
competitive advantage. 
(AT&T, NTT) = R2 = (-0.1055)2 = 0.011 
< 2% of variation in AT&T's decline in competitive advantage (noted earlier) explains a 
gain for NTT's competitive advantage. 
6.6.2.3.4 Conclusion 
Overall, assuming the 3 and 4 per cent premium to be correct, NTT is able to gain at the 
joint expense of BT and AT&T (only 4 percent in AT&T case). The dominant firm section, 
and even the forecasts projected, suggest that NTT from 2000 onwards is outperformed BT 
and AT&T. 
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6.6.2.3.5 Change in competitive advantage (5%) 
Table 6.26: Correlation Matrix of change in competitive advantage of 5% risk 
5% BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0004 
AT&T 0.49 9 1.0000 
NTT 0.0339 0.2899 1.0000 
6.6.2.3.5.1 Observation 
The Durbin-Watson statistic test (not shown) indicates that there is no serial 
autocorrelation between BT, AT&T and NTT. 
Observation shows no negative numbers in the change in competitive advantage using the 
5% risk premium, which therefore signifies that changes in one company do not adversely 
affect the others. 
The correlation between BT and NTT (BT, NTT) is small 
(BT, NTT) = R2 = (0.0339)2 = 0.00115 
< 1% of variation in BT's change in competitive advantage explains NTT's change in 
competitive advantage. 
(BT, AT&T) = R2 = (0.4999)2 = 0.25 
25% of variation in BT's change in competitive advantage explains AT&T's change in 
competitive advantage. 
(AT&T, NTT) = R2 = (0.2899)2 = 0.084 
< 9% of variation in AT&T's change in competitive advantage explains NTT's change in 
competitive advantage. 
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6.6.2.3.5.2 Conclusion: Not rivals 
Using the 5 per cent premium, the overall conclusion is that the companies are not rivals: 
they can each grow in competitive strength. 
6.6.2.3.6 Change in competitive advantage (6%) 
Table 6.27: Correlation Matrix of change in competitive advantage of 6% risk 
6% BT AT&T NTT 
BT 1.0000 
AT&T 0.6749 1.0000 
NTT 0.0688 , 11 0.2096 1.0000 
6.6.2.3.6.1 Observation 
According to the Durbin-Watson statistic test, there is no indication of any serial 
autocorrelation between BT, AT&T and NTT (not shown). 
The main observation from the correlation matrix is that none of the coefficients is 
negative. Therefore, changes in one company's competitive advantage is not adversely 
affecting the others. 
Correlation between (BT, NTT) is small at less than 7% at (0.0688). 
(BT, NTT) = R2 = (0.0688)2 = 0.00473 
<1% of variation in BT's change in competitive advantage explains NTT's change in 
competitive advantage. 
(BT, AT&T) = R2 = (0.6749)2 = 0.4555 
Approximately 46% of variation in BT's change in competitive advantage explains 
AT&T's change in competitive advantage. 
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(AT&T, NTT) = R2 = (0.2096)2 = 0.044 
<5% of variation in AT&T's change in competitive advantage explains NTT's change in 
competitive advantage. 
6.6.2.3.6.2 Conclusion: Not rivals 
The conclusion from analysing the 6 per cent model is the same as for the 5 per cent 
model: they can each grow in competitive strength. 
6.6.2.3.7 Overall conclusion 
However, the reason why a4 per cent risk premium estimate provides the most sensible 
explanation is because the correlation coefficients can be negative, revealing a degree of 
the competitive change, which is consistent with the results of the dominant firm analysis. 
It showed that for most of the overall period, BT was the dominant firm. Later in 2001 and 
onwards (according to the projected forecasts) NTT has taken the lead and that is mainly 
because the competition in the Japanese market is not yet intensive, and the Japanese 
government retains 45 per cent of the NTT's holdings. 
By contrast, this is not the same for BT and AT&T. 
Nevertheless, the strength of the relationships as measured by R squared is sometimes low. 
Also, a 10 per cent cut-off NTT's change on competitive advantage is independent of BT 
and AT&T, which BT's and AT&T's changes in competitive advantage are positively 
related, i. e. they are not rivals (see figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3: The dynamics of competitive advantage (where R2 exceeds 10 per cent) 
NTT 
3= significant and positive using 3% risk premium 
4 =ditto@4% 
-5- = ditto 5% 
6 =ditto@6% 
Historically, the linkage between BT and AT&T arises from the cross investments by both 
countries in each other's economies. The policy of the Japanese government throughout 
the 20th century was to limit and frequently bar inward investments, which would result in 
Japanese companies being owned from abroad. NTT like the other telecoms companies 
was an offshoot of the postal services business, which was seen as a strategic industry and, 
therefore, protected from competition both internally and externally by being a public 
service industry. It gained its investments need from highly successful banking services 
attached to the post office in Japan, and thereby sustained its dominance of the Japanese 
market after part-privatisation. BT had a similar history in that the post office in the UK 
was the originator of BT in its formative years. However, with privatisation, the intention 
was to liberalise the market and encourage competition initially through Mercury and, in 
addition, by allowing external competitors to enter the market. AT&T, which was a 
subdivision of Bell telecoms sees the opportunity to be a technical provider and competitor 
for the expanding services, which emerged after 1980s. A reciprocal opportunity arose in 
the USA for BT to participate in the new technologies. As a result, it can be observed that 
they are very close cross commercially and there are cultural links between these two 
companies, whereas there appears to be little linkage with NTT. 
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6.7 Final comment 
Chapter 6 indicated that three telecoms companies have competitive advantage, and the 4 
per cent risk premium was the most suitable risk premia for these three companies. The 
forecasted figures from 2002-2005 showed that BT and NTT are likely to gain competitive 
advantage in the future, whereas AT&T had a negative competitive advantage. The 
dominant firm section (see 6.6.2.1.6) indicated that BT performed better than AT&T and 
NTT, and had gained more competitive advantage. 
Hypothesis 4 is rejected for most of the study period, and so, in terms of competitive 
advantage, NTT did not exhibit through time a superior competitive advantage position 
compared with BT and AT&T. However, the forecasted period from 2002-2005 supported 
the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5 is supported, given that AT&T is more adversely affected in its competitive 
advantage position by the other two companies. 
Chapter 7 is a reflection chapter, including an overview of issues arising from the research. 
This chapter will also try to update the reader with the financial situation of the telecoms 
markets worldwide. 
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Chapter Seven: Reflections 
Chapter Seven: Reflections 
The investigation in this chapter deals with the side issues of some important events in the 
telecoms market. This chapter deals with two aspects. Firstly, it analyses the rights issue as 
an important management action for BT. Secondly, it begins with a brief reflection on the 
study, and some of the valuable lessons will be identified, which arise from the analysis of 
the telecoms industry and in particular from the study of the three conglomerates BT, 
AT&T and NTT. 
7.1 Reflective comments (analysis) on BT's rights issue 
Table 7.1: Changes in BT's figures before and after rights issue 
Before £ After £ Overall 
results 
Short-term debt (%) 20,733 (52.5%) 9,390 (37.0%) 
Long-term debt % 18,775 (0.475) 16,245 (0.63) 
MV as of 31 March £33,571.09bn £24,282.77bn 
Ratio of STD+LTD/STD+LTD+MV 0.54% 0.514% 
Beta 0.87 0.82 
S. D. . 03732 . 0241269 
Cochran's C test P-Value 0.006256 
Kruskal-Wallis P-value 0.6774 
Standard skewness +0.068 
Standard kurtosis -0.798 
7.1.1 Introduction 
On 10 May 2001 BT announced a one-for three rights issue at an exercise price of £3, 
compared with the previous day's closing middle market price of £5.685. What is so 
significant about this? Firstly, it is noticeable because of its sheer size, for the firm raised 
nearly six billion pounds after expenses. Secondly, the size of the discount of 47.23 per 
cent on the price of the previous day, is untypical of rights issues. Thirdly, it was not 
underwritten. Fourthly, around 90 per cent of the rights were absorbed by existing 
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shareholders and the remainder sold to other shareholders. Fifthly, BT's motivation was 
not to finance the expansion of activities, but primarily to reduce its debt. 
As the analysis unfolds, it will be seen that this rights issue can be considered a success 
story. Of course, for a company as complex as BT not every substantive argument can be 
covered, but the emphasis here is upon valuable lessons that can be learned from such an 
investigation. 
A rights issue is an invitation to existing shareholders to purchase additional shares in the 
company. This is a very popular method of raising new funds, it is easy and relatively 
cheap. The shares are usually offered at a discounted price from the market value-typically 
15 per cent. Shareholders can either buy these shares themselves or sell the right to buy to 
another investor (Arnold, 2002: 405). 
Watson and Head (2001: 120) claimed that: 
"If the rights offered are fully taken up, there is no dilution of ownership and 
control, but they are not appropriate if the amount of finance needed to be raised is 
large, since the funds available to individual shareholders are likely to be limited. " 
They add (p. 125) that: 
"Deeply discounted rights issues are so rare, and Pearson used the deeply- 
discounted rights issue to minimise costs of underwriting". 
Brealey and Myers (2003: 421) state that in some countries such as USA and Japan, rights 
issues a rarity and generally cash offers are the norm and as long as companies 
successfully sell new shares, the issue price in a rights offering is irrelevant, but this is not 
the case in a general cash offer. 
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Atrill (2003: 219) points out some of the advantages of the rights issue: 
f Most common form of share issue; 
f Issue expenses are quite low and issue procedures are simpler than for other 
forms of share issue; 
f The existing shareholders, presumably, find that it suits their risk/return 
requirements; 
f The law now requires shares, which are to be issued for cash to be offered first 
to existing shareholders (this is known as `pre-emptive rights! ); and 
f the offer price is below the current market price. 
According to Gapper and Lewis (1996: 23) the shares usually remain on sale for three 
weeks and to avoid the risk, the companies tend to insure themselves by asking a merchant 
bank to underwrite the issue. For a standard fee of 2 per cent, the bank guarantees to buy 
the shares if the market price falls too far. 
The rights issues are fairly active, and rare in practice to fail (McLaney, 2000). Based on 
an article Clay Harris (FT, 25th Feb. 1999, p. 11) MMC fees in UK are not that high 
compared with elsewhere: 3-6% (US); 1-5% (Germany); 2-4% (France); 2-2.5% 
(Australia); and 3-5% in Japan. In UK, the fees are 2.8% based on the study by MMC, and 
they said deep discounting should be used more than it is, but said this appeared to be 
because of management preference. 
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7.1.2 Testing the rights issue 
The ANOVA test has been used to examine the BT's return index. To prove the 
hypothesis, a table (7.1) has been constructed, which includes some of financial figures for 
2001 and 2002 and some other ratios such as beta, standard deviation and some AVOVA 
test measures have been used to find out if the financial risk has changed after the rights 
issue or not. 
The rights issue and the selling of some of the profitable assets such as Yell, Japan 
Telecom and J-Phone and some other holdings, has decreased the net debt in the 2002 to 
£13,930bn, even though it had increased in 2001 by £18,942bn (see BT annual report 
2002: 79). Hence, this transaction has decreased the total loans and other borrowings to 
£ 18,440bn in 2002 (£30,911- 2001). 
7.1.3 Share Price Analysis 
A naive investor may think that a large discount suggests that the shares were originally 
under-priced at the time of the announcement. But three shares at £5.685, say, worth 
£17.055, together with one share at £3.00, now worth £20.055, are translated into four 
shares at £5.01375 each. This is exactly the same as £17.055 plus the £3 cash. 
Now, of course, the share price is likely to change before the exercise date. Price 
movements depend upon the arrival of new information about the company, its sector, the 
economy and world events. A principle of Einstein's is the standard deviation of the 
movement of microscopic particles suspended in liquid as a linear function of the square 
root of time! This translates very simply. For a period of 36 days before the rights could be 
exercised, this means that the square root of 36, i. e. 6, would be the relevant factor to be 
applied. Actually, there were 37 days, so we use root 37. The standard deviation of BT's 
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own index is 0.03732 for the previous 42 days up to the announcement. The predicted 
standard deviation over the next 37 days would be 0.03732 times root 37 = 22.70 per cent, 
approximately. 
The 47.23 per cent discount in the share price translates into -0.4723/0.2270 = -2.08 
standard deviations. The smaller shaded area in the panel illustration 7.1 (at the end of this 
chapter) shows that the probability of achieving worse than 2.08 standard deviations below 
the mean is 2 per cent. It follows that BT's strategic risk probability, of the price falling by 
more than 47.23 per cent to below the exercise price, was also around 2 per cent (see panel 
illustration 7.1). 
This presumes that BT's own index follows a normal distribution. The normal distribution 
is neither skewed to the right, nor the left and it is not too 'peaked'. The terms for these are 
`skewness' and 'kurtosis'. With a sample of observations there will be some departure 
from an underlying distribution. For BT, it was found that the skewness measure was 
+0.068 and the kurtosis was -0.798. In practice, values of these between -2 and +2 are 
considered to be acceptable. The conclusion is that we can reasonably apply the standard 
normal distribution. 
But why should Einstein's square root of time be applied? Well, if information arrives 
unpredictably and each day's price change is unrelated to the previous day's, then each 
day's standard deviation of returns is independent of the previous day's. A basic principle 
of statistics is that the variance of the sum is equal to the sum of the variances, if events are 
independent of each other. Over 37 days there are 37 individual daily variances. The 
standard deviation is equal to the square root of the variance. Therefore, the 37-day 
standard deviation is equal to the square root of the result of 37 times the daily variance, 
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which equals the daily standard deviation times root 37. It is the application of the square 
root of time, e. g. root 37, as Einstein suggests. 
Now, historically typical rights issues have offered a 15 per cent discount. If BT had 
followed this alternative strategy, the probability of the price falling below its exercise 
price would reflect -0.15/0.2270 = -0.66 standard deviations. The risk of this alternative 
strategy of a 15 per cent discount is shown as the larger shaded area in the panel 
illustration 7.2 (at the end of this chapter), and represents a probability of 25 per cent. 
7.1.4 No underwriting 
Because the probability of the price falling below the exercise price within 37 days is small 
with a 47.23 per cent discount, there is perhaps no real need to have the issue underwritten. 
Even if underwriting costs were 2 per cent, this would have represented a cost to BT and 
hence, to its shareholders. So, the deeply discounted rights issues provided a saving for the 
company in underwriting fees and no overall loss to the investor because the under-pricing 
of the new shares is cancelled by the overpricing of the old shares in terms of their post- 
rights value, when account is taken of the shareholding. 
7.1.5 Debt reduction 
From the financial reports ended March 2001 and 2002, it can be seen that the short-term 
debt was reduced from around £21 billion to around £9 billion, and long term debt was 
reduced by £2.5 billion. This was achieved by a combined strategy of the rights issue and 
the sale of Yell, Japan Telecom and J-Phone. 
Because of the importance of this event to BT's debt reduction as of the 2002 financial 
year, it has been decided to examine the alternative hypothesis that the risk has reduced, 
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since there is less debt (i. e. less financial risk) following the rights issue. So, for BT, the 
standard deviation of BT's own index before the rights issue announcement with the 
standard deviation after the issue itself was compared. 
The daily standard deviation reduced from 3.7 per cent to 2.4 per cent. By using a standard 
result known as a Cochran test, we needed to know whether the reduction in risk was by 
chance or not. There was a less than one per cent chance (0.0063) that, if we rejected the 
proposition that the underlying risk had stayed the same, then we would be wrong. In other 
words, the risk had almost certainly been altered for the better. However, the UK FTSE 
ALL-Share Index has generally been falling (see panel illustration 7.3, at the end of this 
chapter). 
But, for BT's shareholders that do not hold a widely diversified portfolio, this is still good 
news. As to diversified shareholders, there was also a reduction in the beta coefficient from 
2001 to 2002, although since then the beta has increased substantially. At the time, the 
rights issue had been successful in terms of debt reduction, financial risk and shareholder 
risk. 
An added complexity was that the market value of the equity fell from 2001 to 2002, so the 
gearing ratio, when applying a mixed measure of the book value of long-term and short- 
term debt to the value of these combined elements plus the market value of equity, fell 
only marginally. However, risk dimensions and the ability to service debt are no doubt 
much more important than market value ratios. 
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7.1.6 Flexibility 
To regain financial flexibility is very important indeed, for otherwise excessive short-term 
debt can result in restrictions on the firm's ability to restructure and expand. Traditionally, 
share issues have been seen as timed events, when share price performance is at a high. 
However, for BT this was not the case, yet they created their own window of opportunity 
despite the circumstances. 
7.1.7 MMC Recommendations 
Indeed the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in recent years has recommended the use 
of deeply discounted rights issues to avoid altogether the underwriters' costs, which 
rationally can be considered to have been too high in the past. Yet, by international 
standards, compared with the US and Japan, UK underwriters' fees are quite reasonable. 
Furthermore, more sophisticated investors, such as large institutional investors, are more 
likely to appreciate the rationale for a deeply discounted rights issue. The shareholders' 
response was well understood. 
7.1.8 Gearing ratio 
Despite the dramatic fall in the market value of equity (£24,282.77bn) after the rights 
issue, the gearing ratio [(STD+LTD)/(STD+LTD+MV)] actually decreased (0.514), i. e. the 
fall on the MV did not have any affect on the gearing ratio because of the reduction in 
debt. This would suggest a decrease in the beta. In table (7.1), this is shown to be true 
(return, 0.87,0.82). This result is consistent with the previous conclusion in chapter 4, 
where in the ANOVA test the beta was a significant factor, when the privatised and non- 
privatised groups were compared. Hence, as Fama and French (1992) have suggested, the 
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beta is dead. Our result disagreed with Fama and French's conclusion and agrees with 
Clare, Priestly and Thomas (1998). 
However, according to the ANOVA test (0.7082), the mean returns are not significantly 
different afterwards compared with beforehand, and the medians are not significantly 
different at the 95.0% confidence level according to the Kruskal-Wallis test (0.6774). 
7.1.9 France Telecom 
It is interesting to note that France Telecom is also facing a gearing problem of whether a 
massive rights issue can successfully prevent the rating agency from downgrading its 
bonds. Based on a similar analysis to BT's, if France Telecom had launched a rights issue 
at a 47.23 per cent discount at the same time as BT's issue, then it could be reckoned that 
the probability of France Telecom's price falling below the exercise price would also have 
been 2 per cent, because its daily standard deviation as a proportion of the price was 
virtually identical to BT's. 
7.1.10 Conclusion 
BT's rights issue was launched at the right time. Indeed, most of the telecoms companies 
have since been watching BT's rights issue closely. Also, because of the September 11 to 
events, most of the global stock market indices have dropped significantly, so other 
companies did not proceed with rights issues at that time. Other telecoms companies are 
expected to follow the same strategy as BT's, because they too are burdened with heavy 
debts. A good example is France Telecom whose intention is to launch a rights issue to 
raise around e 10 billion by the end of the year (Euroweek, June 9th 2002, p. 1-2). 
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7.1.11 Comment 
This is favourable news for the shareholders because the (median) return stayed the same 
whilst the financial risk was being reduced. 
7.1.12 Final comment 
The financial risk has decreased immediately after the rights issue agreeing with the 
hypothesis. A separate calculation has revealed that the risk of the market has decreased 
faster than for BT. This indeed tended to push up the beta (see tables 7.2 and 7.3 at the end 
of this chapter). 
Conditionally, the rights issue in general reduces the financial risk, but this could happen 
effectively if the stock markets are stable and the equity prices are not volatile, because the 
changes and movements in the stock prices could have an effect on the rights issue's 
effectiveness. A good example is Swiss Life, one of the biggest casualties of the recent 
problems in Europe's insurance industry. It faced a struggle to convince shareholders to 
back up its SFrlbn-plus rights issue after revealing its shareholder funds have fallen by 
one-third since the start of the year 2002. Another good example is France telecom, where 
they are trying to raise c 9bn rights issue (Financial Times, Sept. 19th 2002, p. 26). 
Meanwhile, the financial statement figures reveal only the cash flow and balance sheet 
effects of the rights issue in the account figures, but the importance of the market reaction 
and changes in risk are vital. This reflective comment was to point out the importance of 
this event to BT and what has changed since that event. 
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7.2 Evaluation and interpretation of our models 
The financial analysis has been taken a step further than by previous writers on the subject. 
This has been achieved by applying the techniques and pathways prescribed in the 
literature on financial performance and by introducing a new model aimed at examining 
the degree of competitive advantage of the telecom companies chosen for this thesis. 
A similar analysis can be undertaken for European telecoms companies or indeed any other 
telecoms companies that have gone through the privatisation process. Indeed, it may be the 
model in this thesis will be applicable across a broad spectrum of privatised companies and 
it is arguable that companies who have always been private, but have the same private 
monopoly advantages, would show a similar long-term trend in competitive advantage. 
However, there are limiting factors which make the model less suitable for more 
competitive situations but, nevertheless, perhaps the original Pointon's model (2001) has 
wider applications (see chapter 6). 
One might ask to what extent the measurement of the competitive advantage for these 
companies adds to our understanding of the viability of the privatised telecoms' 
businesses. It is the view that it does give a significant measure of this factor since it 
incorporates a number of key variables, which can be considered crucial for the success of 
any company. 
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In the model, the key variables are dividend-growth, the CAPM rate, PE inverse, and the 
year-ahead earnings yield. These accounting and financial measures are conventionally 
applied and understood by the management of all companies and have been tested 
historically in other theses as good measures for the successful performance of an 
enterprise. 
By projecting forward through a time series, the likely performance of the companies 
relative to each other has been forecasted, where it presumed that they have a similar 
market structure, investment strategy, management culture and parallel technological 
development. 
7.3 News reportage of the telecoms industry worldwide 
While writing this thesis, there are quite considerable changes in the telecoms market, the 
stock market crisis in confidence is spreading right across the globe, and hitherto otherwise 
reliable stable companies are now in serious financial difficulty because their debt burdens 
are larger than the equity value. This is the case for France Telecom, which has led to a 
discussion by Jo Johnson about possible renationalisation by the French government 
(Financial Times, July 1" 2002, p. 21). 
The consensus view appeared to be that the government should be unwilling or indeed 
incapable of purchasing even at market value the equity of the company, which has been 
falling from c= 120bn in 1999 to only £7bn today as of 2002. The primary reason for this is 
not the cost of the shares, but the burden of debt of £45.2bn at the end of 2002. However, 
recent news on this matter suggests that the French government will attempt to underwrite 
or purchase sufficient equity to support the rights issue. 
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Under the Euro regulation, the French government is obliged to restrain its public sector 
debts overall to 60% of its GNP (Gross National Product). As they are marginally around 
this figure, any acquisitions of debt in supporting their industry would reach that regulation 
and require permission of the European Central Bank. This is to say nothing of the likely 
precautions of the competition commission in Brussels, where direct industry protection is 
seen as anti-competitive. 
There was a speculative bubble in the telecoms shares during 2000/2001, which resulted in 
the share values of the telecoms companies accelerating to an unsustainable value thirty 
times earnings in some cases with little prospect of generating income to make a 
reasonable return for the investment. 
Some telecoms companies used inflated share values to embark upon mergers and take- 
overs of their competitors or indeed to enlarge themselves into global players, and it 
seemed there was no limit to the value placed on those shares. As a consequence, when the 
share values collapsed in 2001/2002, the companies were left exposed with large debt and 
massive intrinsic devaluation of the assets acquired. A classic case is that of WorldCom in 
the USA, and to some extent Vodafone in the UK. 
However, in the UK example, there is no evidence yet of any false accounting to 
compound the problem (the sale to France Telecom of their shareholdings in Orange at 
premium prices seems to have avoided cash crises for Vodafone). 
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In the case of Worldcom, they not only falsified their accounts, but their acquisitions of 
BT's shares in Qwest, during the massive take-over of a competitor in the US, required a 
cash payment to BT of $30bn at an inflated value at the time. This resulted in a massive 
debt mountain for WorldCom contributing to its need to hide its true financial position 
(Financial Times, June 18,2002, p. 31). 
Most of the telecoms companies are trying to eliminate strategic overlaps and 
inefficiencies in divisions or subsidiaries. These companies are taking this strategy to raise 
some cash to pay for their debts, and one way or the other, they are trying to implement a 
new investment and financing strategy. A good example is NTT, Japan's dominant 
telecommunications group, where the new management is trying to carry out a 
comprehensive review of group operations in order to close down some of its unprofitable 
operations (Financial Times, 2002, July 1St p. 26). 
It can be seen clearly from the telecoms companies' situation world-wide that many 
telecoms companies are burdened with heavily unpayable debts, of which most came from 
the licence of the 3G package. These companies are trying to overcome the financial 
difficulty by introducing a rights issues similar to what BT did in 2001 (Financial Times, 
July 9th 2002, p. 23; and Financial Times, June 28th 2002: 24). 
In July 9th 2002, Deutsche Telecom is contemplating a sale of its information technology 
services arm as part of its debt-reduction programme, a company insider said on July 8t' 
2002. Selling the IT services unit, which ABN-Amro valued at ¬4bn-¬6bn in a note 
published on July 8th 2002, would mark a reversal of DT's "four-pillar" strategy- the joint 
development of fixed-line and mobile telephony, the internet, and corporate services. By 
this new tactic of selling the IT, it could allow the group to reduce significantly its ¬67.3bn 
debt (Financial Times, July 9' 2002, p. 28). 
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In the wake of the latest revelations from WorldCom, accountants have reported a wave of 
calls from non-executive directors at telecommunications companies to review their 
practices (Financial Times, July 4 t", 2002: 1). 
All these dilemmas and financial difficulties for most of the telecoms companies have 
reduced the appetite from investors for taking a chance that telecoms will turn round 
according to Stephen Michel, telecoms credit analyst at Barclays Capital (Financial Times, 
June 27th 2002, p. 21). However, recent market information suggests that there is now in 
October 2002, a recovery of interest in telecoms shares. 
The situation in the global capital markets is unstable. After the accounting corruption 
scandals in the US, many observers and analysts expect to see more accounting frauds in 
the future. It is hard to say which or when, but the market and the replacement of new 
management might reveal the hidden secrets. 
The expectation of the future is uncertain, but the recent events in the market can say a few 
things about what will happen in the future. In this thesis, the writer is not trying to predict 
the future, but he is making some assumptions on whether or not the telecoms markets are 
stable or not. The likely situation suggests that most of telecoms companies are suffering 
from high debts, and this somehow reflects on the investors' reaction against telecoms. 
What worries most of these telecoms companies is the credit rating. However, they try to 
reduce their debt burden in order to stay in a comfortable investment grade territory. Most 
likely, some of these telecoms companies are in a race to refinance some of their maturing 
bonds and loans. Deutsche Telecom is trying to refinance ¬7.2bn of bonds and loans 
maturing next year 2003 (Financial Times, July 5th 2002, p. 26). 
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These companies are working on property disposals to generate some cash to meet their 
debt requirements and to avoid the downgrade of the Standard & Poor's and Moody's 
Investor Service rate. 
These credit ratings have already been downgraded for French Telecom (Financial Times, 
July 9th 2002, p. 31), and Deutsche Telecom is hanging on the edge to keep its grade stable, 
but conditionally, Deutsche Telecom must reduce their debts of ¬67.3bn in order to stay 
BBB+ (Standard & Poor's) and Baal (Moody's Investors Service rate), but arguably the 
months to come would prove this action (Financial Times, July 5t' 2002, p. 26). 
Analysts do not expect significant increases in Capex as many operators are eager to 
conserve cash to service their large debt burdens by introducing the 3G package in 2003 
and 2004 (Financial Times, June 6t' 2002, p. 4). 
Aggressive battles are evident between the telecoms underdogs companies and small Asian 
companies to launch the most advance technology in the market. Most of these small 
privatised telecoms companies in the developing countries in Asia are taking the same 
pathway as BT when it was privatised. They begin to spread globally across the countries 
in Asia and beyond Asia in some of the European countries to establish some alliances 
with European telecoms companies. 
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South Korean Telecom company, has built up new overseas markets for their CDMA 
technology ahead and instead of the rival GSM platform adopted by the European wireless 
industry and has made an alliance with New Zealand Telecom company. The company 
introduced a new technology innovation called the CDMA2000 1 X, which replaces the 3G 
network, which is more advance than 3G in services for speed and quality, and 3G 
development in South Korea was delayed because of the success of CDMA2000 IX 
(Financial Times, July 10th 2002, p. 29). 
AT&T looks poised to fall out of the Dow Jones industrial average following the expected 
shareholder approval in July 10th 2002 of a planned break-up of the venerable 
telecommunications company. However, AT&T which once dominated the US telecoms 
landscape, will be left as a marginal player after it shrinks back to its core long-distance 
business. The break-up is also expected to lead to a take-over of the remaining AT&T, 
with SBC communications itself a member of the Dow tipped as the most likely buyer 
(Financial Times, July 10th 2002, p. 26). 
The viability of third generation (3G) mobile phone services was thrown into further doubt 
on June 25th 2002 when Telefonica of Spain and Sonera of Finland abandoned plans for 3G 
operations in Germany and wrote off the £5.3bn they paid for a licence two years ago. 
European telecommunications groups spent more than ¬l OObn acquiring 3G licences at the 
height of the technology boom. Telefonica and Sonera, partners in Group 3G, one off six 
licence holders in Germany, are the first to knowledge that that investment is in effect 
worthless (Financial Times, July 26th 2002, p. 23). 
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7.4 Regulation situation in the telecoms market 
When it is launched next year, OfCom will cover more industries in the telecoms sector 
with the possibility of more power to intervene than its predecessor. It is expected to take 
on the role of enforcing competition law held by the Office of Fair Trading (Financial 
Times, May 28th 5 2002, p. 
4). 
However, this is partly conjecture by the financial commentators, and it is more likely to 
continue to be a price-capping agency of the state and part of an EU-wide regulatory 
structure. It is assumed that Oftel will maintain its price control on BT until it sees that the 
regime is working (Financial Times, June 2 1St, 2002, p. 5). 
The telecoms market is evolving slowly towards a more competitive environment, but has 
been inhibited by the collapse of telecoms shares in the stock market, making it difficult 
for existing competitors to remain solvent and manage their current indebtedness. Britain is 
as competitive now as anywhere in Europe, but with only two significant players in the 
shape of Vodafone, Orange and BT. This has partly fed through to lower prices and a 
choice of service. 
The UK is not a low-cost economy, but Internet access is available nationwide at tariffs 
among the lowest in the OECD and broadband prices are below the average of the Group 
of Seven leading Industrial Countries (Financial Times, May 23 `d 2002, p. 20). 
The regulation issue is one of the main concerns of most of the telecoms companies who 
hold private monopolies in their markets. After the company transfers to private hands, the 
governments have chosen to implement a regulation regime in order to restrict the abuse of 
the monopoly by these companies. 
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The main role of the regulation is to watch the market from any awkward behaviour such 
as limiting the competition or having a policy or strategy, which prevents new entrants in 
the market. 
The 1984 Telecommunications Act in the UK was introduced to regulate and monitor BT. 
Oftel was the regulator watchdog for telecoms companies in the UK and more preciously 
for BY Many observers have questioned the ability of Oftel to monitor BT's actions. Oftel 
managed to cap the prices charges by BT, but not the behaviour of BT itself towards other 
competitors. 
The main goal of Oftel has shifted from being a watchdog to a price control agent. As we 
write this thesis, BT is still under price control by Oftel. No doubt that Oftel is doing its 
best to serve the customers, from my readings many telecoms companies in the UK's 
market have admitted that Oftel is not doing its work properly. 
The competition in the UK market has been intensified in some parts of the telecoms 
market such as the Mobile, Internet and Cablevision businesses. The main networking 
system has to be leased from BT in order to provide services to different customers. This 
results in BT sustaining its network monopoly. 
The Oftel has enforced BT to demolish the monopoly in networks by allowing other users 
access to the network as reasonable prices. However, BT still owns more than 80 per cent 
market share in the fixed line and the provisions exchange lines. 
Oftel only has price control over BT's services. Nevertheless, BT has suffered severely 
from this price cap. Oftel should formulate itself to monitor the market and allow more 
freedom for entry and competition. 
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BT as a private monopoly and the main key player in the UK telecoms market has obtained 
more than a 50 per cent market share as of 2002 financial year. The only way to allow 
more competition is not by regulation, but to try to free the market from any restriction and 
let the market be the judge for the survival of telecoms companies. 
The process in the UK telecoms market and the way BT was privatised are a lesson for 
many state-owned telecoms companies worldwide. An alternative route to privatisation 
would be to break the monopoly by dividing the businesses into different components and 
allow them to compete with each other, instead of handing over the whole network system. 
The break up of National Bell in the USA was perhaps a better model for creating a 
competitive environment than that chosen by the Europeans and others who followed the 
BT model. The regulation situation is very serious and needs thorough investigation, 
because the market is moving swiftly and the telecoms technology is sweeping through the 
market, and the regulators may not have the ability to cope with these changes. 
The regulation is not making any direct effect on the monopoly situation in most of the 
telecoms companies. The monopolist companies are retaining most of the market share 
because of their scale of economies. They can react to any change of situation easily, 
because they own the network system in the country. Good examples of companies with 
flexible strategies to deal with change are BT, NTT and Deutsche telecoms, the current 
exception being France Telecom, which may well be renationalised as a means of avoiding 
bankruptcy. 
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The technology will have a little effect on the market position of telecommunications 
monopolies and their high profit margins. According to Petrazzini (1996: 4) the 
governments could consider 2 proactive reform strategies. First, if a government believes 
that its national carrier can withstand the challenges of competition, it should consider 
corporatising the state-owned operator and gradually lowering entry barriers in both value- 
added and basic services. 
Second, if a government believes that its national carrier will not be able to stand up to 
competition or if fiscal considerations are a priority, privatisation alone may be a good 
alternative. 
If a government hands over the entire network to a company after its privatisation, it is a 
private monopoly transfer. A company can enjoy its private monopoly for very long time 
before it can be broken by others. 
With recent scam and scandals in accountancy frauds, the US accountancy regulator has 
step in to monitor the work of auditors based outside the US. The new legislation would 
create an accounting overseeing board with powers to set professional standards for 
auditors as well as investigate and discipline them (Financial Times, July 12th 2002, p. 19). 
In the wake of the accounting irregularities in the US, the European Commission has called 
an emergency meeting of financial regulators and finance ministry officials to discuss 
Europe's response to the financial crisis in the US. This meeting is scheduled to be held on 
July 23 `d 2002, and it will focus on measures to avoid a repeat of the US events in Europe 
and to protect Europe's financial markets if a large company were to collapse because of 
financial irregularities (Financial Times, July 12th 2002, p. 7). 
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For the same reason, the French government on July 11th 2002 promised wide-ranging 
measures to improve standards of corporate governance and financial reporting in France. 
The French government will require the companies to create an audit and remuneration 
committee and that auditing firms be barred from providing consultancy services to the 
same clients (Financial Times, July 12th 2002, p. 7). 
7.5 Overall conclusion 
The reflections chapter examined the question of the use of rights issue as a means of 
redressing the problem of accumulating debt by the telecoms companies. The updated 
information about the telecoms markets recently was not pleasing because of all the 
accounting frauds in the USA, which affected some telecoms companies, which in turn, 
has affected the performance of most of the stock markets worldwide. 
The next chapter will comprise a conclusion and a review of the principal findings. In 
chapter 8, the aim is to highlight some of the future potential research issues that might 
arise. 
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Panel Illustration 7.1: BT's rights Issue panels 
Panel 7.1: BT's Strategic Risk at 2% 
Normal Distribution 
0.4 
0.3 
C 0.2 
N 
0.1 
0 
-5 -3 -1 135 
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Panel 7.2: Alternative risk at 25% (15% 
Normal Distribution 
0.4 
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Panel 7.3: BT's share price against the FTSE ALL SHARE index 
BT GROUP 
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Table 7.2: BT's rights issue result before its launch 
Time 
01/03/2001 
02/03/2001 
05/03/2001 
06/03/2001 
07/03/2001 
08/03/2001 
09/03/2001 
12/03/2001 
13/03/2001 
14/03/2001 
15/03/2001 
16/03/2001 
19/03/2001 
20/03/2001 
21/03/2001 
22/03/2001 
23/03/2001 
26/03/2001 
27/03/2001 
28/03/2001 
29/03/2001 
30/03/2001 
02/04/2001 
03/04/2001 
04/04/2001 
05/04/2001 
06/04/2001 
09/04/2001 
10/04/2001 
11/04/2001 
12/04/2001 
13/04/2001 
16/04/2001 
17/04/2001 
18/04/2001 
19/04/2001 
20/04/2001 
23/04/2001 
24/04/2001 
25/04/2001 
26/04/2001 
27/04/2001 
30/04/2001 
STDEV of Index 
Total 
BT 
981.1 
975.6 
1026 
1054.4 
1059.9 
1078.3 
1017.8 
978.3 
981.1 
944.4 
975.6 
926.1 
916.9 
958.2 
905.9 
860.1 
929.7 
953.6 
1004 
931.6 
951.8 
935.2 
916.9 
878.4 
942.6 
970.1 
967.3 
1010.4 
1052.6 
1045.3 
1056.3 
1056.3 
1056.3 
1021.4 
1071 
1065.4 
1089.3 
1076.5 
1091.1 
1063.6 
1008.6 
1008.6 
1023.3 
LOG BT 
-0.002441484 
0.021875569 
0.011858036 
0.002259495 
0.007474713 
-0.025077159 
-0.017190393 
0.001241222 
-0.016557297 
0.014115813 
-0.022613907 
-0.004335911 
0.019134194 
-0.024375907 
-0.022531312 
0.033793883 
0.011023411 
0.02236747 
-0.032504233 
0.009316221 
-0.007641202 
-0.008582525 
-0.018629646 
0.030635108 
0.012489069 
-0.001255317 
0.01893215 
0.017770028 
-0.003022415 
0.004546329 
0 
0 
-0.014591426 
0.020593617 
-0.002276778 
0.009634811 
-0.005133469 
0.005850522 
-0.011086227 
-0.023059365 
0 
0.00628401 
0.016193692 
FTSE All Share 
2761.9 
2740.78 
2769.31 
2803.36 
2802.39 
2801.54 
2765.17 
2723.05 
2673.94 
2634.53 
2677.87 
2610.41 
2603.23 
2640.38 
2592.76 
2492.75 
2527.94 
2599.54 
2661.69 
2618.96 
2609.32 
2628.67 
2623.46 
2556.1 
2582.67 
2620.96 
2613.47 
2636.55 
2695.37 
2693.03 
2685.22 
2685.22 
2685.22 
2682.45 
2740.94 
2737.07 
2744.41 
2741.02 
2729.44 
2725.24 
2741.75 
2776.77 
2787.7 
LOG FTSE LOG(BT)-LOG(INDEX) 
-0.003333774 
0.004497397 
0.005307298 
-0.000150298 
-0.000131747 
-0.005674991 
-0.006666221 
-0.007903958 
-0.00644851 
0.007086342 
-0.011080765 
-0.001196184 
0.006153894 
-0.007904116 
-0.017083593 
0.006088037 
0.012129743 
0.010260968 
-0.007028608 
-0.001601522 
0.003208726 
-0.000861622 
-0.011296607 
0.004491078 
0.006391475 
-0.001242874 
0.003818493 
0.009582378 
-0.000377199 
-0.001261318 
0 
0 
-0.000448238 
0.009367893 
-0.000613624 
0.001163089 
-0.000536789 
-0.001838653 
-0.000668797 
0.002623097 
0.005512056 
0.001706126 
0.006229874 
-0.008671358 
0.015645695 
0.005628163 
-0.003970379 
0.001244839 
-0.031307032 
-0.023420267 
-0.004988651 
-0.022787171 
0.00788594 
-0.028843781 
-0.010565785 
0.01290432 
-0.030605781 
-0.028761186 
0.02756401 
0.004793538 
0.016137597 
-0.038734107 
0.003086347 
-0.013871076 
-0.014812399 
-0.024859519 
0.024405235 
0.006259196 
-0.00748519 
0.012702276 
0.011540154 
-0.009252289 
-0.001683544 
-0.006229874 
-0.006229874 
-0.0208213 
0.014363744 
-0.008506652 
0.003404938 
-0.011363343 
-0.000379352 
-0.017316101 
-0.029289238 
-0.006229874 
0.000541366 
-0.242877766 
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Table 7.3: BT's rights issue after its 
launch 
Time 
29/06/2001 
02/07/2001 
03/07/2001 
04/07/2001 
05/07/2001 
06/07/2001 
09/07/2001 
10/07/2001 
11/07/2001 
12/07/2001 
13/07/2001 
16/07/2001 
17/07/2001 
18/07/2001 
19/07/2001 
20/07/2001 
23/07/2001 
24/07/2001 
25/07/2001 
26/07/2001 
27/07/2001 
30/07/2001 
31/07/2001 
01/08/2001 
02/08/2001 
03/08/2001 
06/08/2001 
07/08/2001 
08/08/2001 
09/08/2001 
10/08/2001 
13/08/2001 
14/08/2001 
15/08/2001 
16/08/2001 
17/08/2001 
20/08/2001 
21/08/2001 
22/08/2001 
23/08/2001 
24/08/2001 
27/08/2001 
28/08/2001 
29/08/2001 
30/08/2001 
31/08/2001 
Index STDEV 
Total 
BT LOG BT 
912.9 
951.7 0.018076862 
957.8 0.002774763 
937.4 -0.009349884 
940 0.001202904 
953.8 0.006329464 
930.8 -0.010600943 
937.4 0.003068575 
901.7 -0.01686288 
959.9 0.027163922 
984.4 0.010945613 
997.7 0.005828367 
973.7 -0.010574802 
978.3 0.002046884 
955.8 -0.010105027 
931.3 -0.011277423 
933.8 0.001164267 
926.7 -0.003314707 
927.2 0.00023426 
928.7 0.000702023 
967 0.017551029 
986.4 0.00862659 
996.6 0.004467819 
979.3 -0.007605128 
1006.9 0.012070586 
1017.6 0.004590757 
982.4 -0.015288745 
972.1 -0.004577411 
936.4 -0.016249538 
917 -0.009092069 
939.5 0.010527449 
936.4 -0.001435379 
933.3 -0.001440139 
915 -0.008600172 
867 -0.023401997 
868 0.000500628 
885.9 0.008864977 
919.6 0.016214261 
897.6 -0.010516119 
882.3 -0.007466565 
910.9 0.013854423 
910.9 0 
917 0.002898634 
905.8 -0.005337019 
876.2 -0.014429068 
861.9 -0.007146368 
0.010730961 
FTSE All Share 
2660.19 
2689.01 
2658.29 
2641.43 
2616.5 
2583.93 
2578.71 
2579.93 
2547.92 
2586.36 
2608.03 
2599.78 
2561.68 
2551.33 
2564.88 
2544.59 
2550.96 
2513.1 
2491.21 
2495.01 
2543.67 
2563.77 
2599.63 
2611.87 
2630.82 
2616.16 
2607.2 
2609.37 
2585.43 
2552.63 
2562.95 
2564.91 
2597.57 
2584.4 
2555.37 
2536.3 
2542.43 
2573.14 
2567.5 
2562.61 
2593.61 
2593.61 
2578.55 
2570.95 
2534.7 
2539.06 
LOG FTSE LOG(BT)-LOG(INDEX) 
0.004679761 
-0.00499006 
-0.002763252 
-0.004118367 
-0.005439995 
-0.00087824 
0.000205418 
-0.005422135 
0.006503187 
0.003623608 
-0.001375984 
-0.006411721 
-0.001758242 
0.002300415 
-0.003449235 
0.001085833 
-0.006493879 
-0.003799432 
0.000661952 
0.008388477 
0.003418293 
0.006032479 
0.002040017 
0.003139578 
-0.002426834 
-0.001489954 
0.000361318 
-0.004002881 
-0.005544915 
0.001752265 
0.000331997 
0.005495129 
-0.002207528 
-0.00490594 
-0.00325317 
0.001048383 
0.005214412 
-0.000952964 
-0.000827936 
0.005222155 
0 
-0.002529115 
-0.001281927 
-0.006167066 
0.000746399 
0.003882317 
0.014194545 
-0.001107553 
-0.0132322 
-0.002679412 
0.002447148 
-0.01448326 
-0.000813742 
-0.020745196 
0.023281605 
0.007063296 
0.00194605 
-0.014457119 
-0.001835433 
-0.013987344 
-0.01515974 
-0.00271805 
-0.007197023 
-0.003648057 
-0.003180294 
0.013668712 
0.004744273 
0.000585502 
-0.011487445 
0.008188269 
0.000708441 
-0.019171061 
-0.008459728 
-0.020131855 
-0.012974386 
0.006645132 
-0.005317696 
-0.005322456 
-0.012482489 
-0.027284313 
-0.003381689 
0.00498266 
0.012331944 
-0.014398436 
-0.011348882 
0.009972106 
-0.003882317 
-0.000983683 
-0.009219336 
-0.018311384 
-0.011028685 
-0.199670585 
- 276 - 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
8.1 Commentary and contextual material 
When a company transfers from the state into the private sector, the financial performance 
of the company changes, as indicated in the literature review. The research has shown that 
the privatised telecoms companies perform equally as well as their private counterparts. 
Privatisation has been the main financial and economic issue in the developed and 
developing countries. There were many debates on whether or not privatisation would 
increase the performance of state-owned enterprises. Many studies have claimed that the 
SOEs would improve their efficiency in the post-privatisation period. 
The improvement of these state-owned enterprises can be difficult to measure, since many 
have been a transfer of the state monopoly to private monopoly. The telecoms companies 
are good example of this, where most of the privatised national enterprises retained the 
fixed line facility. The test for improved privatised performance must be based on the 
contestability of the market. 
In spite of the limitation imposed by Oftel in 1984, BT has remained the prime supplier 
partly through the inertia of consumers and the dominant brand image of BT. The primary 
gateways are still under monoply control of BT. However, there are changes to BT's 
control of the network, which since 2002 they are obliged by the regulator to make greater 
and lower cost provision for their competitors in order to allow for more competition. It is 
noticeable, however, that BT's broadband service, recently launched, is in direct 
competition with other service providers, who are obliged to lease the BT lines, thus 
placing them at a distinct disadvantage. 
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An example of BT's weakening hold on the market was exemplified by the rise and 
success of competitors in the mobile market sector, where Vodafone and Orange have 
established themselves as market leaders and BT's product Cellnet has had to be revived 
through rebranding to MMO2, which has now been profitably demerged, in the hope of 
recovering lost market share (Financial Times, pp. 23,24,30th May 2002). Adapting the 
new technologies has been difficult for BT, and most of the privatised telecoms companies. 
They are having difficulty in competing with specialised mobile operators. France, 
Germany and Japan telecoms have and are suffering in this contestable market. 
However, BT signalled on the 2 °d of October its intention to return to the consumer market 
in mobiles after the demerger of MMO2 recognising the growth prospect for a large service 
provider depend upon increasing market penetration and market share through new 
products and services. Mobile Sense is to be marketed solely over the internet, thereby 
attracting a particular segment of the phone user market (Financial Times, Oct. 2nd 2002, p. 
26). Says Law of the market states "supply creates its own demand". As in this case, BT is 
creating supply before there is a known demand for their product. 
Most of the telecoms companies in other countries followed the same pathway to 
privatisation as BT. In Qatar, Q-Tel followed BT's strategy as did most of the European 
telecoms companies, such as France, Deutsche, Italy, Spain and Netherlands telecoms. 
These companies have retained their private monopoly of fixed lines with regulatory 
agencies to monitor the charges and regulate the behaviour of these businesses. 
It was interesting to note that BT's lines were the focus of a partial bid when their debts 
rose as a consequence of the 3G payments for licences. The German state owned 
Westdeutsche Landesbank made an £ 18bn offer to buy these assets, recognising the true 
worth of the fixed line rental monopoly ( Financial Times, p. 25, May 3`d 2002). 
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The technological changes, and the new agency rules such as the WTO rules on 
competition internationally and the European Monopolies Commission policy, again on 
competition rules, may enforce liberalisation of the markets. However, to what extent these 
policies will impinge on the performance of the major telecoms companies is as yet to be 
demonstrated. 
It was always going to be difficult to measure precisely the financial performance of the 
major players in the industry, because of their widespread investments in parallel industries 
and products. Indeed as recent reports inform us the accounting practises and the regulation 
of the markets have highlighted a further difficulty in using purely accounting information, 
as evidenced by "ENRON and WorldCom"(Financial Times, pp. 1,18,21,22 June 27th 
2002), and a later accounting scandal case of Xerox (Financial Times, p. 26, July 1" 2002). 
8.2 Testing 
Nevertheless, a comparison of the financial performance of the privatised and non- 
privatised (private based) companies was analysed in this thesis. Most of the other studies 
focused on how to measure the financial performance of companies in pre and post 
privatisation periods (La porta and Lopez-De-Silence 1999; D'Souze, Bortolotti, Fantini 
and Megginson, 2001; see the methodology chapter 3). A comparison of either privatised, 
or private, with state-owned firms was also made to identify to what extent privatisation 
was a real benefit in financial terms (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Pohl, Anderson, 
Claessens and Djankov, 1997; refer to the methodology chapter 3). 
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Although systematic risk is emphasised in the financial literature, unsystematic risk 
(proxied by the standard deviation) was shown to be a significant variable as a financial 
determinant of performance of the combined privatised and non-privatised groups, and re- 
enforced the other measures. The results proved, however, that there were no significant 
differences between the two groups in our data set. 
In the ANOVA test, beta was a significant determinant of performance and this result has 
agreed with previous studies, such as Clare, Priestley and Thomas (1988), and the result 
disagreed with Chan and Chui (1996), and Fama and French (1992). For a further analysis 
of this debate, see chapter 3. 
Similarly the use of the ANOVA and multiple regression tests demonstrated that again 
there were no significant differences between the two ownership groups. In chapter 4, the 
general hypothesis 1 states that the privatised telecoms companies perform differently from 
their non-privatised (private) counterparts, given the present contestability, so the 
hypothesis is rejected. 
What makes it interesting is that the standard deviation of earnings has been a valuable 
measure in examining the financial performance of privatised and non-privatised groups. 
This result could contribute to further research and investigation, and the unsystematic risk 
can be used as a vital measure when examining other comparative financial statistics. 
In chapter 5, BT, AT&T and NTT were examined as the biggest three telecoms companies. 
BT was partially privatised in 1984, and fully privatised in 1993, AT&T was a part of the 
Bell group as a private based company, whereas NTT was part privatised in 1985 with the 
Japanese government still retaining more than 50 per cent of NTT as of the 2002 financial 
year (Megginson, 2000). 
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The main reason behind testing these three companies was to discover where BT stands 
financially compared to the other two companies, and to see whether or not the financial 
performance of these companies are related to each other, or more related to their local 
markets (see chapter 5). 
From the financial examination undertaken, the results showed that the financial 
performance indicators of the three telecoms companies were not normally distributed. 
However, the BT measure was close to being normally distributed according to the 
standard skewness and standard kurtosis result (see chapter 5). 
Tests revealed that the three companies' data sets demonstrated no sign of autocorrelation 
(Durbin-Watson statistic test), and that they were related to each other, but the results 
indicated that these companies are related more to their markets than to each other. 
The downside risk indicated that BT was more of a safe investment than both AT&T and 
NTT. The overall results of the investigation supporting this thesis is that BT performed 
better than AT&T and NTT over the whole period. Applying a one year ahead forecast, BT 
and NTT have positive results, whereas AT&T had a negative result, but BT still performs 
better than NTT. The forecasting undertaken in chapter 5 reveals a superior performance 
by BT, whereas the competitive advantage forecast in chapter 6 reveals that both BT and 
NTT have positive results, but AT&T has a negative outcome (as revealed in chapters 5 
and 6). One can conjecture that these results were influenced by the contestability factor 
(the degree of liberalisation in the market place) in that the privatised monopolies with the 
security of line rental have a competitive advantage over others who have to struggle for 
market share. 
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In part fulfilment of hypothesis 1, the two hypotheses in chapter 5 are pertinent. 
H2: The financial performance of each company is positively related to that of the other 
companies. The rationale is that, in the telecoms market, companies would be affected by 
similar technological factors. This can be represented by 02,133 >0 where the financial 
performance of company j at time t is given by fj, t. So, for the first company: 
f l, t =a+ 
02f2, 
t+ 
P3f 3, t (Equation 5.1) 
This hypothesis stands. 
H3: In a global market, company performance is related more closely to the sector (i. e. 
other respective companies) than each respective stock market. This can be represented by: 
f i, t =a+ 
ß2f 2, t+ 
P43, 
t+ y Fi, t 
(Equation 5.2) 
where Fl, t represents the performance of the stock market index of the chosen company 1, 
and the y coefficient is less significant than ß2 and ß3. 
This hypothesis is rejected. 
The competitive advantage model, a theoretical work introduced by Pointon (2002), has 
been used empirically for the first time, and proved to be important for this thesis. The 
original formula was not entirely appropriate for these telecoms companies, so a revised 
model was introduced, called Al-Shafi's method, which takes into consideration: the 
dividend growth model, the PE ratio inverse, the CAPM rate and an earnings based model, 
in order to calculate the competitive advantage in this case (see chapters 3 and 6). 
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By using the competitive advantage model, it has been shown that of the three companies: 
from 1990-93, AT&T had a competitive advantage over the others; from 1993-2000, it was 
the turn of BT; and projecting from 2001-2005, it would appear that NTT will have the 
competitive advantage. 
The competitive advantage model indicated that BT was the dominant firm overall 
according to the study period. The forecasted competitive advantage was that both BT and 
NTT's measures will increase over the forecasted period from 2002 to 2005. 
The estimated risk premia at 3,4,5 and 6 per cent have been used to examine the 
competitive advantage. The overall result indicated that the 4 per cent risk premium 
provides the most plausible explanation in examining BT, AT&T and NTT, because the 
result has shown that the competition between the companies in the global sphere is more 
visible. 
In order to examine their performance from a wider stakeholder perspective, the WACC 
approach was adopted using the average of the dividend growth model and earnings based 
model instead of the CAPM model. The CAPM suffers from the difficulty of the time 
dimension, and that the risk premium values are dependent on the state of the market at a 
given time. The WACC result showed that BT outperformed both AT&T and NTT, 
whereas NTT had consistently the lowest performance over the time period chosen. In part 
of fulfilment of hypothesis 1, the hypotheses in chapter 6 are: 
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H4: In terms of competitive advantage, NTT exhibits through time a superior position 
compared with BT and AT&T on account of its monopoly position. This hypothesis is 
rejected for the study period, but accepted in the forecasted period (2002-2005). 
H5: Of the three global players, AT&T is more adversely affected in its competitive 
advantage position by the other two companies on account of its having a weaker 
monopoly position. This hypothesis stands. 
8.3 Financial Strategies 
Despite the high and negative figures for 2001, BT's management planned to reduce their 
debts from 01 bn to less than £20bn by December 2002, by raising £5.9bn through a rights 
issue, and by selling some of their aquisitions to generate another £5bn (see BT annual 
report 2001). The company managed to raise that amount to pay some of its debts (see BT 
annual report, 2002). The 2002 figures reveal an improved position for BT as a 
consequence of the debt reduction occasioned by a fortuitous rights issue. 
Another good example of a similar financial difficulty in the telecoms industry is France 
Telecom, whose share price was 11.82 euros as of July 2"d 2002, where it dropped from 
being 200 euros as of March 2000. The French company had a huge debt and the debt level 
was forecasted to reach of 70bn euros (£45.2bn) by the end of 2002 (Financial Times, p. 
21, July 2 "d 2002). In October we read that the debt will be partially reduced through a 
rights issue substantially supported by the French government, which still retains 54 per 
cent of the equity. It is argued, however, that the market will re-rate the debt of France 
Telecom despite this reduction, since the onus of the debt will remain with France Telecom 
(Financial Times, Oct 16th 2002, p. 30). 
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According to forecasts BT's management is set to reach its target of annual growth in 
earnings of 25 per cent until 2005. The new mobile services should generate annual 
revenue of £500m by 2005 and the revenues are expected to grow by 35 per cent a year 
until 2005. The pre-tax profits are set to increase to £2. lbn in 2003-04 (Investor Chronicle, 
2002: 22-23; Financial Times, May 17th 2002: 23; and Financial Times, May 17th 2002: 24). 
However, a recent article in FT by Robert Budden reports that Ben Verwaayen, the new 
chief executive of BT, has had to reduce his forecast of growth, which had been 6 to 8 per 
cent annualised growth to 2.8 per cent. This suggests the telecoms market growth rate will 
match the national growth rate of the UK (FT, Nov. 1" 2002, p. 1). 
According to Key Note (2001: 25) reports, most of the Europe's operators have already 
spent 120 billion Euros on 3G licences and now face a similar bill to construct networks 
(while realising that services will not actually get started in earnest until at least 2003 or 
2004). There is a difficulty in implementing the 3G mobile services and according to the 
financial press, it is expected to be delayed. 
It can be argued that the telecoms industry as a whole has faced times of financial 
difficulty in 2000 and 2001 and this difficulty might remain for a few years to come. This 
difficulty is derived mainly from three problems. First, the competition is intensified 
gradually every year, while we see new entrants enter the market. Second, technology and 
liberalisation, have changed the telecoms markets everywhere. This indeed created many 
new companies in mobile and internet services, which the market as a whole could not 
absorb. Third, many telecoms companies have borrowed huge amounts of money to fund 
for the 3G services, which might or might not, be a successful service. According to 
Fransman (2002) some of this could have been foreseen if the dynamics of the new 
telecoms industry had been more rigorously analysed (Financial Times, Oct 16th 2002, p. 
15). 
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The current unstable state of the world telecommunications industry has its roots in the 
over-expansion of the industry since 1996. Between 1996 and 2001, analysts estimate that 
bank loans to the sector exceeded $900bn in syndicated loans, the bond market may have 
provided at least $400bn and $500bn was raised from private equity and stock market 
issues, and nearly half of European bank lending in 1999 was to telecoms companies (Key 
Note, 2001: 48). 
There are four factors that characterise the future telecoms system. First, is broadband 
communications, which make it possible to transfer large enough quantities of data to have 
one-to-one transfer of real-time moving pictures (video) and sound to make them 
interactive. Second, is mobility so that these systems can be accessed from virtually 
anywhere on the globe. Third, wireless communication, making all services accessible 
through a handset. Fourth, Multimedia and Internet technologies constitute the major 
networks and protocols in the `Information Super Highway' (Eliassen and Sjovaag, 
1999: 269). 
Even though there are some financial difficulties facing the telecoms worldwide, the 
growth of new technologies and services such as the internet, cable TV, new broadcasting 
services and new switching and transmission technologies have enabled new participants 
to enter telecommunications field. Increasing private participation and foreign investments 
will allow the telecoms industries to spread globally and will increase the degree of 
competition to launch new technological products and the prices of services are likely to 
dramatically decrease. 
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8.4 Overall conclusion 
Against this background, this research has demonstrated that there are no significant 
differences between the privatised and non-privatised (private) groups. The unsystematic 
risk rather than beta, has been identified as a significant variable that can be used again in 
future research as one of key variables in the determination of financial performance. 
In examining the three biggest telecoms companies, the analysis revealed that the financial 
performance of these three companies are generally related to each other; they move in the 
same direction. This suggests that the companies may employ the same finance and 
management strategies. However, they are more related to their financial stock markets 
indices. 
The forecast has shown that AT&T is not performing well at this time and the forecasted 
results in chapters 5 and 6 for the future performance and the future competitive advantage 
indicate that AT&T will not be performing well in the future. The Financial Times article 
of July 10th 2002 "AT&T poised to tumble out of Dow" on page 26, agrees with the 
forecasting for AT&T. The company is now breaking up, and it has done so by the end of 
2002. There is a possibility of a take-over by SBC communications in the USA. 
For BT, the rights issue was a successful strategic move and as a result they may have 
avoided some of the financial problems of their immediate competitors. 
The general hypothesis 1 that the privatised telecoms companies perform differently from 
their non-privatised (private) counterparts, given the present contestability, is rejected. 
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8.5 Limitations and directions for further research studies 
The limitations to the present study were that: (1) the analysis was conditional on accepting 
the present levels of contestability in the telecoms sector and therefore, although the 
general hypothesis was not accepted, it is not certain this would apply if the chosen 
industries had a greater contestability; (2) the research has thrown up a valuable tool for 
assessing the degree of competitive advantage, such a model might well be extendable to 
other sectors of industry on a cross country basis; and (3) the use of unsystematic risk, as a 
means of analysing the financial performance of the companies chosen has been the 
preferred choice to the beta measure, and this may well be applied in other scenarios for 
further research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Privatisation World-wide 
Table (1) Privatisation revenues in East Asia and Pacific, 1990-98 (millions of US$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
China - 11 1,262 2,849 2,226 649 919 9,120 611 17,647 
Indonesia - 190 14 31 1,748 2,031 1,008 141 122 5,285 
Malaysia 375 387 2,883 2,148 798 2,519 214 704 - 10,028 
Philippines - 244 754 1,638 494 207 22 371 - 3,730 
Thailand - - 238 471 242 - 291 48 353 1,643 
Other 1 2 10 18 - 4 226 - 5 266 
Total 376 834 5,161 7,155 5,508 5,410 2,680 10,680 1,091 36,600 
Source: World Bank Privatisation Database, 1998 
Table (2) Privatisation revenues in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990-98 (millions of US$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Argentina 7,532 2,841 5,741 4,670 894 1,208 642 4,366 510 28,404 
Bolivia - - 9 13 - 789 34 40 10 895 
Brazil 44 1,633 2,401 2,621 2,104 992 5,770 18,737 32,427 66,729 
Chile 98 364 8 106 128 13 187 - 181 1,085 
Columbia - 168 5 391 170 - 2,075 2,876 518 6,203 
Peru - 3 212 127 2,840 1,276 1,751 1,268 480 7,957 
Venezuela 10 2,278 140 36 8 39 2,017 1,387 112 6,028 
Other 71 147 120 393 1,289 132 140 726 2,447 5,466 
Total 10,915 18,723 15,560 10,488 8,199 4,616 14,142 33,897 37,685 154,225 
Source: World Bank Privatisation Database, 1998 
Table (3) Privatisation revenues in European and Central Asia, 1990-98 (millions of US$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Bulgaria - - - 45 147 111 48 525 569 1,445 
Czech Rep. - - 9 645 7 1,645 - 72 181 2,549 
Hungary 483 798 779 1,685 1,507 3,988 945 2,139 342 12,666 
Poland 62 338 240 733 641 980 605 2,246 2,436 8,281 
Russia - 35 88 110 - 1,002 1,192 4,177 909 7,513 
Turkey 437 212 780 483 354 572 297 465 1,016 4,617 
Other 280 1,168 1,739 287 1,301 1,444 2,379 6,913 2,550 18,060 
Total 1,261 2,551 3,626 3,988 3,957 9,742 5,466 16,537 8,002 55,131 
Source: World Bank Privatisation Database, 1998 
Table (4) Privatisation revenues in Middle East and North Africa, 1990-98 (millions of US$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Egypt - - - 118 393 262 1,150 
855 539 3,317 
Morocco - - - 273 347 240 271 716 
92 1,940 
Tunisia 2 17 60 - - 32 36 3 364 514 
Other - - 9 26 42 212 
21 38 5 353 
Total 2 17 69 417 782 746 1,478 1,612 1000 6,124 
Source: World Bank Privatisation Database, 1998 
Al 
Table (5) Privatisation revenues in South Asia, 1990-98 (millions of US$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Bangladesh - - - 43 12 5 - - - 60 
India - 931 1,098 861 1,505 810 495 1,373 52 7,125 
Pakistan 11 63 343 17 1,106 36 317 58 41 1,992 
Sri Lanka 18 2 105 52 42 65 77 631 81 802 
Other - - 11 1 1 - - 2 - 15 
Total 29 996 1,557 974 2,666 916 889 1,794 174 9,995 
Source: World Bank Privatisation Database, 199 
Table (6) Privatisation revenues in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-98 (millions of US$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Cote'd Ivo. - 2 10 5 19 74 103 263 94 570 
Ghana 10 3 15 28 476 87 186 68 21 893 
Kenya 12 1 12 10 19 13 137 24 30 258 
mozambique 3 5 9 6 2 26 38 21 29 139 
Nigeria 16 35 114 541 24 - - - - 730 
South Afr. - 1,073 - - - - 122 1,287 247 2,729 
Tanzania - - 3 27 5 77 13 16 111 252 
Uganda - - 12 19 24 47 30 20 15 167 
Zambia - - - 3 14 69 30 302 409 827 
Zimbabwe - - - - 13 75 - 110 - 198 
Other 33 2 32 2 9 5 86 238 402 809 
Total 74 1,121 207 641 605 473 745 2,348 1,356 7,571 
Source: World Bank Privatisation Database, 1998 
Table (7) Privatisation by sector, 1990-1998 (millions of U. S. dollars) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Infrastructure 9,704 6,863 9,715 5,360 9,399 9,240 15,063 37,370 39,964 142,677 
Telec6ms. . 7,643 5,981 '3,007 1,083 6,069 3,691 3,814 12,863 26,619 70,771 
Power 59 359 4,892 1,741 2,180 4,523 6,156 17,979 9,994 47,882 
Manufacturing 1,402 5,558 7,188 7,491 6,091 5,787 3,546 7,795 2,167 47,025 
Steel 185 2,145 1,614 2,900 1,219 135 193 916 3 9,310 
Chemicals 156 466 315 415 1,285 291 488 1,222 514 5,152 
Construction 196 484 732 491 790 592 745 318 718 5,066 
Other manuf. 864 2,462 4,528 3,685 2,798 4,769 2,120 3,743 932 25,901 
Primary 
sector 
1,367 3,608 3,394 6,215 4,068 4,336 2,787 12,932 3,125 41,832 
Petroleum 568 2,085 2,760 5,162 2,115 2,781 1,687 7,956 1,975 27,089 
Mining 485 235 382 187 1,220 618 468 4,418 971 8,984 
Financial 
services 
47 7,793 5,263 3,411 1,065 1,933 2,895 3,445 3,149 29,001 
Banking 47 7,505 5,099 2,464 779 1,853 2,646 3,055 2,471 25,919 
Other 
services 
138 420 621 1,184 1,088 606 1,108 5,031 905 11,100 
Total 12,658 24,242 26,181 23,661 21,712 21,901 25,399 66,573 49,309 271,636 
Source: World Bank Privatisation Database, 1998. 
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Appendix 2: Major privatisation companies in fix+ 1_ K- 
Companies Date of 
first sale 
Industry Proceeds 
£m 
British Petroleum 1977 Oil 6,053 
National Enterprise Board Investments 1980 Various 354 
British Aerospace 1981 Aerospace 390 
Cable and Wireless 1981 Telecommunications 192 
Amersham International 1982 Scientific products 64 
National Freight Corporation 1982 Road Transport 5 
Britoil plc 1982 Oil 1,078 
British Rail Hotel 1983 Hotels - 
Associated British Ports 1983 Ports 97 
British Leyland (Rover) 1984 Automotive 150 
British Telecom 1984 Telecommunications 16,138 
Enterprise Oil 1984 Oil 384 
Sealink 1984 Sea Transport - 
British Shipbuilders and Naval Dockyards 1985 Shipbuilding - 
National Bus Company 1986 Transport - 
British Gas 1986 Gas 8,141 
Rolls-Royce 1987 Aero Engine 1,032 
British Airports Authority 1987 Airports - 
British Airways 1987 Airline 854 
Royal Ordnance Factories 1987 Armaments 186 
British Steel 1988 Steel 2,425 
Water 1989 Water 3,468 
Electricity industries 1990 Electricity 15,474 
Trusts Ports 1992 Ports - 
British Coal 1993 Coal 925 
Railways 1995 Railways 1,121 
British Energy 1996 Energy - 
Total 58,531 
Source: HMSO (1998) Information on Privatisation in the UK, February 1998, pp. 21-22 
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Appendix 3: BT Privatisation Timetable 
I. First offer 
First offer for sale Date Amount 
First instalment 28 November 1984 £0.50 
First day of dealing 3 December 1985 
Second instalment 24 June 1985 £0.40 
Final instalment 9 April 1986 £0.40 
Total payable £1.30 
source: li l (I99 ), investor relation (see www. bt. com). 
II. Second offer 
Second offer for 
sale 
Date Amount UK offer Amount 
International offer 
First instalment 6 December 1991 £1.10 £1.25 
First day of dealing 9 December 1991 
Second instalment 7 July 1992 £1.20 £1.20 
Final instalment 2 March 1993 £1.05 £1.05 
Total payable £3.35 £3.50 
source: li l (19yä), Investor relation (see www. bt. com). 
III. Third offer 
Third offer for sale Date Amount UK offer Amount 
International offer 
First instalment 14 July 1993 £1.50 £1.60 
First day of dealing 19 July 1993 
Second instalment 1 March 1994 £1.40 £1.40 
Final instalment 11 October 94 £1.20 £1.20 
Total payable £4.10 £4.20 
Source: BT (1998), Investor relation (see w, %vw. bt. com). 
In November 1984, the UK government offered a total of up to 3,012 million of the 
company's shares for sale in the UK and elsewhere. All of those shares were taken up. 
In December 1991, the UK government sold over half its remaining shares in BT, retaining 
a holding of about 22 per cent. It sold this holding in July 1993. 
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Appendix 4: The rest of the privatisation issues 
1. Privatisation methods 
(a) Restitution and reprivatisation 
Rondinelli (1995: 12,1991), Canning and Hare (1994: 197) stated that the restitution and 
reprivatisation has been used in the government of Germany, Hungarian government and 
in the former Czechoslovakia. 
(b) Auctioning of small companies 
According to Luders (1993) Chile used managed auctions during the late 1970s and early 
1980s to sell both small and large state enterprises. The Chile government allowed the 
bidders to offer cash or credit terms for shares in SOEs. 
(c) Mass Privatisation 
(1) Direct Sale 
Hinds (1995: 187), Pavlin (1995), Goad (1992: 24), Denton (1992: 4), Ralph (1997: 155), and 
Smith (1990: 49) they stated that the direct sale been used extensively in Guyana, Slovania, 
Singapore government, Trinidad and Tobago, in Central European countries, and in 
Canada. 
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(2) Stock offerings (Public share offering) 
Kelegama (1997: 170, and p. 195), Cezley (1995: 209), Gomulka and Jasinski (1994: 233), 
Greenidge (1997: 107), Ralph (1997: 155) and Newman (1986) argued that the stock 
offerings method is used in UK, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Poznan, Guyana and Trinidad and 
Tobago, and some European countries such as France and Germany. 
BT was privatised through the public share offerings method in 1984 (see Megginson, 
2000). 
(3) Liquidation 
According to Luders (1993: 107), Bobinski (1992: 4), Gomulka and Jasinski (1994: 23 1) the 
liquadiation method has been excercised in Chile, Poland, and some former Communist 
countries. 
(4) Employee or management buy-outs 
Vacha (1995: 63), Eardley (1995: 234), Bouin and Michalet (1991: 135), Bos and Gunter 
(1997: 80) state that the employee or management buy-outs method is being used in Poland, 
in former Czechosolvakia, Sri Lanks, and some other countries 
(d) Public distribution of shares 
Rondinelli (1995: 17), Vacha (1995: 61), Ryszard (1997: 261), argued that the public 
distribution of shares are obvious in countries such as Mongolia, former Czechoslovakia, 
Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Poland and Romania. 
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A paper was presented to Commission of the European Communities in 1991, indicated 
that Romania government issued a free certificate of ownership in Private Ownership 
Funds to all citizens over 18 years of age to obtain some shares in more than 2,000 large 
state companies (see Ewing, Lee and Leeds, 1993). 
(e) Marketisation or demonopolisation 
According to Rondinelli (1995: 18) in Malaysia, the government has already corporatised 
several ports, the National Board and Sabah Gas Industries; and it is planning to 
restructure the Selangor Water Supply Company, several airports, the postal service and 
railway system. 
(f) Public service contacting 
1) Service contacts 
According to McBain (1997: 213), Savas (1990: 232), Rondinelli (1995: 19), the services 
contracts have been in countries such as Jamaica, United States, in Latin America such as 
Chile and Guatemala governments. 
A published paper by US Agency for International Development shows that Peru 
government contacts out activities in water supply, such as meter-reading, computer 
services, billing and collection to private companies (see Maureen Lewis and Miller, 
1986). 
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(2) Management contracts 
Kean (1988: 1-2), McBain (1997: 209), Bouin and Michalet (1991: 139), and Rondinelli 
(1995: 19) said that the management contracts have been famous projects in Malaysia (see 
Woon 1989), in Guyana, Jamaica, Morocco, Ghana, and both Canada and United States. 
(3) Lease contacts 
Kozachenko, Monakov and prokopenko (1995: 128), Kelegama (1997: 187), McBain 
(1997: 214), and Vocha (1995: 55) have shown that the lease contracts are used in Ukraine, 
Sri Lanka, Caribbean states and in both Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
(g) Public private partnership 
According to Chi (1998) the public private partnership programmes are used mostly in 
correction, health care, mental health and retardation and transportation. 
(1) Joint ventures 
Cooper and Johri (1995: 150), Rowley and Lewis (1996), Rondinelli (1995: 2 1), and Ralph 
(1997: 155) stated that the joint ventures are used in countries such as Canada, China 
government, and in both Trinidad and Tobago government. 
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(2) Build-operate-transfer agreements 
Hensley and White (1993), Central Bank of Oman (1998), and Rondinelli (1995: 22), they 
said that the BOT method is used in Malaysian, Oman, and in Indonesia. 
(3) Joint investment 
According to Yeh (1990), and Rondinelli (1995: 23), the joint investment method has been 
in the Hong Kong and India governments. 
(h)Transferring services to private or non-governmental organisations 
A paper was published in California University (1981) showed that every cooperative 
organisations or clubs or religions communities can participate in the public provision in 
some services in Asia countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (see Ralston, 
1981), and in Canada (Veit, 1990: 207). 
2. Comments on privatisation's methods 
A public share offerings of shares has understandable political appeal. However, it is risky 
for a small investor to participate in such a highly risky equity market. Small investors can 
suffer from a lack of legal information, little legal appeal in the event of distortion and 
typically a lack of experience to make good decisions in the market. 
A private shares sale to corporate buyers, more wisely by tender, may represent a good 
privatisation technique, because new owners take the lead in transforming the enterprise 
into a feasible business. However, the problem with private sale of shares to corporate 
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buyers is how many potential buyers there are. There is a possibility of too few compared 
to the number of assets to be sold. 
Mass privatisation or free distribution schemes can create a broad ownership position that 
balances efficiency, information needs and corporate structure with a fair distribution of 
property, and may require the creation of an investment portfolio, such as mutual funds. 
However, mass privatisation has risks that are significant in that if strong intermediaries do 
not arise, the large number of shareholders make corporate governance ineffective. 
Sales of assets through liquidation may be good, even though there is potentially a heavy 
social and economic cost to be paid by this method. Management and employee buyouts 
can also be used especially where there are not attractive private sector buyers. The two 
main difficulties here are fairness and whether or not the acting management can improve 
the performance of the enterprise in question. Management contracts are an effective way 
of bringing in foreign expertise, without the risk of investment, but they are expensive and 
should not be used in highly uncertain environments where foreign interest would not 
otherwise exist. 
3. The process of privatisation 
Whatever the objectives and whatever the approach to be taken or adopted, the overriding 
rule is that each privatisation must be successful if the momentum of a privatisation 
programme is not to be lost. The privatisation process needs a careful preparation to path 
the way for successful programme. 
The process its self has a complexity connects to it and it will vary from one privatisation 
to another depending on the type of privatisation that is taken. For example, a trade sale or 
an employee buy-out will require less preparation, whereas the more sophisticated form of 
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privatisation is the flotation on a stock exchange and it is the widely known method. This 
type involves far greater effort and a lengthy period of preparation. 
Ernst and Young corporation (1999: 4-5) is specialised and has done many privatisation 
programmes worldwide and in the developing countries, has explained in more details that 
the privatisation process goes through series of channels, such as corporatisation; 
feasibility; preparation for sale; vesting; marketing the shares; and after the sale. Lets 
consider each one of these process individually. 
(a) Corporatisation 
The preparation does not necessarily start with the decision to privatise. If there is a state- 
run organisation of some size, various aspects of which are controlled by different parts of 
government; and organisation evolved over time, possibly into an unwieldy combination of 
activities. Government has to decide how those activities can be molded together to 
improve efficiency and results, with the possibility of privatisation in the future. Specialists 
are engaged to help the government to asses how best to proceed through passing 
legislation, and the government will be able to target its defined structure and improve the 
focus and performance (see Ramanadham 1988, for more details). 
The UK government has done some changes internally for BT. They have reorganise BT 
through cultural transformation, which is the change in the dominant behavioral norms, 
value systems and the spirit of the organisation through recruting senior managers 
committed to changing the SOE to a more commercially viable corporation (see Hills, 
1986: 122). 
All 
The UK government has appointed Sir Jefferson (he was British Aerospace's chair) and 
Dyke Weyer (he was the financial manager in British Aerospace), both of them had a 
distinguished experience and they were committed to make BT more sensitive to 
consumers' needs and more profit oriented (see Zahariadis, 1995). 
(b) Feasibility 
The enterprise might be already in the form of a corporation, therefore the privatisation 
process begins with a feasibility study to consider the options. A team will be formed 
comprising civil servants and external consultants. The team will weigh the political 
sensitivities against the benefits to be gained and will look at how to achieve the transfer of 
ownership. 
There was a feasibility study done on BT before privatisation. After the feasibilty study, 
the UK government had two options available. One was to privatise BT through public 
share offerings method, and the other one was to break up BT. The UK government chose 
not to break up BT for few reasons. First, BT was the first public untility to denationalised; 
second, it meant to be the largest company flotation; and thirdly, it was considered as a 
national flagship with international potential and was politically aspirations and financial 
needs (see Kay, 1984). 
The UK government then finally decided to privatise BT through public share offerings 
and ignored the idea of breaking up BT. It seems that UK government was scared from 
future takeover threats. 
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(c) Preparation for the sale 
The amount of preparation necessary prior to a sale will vary. Normally, for major 
flotation, this preparatory period can take up to two years, but problems are encountered, 
the preparation might take longer. The government and the enterprise will have separate 
advisors. The government, as vendor, will be trying to achieve the most politically 
acceptable result, which will involve maximising the proceeds. The management of the 
enterprise, will need to take into the interests of investors-the purchasers- as future growth 
will have to be delivered. The opposing positions are tempered by the desire of both sides 
to see a successful flotation. 
The BT privatisation took very long time to prepare it for sale. It costed the government 
more than £270 millions for the preparation. It was worth it afterall, most of BT shares 
were sold immediately and were oversubscriped. The UK government had to adjust the 
shares distribution levels. They gave the priority to smaller investors to gain more shares 
than bigger investors and institutions. The updated shares information show that financial 
institutions own more than 50 per cent of BT's shares after small investors sold their shares 
for profit making (see Newman, 1986). 
The government had to change the management of BT before privatisation to prepare it for 
private enviornment culture and after the privatisation, the profit center management was 
established to provide a variety of incentives and penalities for managers, which force 
them to adopt a commercial, private sector style of management. This approach was later 
used for some privatisation companies, such as water industry (Davidson, 1993: 49). 
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(d) Vesting 
The business of the corporation is transferred into a limited company. A new capital 
structure is put in place, which requires a decision on the mix of equity and debt finance. 
The BT has gone through the process of transferring the company into limited company in 
1982, and BT's capital was structured before the privatisation took place (see Newman, 
1986; and Harper, 1997) 
(e) Marketing the shares 
For success, marketing is all-important. It is critical that the image of the business is 
improved. The promotional campaign will be strictly controlled and designed to link with 
the marketing of the flotation. This gradually will build to a peak just before the offer to 
subscribe for shares closes. It makes potential investors aware of the opportunity to invest 
and where and how they can obtain information about the share offer. 
BT was successfully privatised in 1984. In the first trading day, BT's shares made more 
than 70 % profit, and it was astonishing for the UK government and investors. Most of 
these small investors sold their shares in early stages after making big junk of profit and 
the financial institutions took over these shares and bought them directly from the small 
investors or through the stock market. The BT successful privatisation programme has 
encourged the UK government to privatise more companies to generate more profit for the 
government. 
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(f) After the sale 
Following flotation, share application audits may be conducted for investor protection. 
Management has to deliver the promises it made in the prospectus. In fact, it is worth 
remembering that throughout all the preparation, which involves an enormous commitment 
from the top management, that very same management has to keep running the business. 
The privatisation must be controlled and a feasible timetable established to ensure all 
issues are highlighted and tackled. Above all, it is down to flexibility, imagination, 
communication and cooperation (see Miller, 1994; and Hyman, 1988 for more details of 
preparation process). 
BT privatisation has gone through the privatisation process stages step by step. In 1980, 
BT was separated from the post office and UK government appointed Sir Jefferson 
(Chairman of British Aerospace) to restructure the company. In 1981, BT Telecom became 
a public corporation. On 19 July, 1982 the government announced its intention to sell up to 
51 per cent of British Telecom to the public. The government appointed advisory group to 
have a feasibility study of BT and to estimate its value. In 1984, BT was privatised (see BT 
1999; and Newman, 1986 for more details of the process). 
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See the graph of the privatisation process: 
Illustrative example not based on a particular case 
Public Corporation 
Stage 1 
Governed by statute 
Loan financed 
Public sector style administration 
1 
Feasibility Study 
Study undertaken by civil 
servants, investment banks or 
management consultants. 
Background & Options 
Report to Ministers on 
possibility, options and 
prerequisites of any sale 
Ministerial Decision 
Decision in principle to 
proceed, choice of option to be 
pursued. 
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Stage 2 This example assumes sale of the business as one unit by share flotation 
Select Advisor 
Investment bank advisors selected for advice leading up to sale also 
accounting and legal advisors. 
Prepare Business 
Strengthen 
management team 
Prepare Legislation 
Power to wind-up the 
public corporation and 
create PLC (Public 
Limited Company) 
Consider 
Regulation/Deregula 
tion 
Ensure management 
systems are suitable 
for private sector 
Improved 
results 
Stage 3 Consider 
Balance Sheet 
Adjust balance 
sheet if necessary 
Powers included to 
regulate or deregulate 
any monopoly 
business. 
Pass Legislation including any 
Regulatory Measures 
Power to create 
and sell PLC 
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Well Run PLC With Appropriate Balance Sheet 
Companies Act company; appropriate debt/equity ratio 
Commercially oriented management 
Reduced monopoly power; initial price caps set (for regulated companies). 
Stage 4 
Select/ Reselect 
Advisors for Sale 
Financial Legal 
and PR advisors 
ets. 
L 
Good results 
Develop 
corporate 
image and 
track record 
Develop offer structure 
Choose 
Market Slot 
Produce 
prospectus 
Marketing 
Retail 
Agree 
Timetable for 
listing 
Number of 
Shares to be 
Sold. 
Including path- 
finder and 
Mini- 
prospectus for 
retail investors 
-Advertising 
Campaign 
-Mass Mailing 
-Retail Incentives 
Institutional 
-Roadshows 
-Analysts Research 
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Final Decision 
Final go-ahead given 
Bookbuilding begins. 
SELL 
Priced announced 
100% (or lesser proportion 
but above 50% to achieve 
privatisation) sold 
Transfer of ownership 
from public sector to 
private sector 
completed 
Source: Her Majesty's Treasury (1998), "Information on privatisation in the UK", p. 28 
At the outset of the privatisation process, there are a number of strategic decisions that 
need to be made, which will determine the ultimate form the sale will take. These might 
include government fund-raising requirements, the timing of sale, or wider political 
objectives such as extending share ownership or expanding capital markets. These 
decisions will determine the type of sale that is appropriate, ranging from a public share 
issue to a management buy-out or a trade sale (Hyman, 1988). 
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4. Final comments 
Privatisation is unlike all other financial transactions. The differences arise because of size, 
political sensitivities, investor interest, and the complexity of privatisation's objectives. 
After a strategic evaluation has been taken, an enterprise will undergo an often-extensive 
process of preparation for life in the private sector. This will involve creating an 
appropriate legal form for the enterprise and creating a track record to attract investors. 
As the final form of the enterprise will often differ considerably from the form in, which it 
operated in the public sector, this can be a protracted process and will involve financial 
restructuring to make the business self-sufficient and commercially viable. As a final stage 
of the process, a valuation will need to be placed on the business and appropriate selling 
techniques developed to enable a successful privatisation (Grimstone, 1988). 
The governments worldwide try to increase the image of its enterprises before launching 
the privatisation programme. They increase the financial performance of their enterprises 
before privatisation by arranging the right strategy tools and proper funds to make the 
enterprise financially successful. The financial performance is considered to be the key 
aspect of the whole privatisation process. 
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Appendix 5: (UNCTAD Objectives) 
1. Encouraging and enhancing economic efficiency; 
2. Redefining the role of the state to allow it to concentrate on control and governing; 
3. Reducing the financial burdens allocated for public projects and enterprises; 
4. Reducing the level of debts; 
5. Freeing the limited financial resources of the state in order to finance other sectors such 
as education; 
6. Creating and establishing new investment including foreign private investment; 
7. Mobilizing local resources for development; 
8. Widening and expanding the ownership base; 
9. Spreading the habit of investment and developing it amongst the citizens in order to 
establish the knowledge of the ways and means of employing accumulated finances 
and consequently mobilizing their savings in the market; 
10. Creating new employment opportunities together with increasing investment and as a 
result the absorption of the annual increases in national labour; 
11. The possibility of allowing employees of the privatised corporations to subscribe and 
have shares in their capital; 
12. Reducing routing and widespread bureaucracy in the government civil service and 
administration because simplicity and directness characterize the management of the 
private sector; and 
13. Attracting back emigrant national capital as privatisation represents one of the tools 
and means of attracting back national capital abroad. 
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Appendix 6: The three companies history 
A. British Telecom Profile 
BT Group plc is the holding company for the BT Group of companies. The Company 
operates primarily through British Telecommunications plc (BT), a wholly owned 
subsidiary. 
BT's principal activities include local, long distance and international telecommunications 
services, Internet services and information technology (IT) solutions. In the United 
Kingdom, British Telecommunications plc serves 29 million exchange lines, as well as 
providing network services to other licensed operators. 
Geographically, British Telecommunications plc has operations worldwide, although it is 
its intention in the future to focus more on the United Kingdom and Western Europe. 
British Telecommunications plc is comprised of BT Ignite, BTopenworld, BT Retail, BT 
Wholesale, BTexact Technologies and BT Affinitis 
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B. History of NTT 
1985 April: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation established. 
1986 Oct. -Nov: 1.95 million government-owned shares of NTT stock sold. 
1987 Feb: NTT listed on stock exchanges in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Hiroshima, 
Fukuoka, Niigata, and Sapporo Initial Public Offering price: 1.6 million yen (Feb. 2, 
1987). 
1987 Nov: 1.95 million government-owned shares of NTT stock sold. 
1988 July: Sales activities covered by Central Data Communications Division transferred 
to NTT Data Corporation. 
1988 Oct.: 1.5 million government-owned shares of NTT stock sold. 
1992 July: Sales of car phones and other mobile phones transferred to NTT Mobile 
Communications Network, Inc. (NTT DoCoMo). 
1992 Dec.: Responsibility for electrical power and administration of construction and 
building management transferred to NTT Facilities, Inc. 
1994 Sep. 29: NTT listed on New York Stock Exchange 
1994 Oct. 12: NTT listed on London Stock Exchange 
1995 Apr. 26: NTT Data Communications Inc. listed Nov. Stocks held by shareholders 
(based on shareholders' register as of the end of September 1995) split at a ratio of 1 to 
1.02. 
1997 Sep.: Sales activities covered by Software Division transferred to NTT 
Communicationware Corp. 
1998 Oct. 22: NTT Mobile Communications Network, Inc. listed Dec. 1 million 
government-owned shares of NTT stock sold. 
1999 Jun. 29: 14th Regular General Meeting of Shareholders held Jul. 1 Reorganisation 
Jul. 13 NTT acquires common stock for treasury (48,898 shares). 
1999 Nov.: 952,000 million government-owned shares of NTT stock sold. 
2000 Feb.: Treasury stock acquired (28,512 shares) 
2000 Oct.: One million shares of government-owned NTT stock sold 
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C. History of AT&T corporation 
The history of AT&T is in large measure the history of the telephone in the United States. 
AT&T's roots stretch back to 1875, with founder Alexander Graham Bell's invention of the 
telephone. During the 19th century, AT&T became the parent company of the Bell System, 
the American telephone monopoly. 
The Bell System provided what was by all accounts the best telephone service in the world. 
The system broke up into eight companies in 1984 by agreement between AT&T and the 
U. S. Department of Justice. 
From 1984 until 1996 AT&T was an integrated telecommunications services and 
equipment company, succeeding in a newly competitive environment. Today, AT&T is 
rapidly evolving from a company that handles mostly long-distance voice calls to a family 
of four businesses that connects people to information in any form that is useful to them - 
voice, data and video, over any of three different networks-wireless, data and cable. 
On September 20,1995, AT&T announced that it was restructuring into three separate 
publicly traded companies: a systems and equipment company (which became Lucent 
Technologies, ) a computer company (NCR) and a communications services company 
(which would remain AT&T. ) It was the largest voluntary break-up in the history of 
American business 
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